

The UN Peacebuilding Commission and International Geneva

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On 20 December 2005, upon the recommendation of the United Nations (UN) Secretary-General, the Security Council and the General Assembly jointly established the new UN Peacebuilding Commission (PBC).¹ Located in New York, the Commission is responsible for addressing a critical gap within the United Nations and the global system by providing a coordinated, coherent and integrated approach to post-conflict peacebuilding and facilitating dialogue among key actors. This article attempts to show that the work of the PBC will be enhanced by adopting a broad understanding of relevant actors and centres of competence. It focuses on “International Geneva” and discusses the potential implications of the PBC for Geneva-based international and non-governmental organizations concerned with post-conflict reconstruction and related tasks. It demonstrates how far and in which ways Geneva-based organizations engaged in peacebuilding work could contribute to the work of the PBC. Some of the arguments made in the following pages reflect findings of an ongoing project on the PBC and International Geneva being carried out by the Geneva Centre for Security Policy in close partnership with the Quaker United Nations Office, the Programme for Strategic and International Security Studies of the Graduate Institute of International Studies and the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces.

Implications of the changing nature of peace operations: from peacekeeping to peacebuilding

The creation of the Peacebuilding Commission has been a response to the fundamentally transformed nature of peace operations during the last decade. While the peacekeeping operations of the Cold War period were typically limited to the deployment of an interposition force between warring factions, missions since the early 1990s have become much more complex and multi-faceted, comprising not only military but also civilian, humanitarian, political and other aspects. These so-called second-generation missions have taken on tasks such as refugee return, reintegration of former combatants, reconstruction of state institutions and monitoring of elections.

The changing nature of peace operations is demonstrated by the current cases of Afghanistan and Iraq. Although the United States and its coalition partners are involved in war-fighting and counter-insurgency operations in both states, making these interventions significantly different to recent operations elsewhere (in places such as Côte d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leone or

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Timor-Leste), a broad range of state-building activities are simultaneously being carried out under international auspices, which are similar to those that have occurred elsewhere, such as managing the constitution-making process, holding elections, controlling violence and economic reconstruction.

The successive peace missions in Burundi—the UN Operation in Burundi (ONUB) and the UN Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB)—are a further example of the evolution of peace operations. From May 2004 to December 2006, ONUB supported disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) and security sector reform (SSR) activities, organized national elections and played a critical role in supporting a negotiation process between the government and remaining rebels, which resulted in a comprehensive ceasefire agreement. BINUB, whose mandate started on 1 January 2007, continues to support DDR and SSR activities.² But it also promotes the protection of human rights, pushes for measures to end impunity and supports poverty reduction efforts. These operations demonstrate the comprehensive challenge that peacebuilding presents: its multiple objectives range from providing security in the aftermath of conflict, demilitarizing society, reversing impunity, restoring justice and accountability, to rebuilding rule of law and governance institutions and finally democratizing society and fostering economic and social development.

Peacebuilding entered the UN lexicon and international practice with former UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali's *Agenda for Peace*, published in 1992.³ Boutros-Ghali distinguishes four sequential but overlapping activities in the conflict management cycle: preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping, peacemaking and peacebuilding. He describes peacebuilding as "action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict".⁴ This highlights the dual and sometimes conflicting task of peacebuilding: to obtain security and an end to hostilities on the one hand, and on the other to engage in the parallel longer term process of consolidating peace (by reconciling people and groups, reforming or rebuilding institutions, structures and economies) to diminish the possibility of a relapse into violence.

The task is rendered even more complex as the conflict cycle is not linear and each conflict dynamic has its own specific needs to which peacebuilding must respond if it is to be successful.⁵ The intensity of deadly violence also varies greatly and significantly influences the prospects of successful peacebuilding. The future of peacebuilding thus depends on an accurate understanding of each conflict setting and its potential both for peace and for further violent conflict.

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Conflict propensity could be divided into three different types of situation. The first is those places where armed conflict is over but peace is not yet consolidated. One could even include in this category countries where conflict ended very early in the post-Cold War era, where wars have been over for a decade or more—El Salvador, Mozambique and South Africa, for example—but where the legacies of conflict are still apparent and the wounds of war have not fully healed. Elsewhere too—in Angola, Burundi, Guatemala, Haiti, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Timor-Leste—negotiated settlements have been reached, DDR has advanced considerably, new military and police forces have been or are being trained and elections have been held, but the peace is very tenuous, societies are fragile and serious root causes of conflict persist.

Second are those situations in which armed conflict is an acute problem and where international interveners find themselves in the middle of difficult and violent transitions, where peacebuilding is a day-to-day struggle of helping societies slowly to overcome violence, managing spoilers and warlords, and seeing through a troubled political transition. From the UN perspective, Afghanistan is such a situation as is the Democratic Republic of the Congo; both very difficult cases for peacebuilding.

The third category constitutes a large number of countries that are vulnerable to "state failure" because of weak institutions, vulnerability to pressures from exclusionary or radical armed groups, and other factors. Near or actual state failure puts populations at tremendous risk as levels of violence

increase and civilians are made vulnerable. The frequent recurrence of such situations in different parts of the world has forced consideration at the international level of the international community's responsibilities as regards intervention in national settings to protect civilians; what is the "responsibility to protect"? In light of recent advances in global norms, in particular the so-called responsibility to protect,⁶ many people are arguing that the future of peacebuilding and its sustainability is really about state- and institution-building.⁷

In view of the multiple conditions and settings of peacebuilding, and multi-stakeholder involvement, an important prerequisite for successful peacebuilding is coordination. In his *In Larger Freedom* report of 2005 former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan referred to the need for coordination as follows:

at this very point there is a gaping hole in the United Nations institutional machinery: no part of the United Nations system effectively addresses the challenge of helping countries with the transition from war to lasting peace.⁸

The need for greater coordination should be assured and facilitated by the PBC but also by reform efforts proposed by the High-level Panel on System-wide Coherence in the Areas of Development, Humanitarian Assistance and the Environment. This panel called for further strengthening of "the management and coordination of United Nations operational activities" and it particularly makes a case to better coordinate and integrate development strategies into post-conflict peacebuilding.⁹

Creation and horizon of the Peacebuilding Commission

The PBC was born of the recognition that effective and sustainable peacebuilding requires a long-term commitment by the international community in terms of financial and human resources. Given that there is a 44% risk of all civil wars re-erupting within five years of a peace settlement,¹⁰ often due to a lack of sustained commitment by the international community, ensuring that international attention remains focused on countries emerging from violent conflict seems key for sustained peace.

The official mandate of the PBC is as follows:

- to propose integrated strategies for post-conflict peacebuilding and recovery;
- to help to ensure predictable financing for early recovery activities and sustained financial investment over the medium to longer term;
- to extend the period of attention by the international community to post-conflict recovery; and
- to develop best practices on issues that require extensive collaboration among political, military, humanitarian and development actors.¹¹

Despite these straightforward goals, expectations about what the PBC should do and how it will operate in post-conflict environments vary widely both within and outside the United Nations. Generally speaking, experts believe that the main added value of the PBC will be in improving coordination between all national and international actors involved in peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction, helping to maintain a coalition of interests around a country in a post-conflict situation, contributing to bridging the "relief to development gap", and generally improving the sequencing of the various phases of peacekeeping efforts.

The PBC therefore faces the challenge of bringing greater coherence to the network of UN agencies and bodies that can be clearly understood to be dealing with post-conflict challenges, such as the UN Development Programme (UNDP), the Offices of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees

(UNHCR) and the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), in addition to the traditionally involved UN Departments of Peacekeeping Operations and of Political Affairs. In addition, given the growing complexity of peace operations, agencies whose main focus has not traditionally been on post-conflict reconstruction are also becoming increasingly relevant in this field. These include, for example, organizations such as the World Health Organization (WHO), the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS or the Global Fund to Fight Aids, Tuberculosis and Malaria, the International Organization for Migration, the International Bureau of Education or the World Bank. The PBC must seek to incorporate such organizations in its coordinating efforts.

And the Commission will need to go even further in its efforts to reach out to and coordinate relevant actors: UN General Assembly resolution 60/180 and Security Council resolution 1645 (2005) establishing the PBC also "note... the importance of participation of regional and local actors, and stress... the importance of adopting flexible working methods, including use of videoconferencing, meetings outside of New York and other modalities, in order to provide for the active participation of those most relevant to the deliberations of the Commission".¹² Finally, the resolutions also make explicit mention of the contribution of civil society actors to peacebuilding: "recognizing the important contribution of civil society and non-governmental organizations, including women's organizations, to peacebuilding efforts",¹³ the resolutions "encourage... the Commission to consult with civil society, non-governmental organizations, including women's organizations, and the private sector engaged in peacebuilding activities, as appropriate".¹⁴

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Clearly, if the Peacebuilding Commission is to begin to fulfil expectations, its horizon must be raised far beyond its New York base. Coordination within the UN system itself will be a major challenge. But linkages must also be made to the many other actors (intergovernmental, national and non-governmental), processes and settings that can be considered as having the capacity to initiate and implement successful steps in a peacebuilding process.

Implications of the PBC for International Geneva

The Peacebuilding Commission's establishment in New York has implications for Geneva as a major global centre for peace. Geneva offers the promise of important peacebuilding contributions; prominent organizations and respected research and academic institutions concerned with peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction tasks have a strong presence in Geneva. The city is the headquarters of relevant UN agencies such as OHCHR, UNHCR and WHO, and hosts key branch facilities of UNICEF and UNDP, including UNDP's Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery. Geneva also offers training and research activities through the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, the United Nations Institute for Training and Research and the Geneva branch of the University for Peace. In addition, Geneva is home to the International Committee of the Red Cross and international foundations such as the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), the Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP) and the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining. Academic institutes, such as the Graduate Institute of International Studies and the Graduate Institute of Development Studies (to be joined into an Academic Centre of Competence in International Studies in January 2008), also provide an important basis for policy-relevant research. There is a rich presence of civil society organizations engaged in peacemaking and peacebuilding work in different parts of the world as well, including the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, the International Peacebuilding Alliance (Interpeace), Initiatives of Change and the Quaker United Nations Office (QUNO), to name but a few. Geneva thus offers vast knowledge and practical expertise on such issues as DDR, SSR, the rule of law and transitional justice, human rights, development and other issues relevant to post-conflict peacebuilding.

In order to explore the implications of the new PBC for Geneva-based international and non-governmental organizations, GCSP, in close partnership with DCAF, the Graduate Institute of International Studies and QUNO, launched a project in 2006 entitled “The UN PBC and International Geneva”. The main objective of the project was to examine how the PBC can best ensure that Geneva-based stakeholders in post-conflict reconstruction can add value to the work of the PBC in terms of country-specific operations, norms and standard-setting, lessons learned and peacebuilding strategy design.

In the course of the first phase of this project, which involved representatives from a number of Geneva-based organizations in a range of workshops and seminars, it emerged that there is a need to foster awareness of this rich presence in Geneva and to better explore and understand the practical and potential linkages among the various organizations—within Geneva, between Geneva and other peacebuilding centres, and with the countries under consideration by the PBC (Burundi and Sierra Leone in April 2007). Furthermore, it became clear that Geneva hosts organizations that are leaders in their fields and could significantly contribute to the work of the PBC. To give but three examples, the Small Arms Survey is the principal international source of public information on all aspects of small arms and light weapons and its analyses are of considerable relevance to many dimensions of post-conflict peacebuilding; DCAF is one of the leading centres of expertise in security sector reform and governance; and Interpeace has intensive experience in peacebuilding programming.

These early explorations also showed that many organizations thus far do not have an official policy stance on the Peacebuilding Commission, but are still developing their thinking on this new body, though a number do have desk officers or focal points dealing specifically with the PBC. In general, there was agreement that International Geneva has a creative role to play in the activities of the PBC, a role beyond merely plugging in to the discourse in New York. Geneva-based organizations demonstrated a strong interest in working together further to enhance the contribution that International Geneva can make. The United Nations Office at Geneva has endorsed these research efforts, and has in turn initiated a number of activities aimed at greater understanding of the United Nations’ contribution to peacebuilding. Given that at this early stage the agenda of the PBC is still fairly open, there is an opportunity to make constructive use of the wealth of knowledge found in Geneva to shape and support the future activities of the Commission.

“MAPPING” INTERNATIONAL GENEVA

The first phase of the research project recognized the expertise of International Geneva in various dimensions of peacebuilding, but it also revealed that there exists only a notional understanding of the particular value Geneva could add to the UN peacebuilding project. For this reason, GCSP and its project partners (QUNO, the Graduate Institute of International Studies and DCAF) are currently conducting a mapping exercise in order to produce a comprehensive and structured survey of institutions involved in peacebuilding. The mapping will demonstrate the competencies of Geneva-based organizations in relation to the specific peacebuilding sectors identified in the United Nations Peacebuilding Capacity Inventory prepared by the Executive Office of the Secretary-General.¹⁵ The inventory was undertaken to determine the capacities that exist within the United Nations by asking agencies for information concerning their activities in various sectors relevant to a country in the post-conflict recovery phase. It defined four broad areas as key to peacebuilding: security and public order; justice and reconciliation; governance and participation; and socio-economic well-being.

An initial mapping exercise using these categories was conducted in Geneva in September 2006 among a range of Geneva-based organizations (See Box 1). This mapping revealed that Geneva-based organizations can add value to the UN peacebuilding project, particularly in areas where UN

peacebuilding capacities are very limited or non-existent. The Peacebuilding Capacity Inventory found that the United Nations lacks substantial capacity and knowledge in security sector governance; a Geneva-based centre of excellence like DCAF could certainly add important value to the work of the PBC in this respect. The fuller inventory of Geneva actors (which will be completed in mid-2007) will, it is hoped, reveal a range of areas where Geneva can contribute to the work of the PBC.

Realizing synergies in Geneva

Mapping Geneva-based organizations engaged in peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction will not only provide a fuller picture of Geneva policy, advocacy, research and operational competencies across the range of responsibilities of the Peacebuilding Commission but will also constitute a solid basis for the possible establishment of a coordinated peacebuilding “platform” in Geneva. The respective Geneva-based organizations (both intergovernmental and civil society) could be divided according to the peacebuilding sectors noted in the UN inventory and others, and a mechanism could be established to facilitate communication, knowledge exchange and collaborative planning among organizations. Such a platform could offer beneficial synergies. The various organizations within each sector could group their work in such a way as to provide the PBC with, inter alia, research and coherent policy proposals on specific subjects, experts and personnel or training activities. Such a sector-structured platform could also serve as a direct link between the PBC and civil society practitioners, who could share their field experience, best practices and lessons learned with the Peacebuilding Support Office, the donor community and the war-torn countries under consideration by the PBC.

GENEVA AS A HUB OF GLOBAL INITIATIVES

Creating a Geneva-based peacebuilding platform could add value to the work of the PBC in at least two significant ways. First, it could contribute to the coordination of already existing peacebuilding-related programmes and initiatives. Currently, joint programming between agencies is either limited or is developed on an ad hoc basis. A Geneva-based peacebuilding platform could bring important UN agencies like UNHCR, OHCHR and WHO together to discuss and develop cooperation and coherence with other Geneva-based organizations. This Geneva-based cooperation should help informal coordination and even facilitate the implementation of peace consolidation strategies within a framework of UN integrated offices in the field. A “core group” of participating organizations, representing the early elements of such a platform, is already contributing to establishing patterns of communication between Geneva-based, New York-based and other actors in different parts of the world seeking to contribute to the United Nations’ peacebuilding functions. For example, there is a developing relationship between QUNO (on behalf of the Geneva core), the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (based in the Netherlands) and the World Federalist Movement-Institute for Global Policy (based in New York)¹⁶ working to facilitate the effective relationship between the PBC and civil society organizations.

Second, integrated peacebuilding requires linkages across a range of global peacebuilding-related efforts and International Geneva is well placed to bring such initiatives together; Geneva could serve as a hub and mediator of the work of the PBC and other initiatives related to peacebuilding. For example, there is a growing recognition of the link between armed violence and development. In the 2005 World Summit Outcome document, global leaders recognized the strong linkage between development, peace, security and human rights.¹⁷ (The establishment of the PBC was a direct consequence of this recognition.¹⁸) A Geneva-based peacebuilding platform could function as a focal point for existing and

Box 1. Extract of the Initial Mapping Exercise for Geneva-based organizations***Security and public order****(security sector, law enforcement, defence initiatives, DDR, mine action)*

Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (small arms, armed violence prevention, monitoring)

DCAF (security sector governance)

GCSP

Geneva Call (DDR, mines, child soldiers, armed groups)

Geneva Forum (engagement with diplomats, international organizations, NGOs on small arms, ERW, mine action, DDR)

Nonviolent Peaceforce

ICBL–Landmine Monitor

International Council on Human Rights Policy (current work on political violence)

Oxfam (Control Arms Campaign, responsibility to protect, country-focused advocacy)

PSIS (SSR, DDR, functions of the state)

Saferworld (arms control, SSR, conflict prevention)

UNDP (Burundi, Haiti, Sri Lanka, Timor-Leste, small arms)

UPEACE (non-violent transformation of conflict in Africa, environmental security, international law and HR)

Justice and reconciliation*(transitional justice and community rebuilding, judicial and legal reform, corrections, human rights)*

Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (Burundi: justice and rule of law; Sierra Leone: justice)

Dominicans for Justice and Peace (human rights)

Franciscans International (human rights work in Burundi, Colombia, Guatemala)

International Commission of Jurists (justice and the rule of law)

International Council on Human Rights Policy

Oxfam (humanitarian and HR lobbying, International Criminal Court)

Swisspeace (transitional justice and reconciliation)

UNDP

World Vision (human rights)

Governance and participation*(good offices, peace support, public administration and government, strengthening governance, economic strategy and coordination of international assistance, financial transparency, elections, political parties, civil society, media)*

Franciscans International (elections, civil society)

GCSP

Initiatives of Change (Sierra Leone: Moral Foundations for Democracy, Hope Sierra Leone)

International Council on Human Rights Policy

Oxfam (MDG campaign, Make Trade Fair, Control Arms Campaign, lobbying, IFIs)

Saferworld (civil society capacity-building)

Swisspeace (in-country civil society forum, government–NGO platforms)

UNDP

Social and economic well-being*(protection and shelter of vulnerable groups, basic needs, gender, physical infrastructure, employment generation, economic foundations for growth and development)*

Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (protection, survivors, gender)

Geneva Call (gender, women combatants)

ICBL–Landmine Monitor (victim assistance in Burundi, Sierra Leone)

International Council on Human Rights Policy

Oxfam (development, HR and humanitarian programmes in Burundi, Haiti, Sierra Leone, Timor-Leste)

Swisspeace (gender, private sector)

UNDP

Other

Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (mediation)
 International Council on Human Rights Policy
 Oxfam (Make Trade Fair)
 PSIS (comprehensive approach to post-conflict peacebuilding)
 Swisspeace (early warning, conflict sensitivity, mediation support)
 UNDP
 UNOG (partnership building and facilitating work in support of the work of UN contacts between UN family and civil society)
 UPEACE (conflict prevention and peacebuilding in Africa)

Source: Workshop on Civil Society Organisations and the UN Peacebuilding Commission: Mapping the Contribution of Geneva-based Organisations, Appendix B: Mapping Exercise—Civil Society Workshop, 29 September 2006, at <www.gppac.org/documents/GPPAC/process/Mapping_Exercise_Geneva_Meeting_FINAL_24102006.pdf>.

future global initiatives on development and armed violence. Two prominent initiatives on the subject are already being driven from Geneva, namely the Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development¹⁹ and the Armed Violence Prevention Programme.²⁰

The Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development is an initiative endorsed by almost 50 states (as of April 2007) with the intention to “promote sustainable security and a culture of peace by taking action to reduce armed violence and its negative impact on socio-economic and human development”.²¹ It has been described by UNDP as the “the strongest political statement to date that the devastating impact of armed violence must be addressed within development contexts, rather than in the isolated domains of disarmament, peacebuilding and other processes”.²² The declaration’s signatories have committed themselves to integrate armed violence reduction and conflict prevention programmes into national, regional and multilateral development frameworks, institutions and strategies. Signatories will meet in 2008 in order to assess progress toward the achievement of the measures outlined in the agreement. The Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation and UNDP are providing important support for this initiative.

The Armed Violence Prevention Programme, jointly coordinated by WHO and UNDP, recognizes that armed violence is a global problem with important development, health and security dimensions. Its goal is “to promote effective responses to armed violence through support for the development of an international policy framework founded on a clear understanding of the causes, nature and impacts of armed violence, and best practices generated from violence reduction and prevention initiatives to date”.²³

Both of these processes are clearly at the heart of peacebuilding and of concern to the work of the PBC. A Geneva-based peacebuilding platform could facilitate the active relationship between the actions being undertaken by these initiatives and the key areas of focus of the PBC, such as community security, and provide expertise, network and conference services for the formulation of new approaches and programmes.

Constraints and opportunities for the PBC and the role of Geneva

The Peacebuilding Commission is still very much an institution in formation and the jury is still out on the real contribution it will be able to make to fulfilling the visions foreseen for the United Nations in post-conflict peacebuilding. It faces many constraints and challenges, some of which relate to the

very nature of its construction and the limited financial and human resources that have so far been committed to it. The internal challenge of bringing coherence and coordination to the many UN agencies involved, including overcoming the inevitable “turf” issues that this implies, is considerable. Added to this is the challenge of moving beyond the rhetoric of recognizing the important contribution of civil society organizations to the many dimensions of peacebuilding with which the PBC will be seeking to engage, to finding effective methodologies of inclusion and partnership.

Nonetheless the PBC constitutes an important institutional experiment of tremendous relevance to the ability of the United Nations to meet the security and development needs of today. It represents considerable opportunities for the United Nations. Being a joint creation of the UN Security Council and General Assembly, it commands more democratic legitimacy than many other UN bodies. And if the PBC proves successful it will help improve the credibility of the United Nations as a whole. Finally, the very constraints facing the PBC, including financial ones, could also represent an opportunity for the realization of broader evolutionary potential in the UN system—that of learning to incorporate the contribution of civil society organizations and other non-governmental actors into its activities and functions. The PBC is unlikely to have the capacity to deal with all the aspects of post-conflict peacebuilding with which it is charged. If political and institutional constraints on their inclusion can be overcome, civil society organizations and others will generally have an important role to play both at the planning and the operational stages of post-conflict reconstruction efforts.

We have argued here that settings beyond New York can add important value and resources to the capacity of the PBC, and have highlighted this by showing how Geneva could play an important role, at a minimum by the potential support it could provide to the work of the Peacebuilding Support Office. It is therefore important that the early efforts at developing the capacities and competencies of International Geneva in peacebuilding continue and that all possible efforts be made to put these at the service of the PBC.

Notes

1. United Nations General Assembly resolution 60/180 of 20 December 2005, UN document A/RES/60/180, 30 December 2005; Security Council resolution 1645 (2005), UN document S/RES/1645(2005), 20 December 2005.
2. See United Nations Security Council resolution 1719 (2006), UN document S/RES/1719(2006), 25 October 2006.
3. *An Agenda for Peace: Report of the Secretary-General*, UN document A/47/277 – S/24111, 17 June 1992, at <www.un.org/docs/SC/agpeace.html>.
4. *Ibid.*, paragraph 21.
5. The December 2005 edition of *Security Dialogue* (vol. 36, no. 4), edited by Oliver Jütersonke and Rolf Schwarz, draws attention to a range of peacebuilding challenges. See particularly Rolf Schwarz, “Post-conflict Peacebuilding: The Challenges of Security, Welfare and Representation” (pp. 429–446) and Keith Krause and Oliver Jütersonke, “Peace, Security and Development in Post-conflict Environments” (pp. 447–462).
6. This notion of the responsibility to protect was mainstreamed by the 2005 World Summit Outcome stating “...we are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.” (2005 World Summit Outcome, United Nations General Assembly resolution 60/1 of 16 September 2005, UN document A/RES/60/1, 24 October 2005, paragraph 139.) See also *Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty*, International Development Research Centre, December 2001, at <www.iciss.ca/report-en.asp>.
7. See, for example, the work of Roland Paris (in particular, *At War's End: Building Peace after Civil Conflict*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2004) and Carl Bildt (“Peace After War: Our Experience”, Tanner Lectures on Human Values, 2 March 2005 at Cambridge University, at <www.tannerlectures.utah.edu/lectures/Bildt_2006.pdf>).
8. *In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All: Report of the Secretary-General*, UN document A/59/2005, 21 March 2005 at <www.un.org/largerfreedom>, paragraph 114.

9. *Delivering as One: Report of the High-level Panel on United Nations System-wide Coherence in the Areas of Development, Humanitarian Assistance and the Environment*, UN document A/61/583, 20 November 2006, at <www.un.org/events/panel>, Annex 1, paragraph 1 and main document, paragraph 26.
10. Paul Collier et al, 2003, *Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy*, New York, Oxford University Press and World Bank, p. 83.
11. See the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission's web site at <www.un.org/peace/peacebuilding>.
12. United Nations General Assembly resolution 60/180, op. cit., paragraph 19.
13. Ibid., preamble.
14. Ibid., paragraph 21.
15. Executive Office of the Secretary-General, 2006, *Inventory: United Nations Capacity in Peacebuilding*, September, at <www.undp.org/bcpr/iasc/content/docs/Oct_Links/doc_4.pdf>.
16. The WFM-IGC performs a very useful information service regarding the workings of the PBC. To subscribe, write to pbc-info-subscribe@yahoogroups.com.
17. 2005 World Summit Outcome, op. cit., paragraph 74.
18. 2005 World Summit Outcome, op. cit., paragraph 97.
19. The Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development, made at Geneva, 7 June 2006, at <www.undp.org/bcpr/we_do/Geneva_Declaration_.pdf>.
20. UNDP and WHO, *Armed Violence Prevention Programme: Support to Community Based Violence Prevention Programmes*, project document, no date, at <who.int/violence_injury_prevention/violence/activities/en/avpp_overview.pdf>.
21. The Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development, op. cit.
22. UNDP, "What's New", *CPR Newsletter*, vol. 2, no. 2, summer 2006, at <www.undp.org/bcpr/newsletters/volume_3/index.htm>.
23. See *Armed Violence Prevention Project*, at <www.who.int/violence_injury_prevention/violence/activities/armed_violence/en/index.html>.