

The UNSCOM Regime: Crucial On-Site Elements

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Although there are some who may argue that the situation in Iraq under which the United Nations Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) operated was unique and thus a regime from which it is unsafe to draw conclusions, such an argument is quite wrong. Careful analysis of the work carried out by UNSCOM over the past eight years in the face of continued Iraqi non-cooperation has demonstrated the crucial importance of on-site inspections. Without on-site inspections, there could have been no progress on eliminating Iraq's weapons of mass destruction.

The UNSCOM regime was established by Security Council resolution 687 (1991),¹ which included several elements: deployment of a United Nations observer unit; arrangements for demarcating the Iraq-Kuwait border; the removal or destruction of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction and measures to prevent their reconstruction, under the supervision of a special commission and the Director General of the IAEA; and creation of a compensation fund to cover direct loss and damage resulting from Iraq's invasion of Kuwait.

UNSCOM was set up to implement Section C (paragraphs 7–14) of resolution 687 — the removal or destruction of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction and measures to prevent their reconstitution. The first of these paragraphs invited Iraq to reaffirm unconditionally its obligations under the 1925 Geneva Protocol and to ratify the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC). Paragraph 8 required Iraq to unconditionally accept the destruction, removal or rendering harmless, under international supervision, of:

“(a) all chemical and biological weapons and all stocks of agents and all related subsystems and components and all research, development, support and manufacturing facilities related thereto;

(b) all ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometres and related major parts and repair and production facilities;”

Iraq was required to submit, within fifteen days of the adoption of resolution 687, a declaration on the location, amounts and types of all the items specified in (a) and (b) above and agree to urgent, on-site inspection as detailed in (i) and (ii) below. Within forty-five days, the Secretary-General was to develop and submit a plan for:

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“(i) the forming of a Special Commission which shall carry out immediate on-site inspection of Iraq’s biological, chemical and missile capabilities, based on Iraq’s declarations and the designation of any additional locations by the Special Commission itself;

(ii) the yielding by Iraq of possession to the Special Commission for destruction, removal or rendering harmless, taking into account the requirements of public safety, of all items specified under paragraph 8 (a), including items at the additional locations designated by the Special Commission under paragraph (i) and the destruction by Iraq, under the supervision of the Special Commission, of all its missile capabilities, including launchers as specified under paragraph 8 (b).”

In addition, Iraq was required to “unconditionally undertake not to use, develop, construct or require any of the items specified”, and the Secretary-General, in consultation with UNSCOM, was required to “develop a plan for the future ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq’s compliance” with this undertaking.

Consequently the three fundamental elements of resolution 687 are the following:

- declaration to UNSCOM of the locations, amounts and types of chemical and biological weapons;
- destruction, removal or rendering harmless under UNSCOM supervision; and
- an ongoing monitoring and verification (OMV) plan.

The OMV plan² was approved by Security Council resolution 715 (1991)³ in October 1991 and was declared provisionally operational in October 1994.⁴

Over the past seven years, the work of UNSCOM can be regarded as eight phases:

- Phase 1: The setting up of UNSCOM and the initial inspections (1991);
- Phase 2: Continued inspections to determine the past programmes, hindered by incomplete and inaccurate declarations (1992–1993);
- Phase 3: Destruction of chemical weapons under UNSCOM supervision (June 1992–June 1994);
- Phase 4: Ongoing monitoring and verification (November 1993 onwards);
- Phase 5: Significant disclosures of past programmes (1995);
- Phase 6: Continuing difficulties (1996–1997);
- Phase 7: Increasing politicization (1997–1998); and
- Phase 8: Iraqi withdrawal of cooperation (August 1998–December 1998).

Using UNSCOM’s work in regard to Iraq’s chemical and biological weapon capabilities, this article considers the crucial importance of on-site activities in two broad areas: determination of Iraq’s past programme and OMV.

Determination of Iraq’s Past Programme

When UNSCOM was set up in May 1991, it was envisaged that Iraq would cooperate and that the tasks of UNSCOM would be complete within six months or a year. Consequently, UNSCOM was set up as a small group of some twenty to twenty-five individuals organized into five groups that

would cease to exist once they completed their tasks. Regrettably, Iraq never cooperated and instead has consistently taken a minimalist approach, providing as little information as possible and has sought to conceal its capabilities. Consequently, UNSCOM has had to carry out its work over a much longer period and had to involve significantly larger numbers of personnel to uncover the Iraqi programmes and prevent their reacquisition. UNSCOM has had remarkable success in uncovering Iraq's prohibited programmes and in ensuring that these capabilities were not being reacquired. During 1997 and 1998 this success led to increasing difficulties with Iraq, who through international lobbying and withdrawal of their limited cooperation have successfully managed to stop the work of UNSCOM.

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The initial inspections of Iraq were carried out using teams of experts drawn from Member States of the United Nations. The first report⁵ of UNSCOM on 25 October 1991 noted that the inspections undertaken have had to be:

“energetic, rigorous and intensive because of the failure of Iraq ... to adopt the candid and open approach to disclosure of its capabilities which is called for in ... Resolution 687 (1991). While co-operation from Iraq has generally been forthcoming at the field level ... in relation to the activities and resources declared by Iraq, a totally different attitude of non-cooperation, concealment and sometimes false information has emerged in relation to non-declared activities, resources and sites that have been designated by the Special Commission on the basis of its own assessments or of data supplied to it by States.”

As UNSCOM had limited resources, the number of inspections that could be supported in Iraq at the same time was limited — which meant that inspection teams had to be withdrawn without completing their missions. Together with the lack of continuity in the chief inspectors, this was exploited to the maximum by Iraq to withhold information, thereby making the overall task much more difficult and extended.

CHEMICAL WEAPONS

In the chemical area, a month-long inspection was carried out at the Muthanna State Establishment — the principal chemical weapons development and production facility which had been bombed during the Gulf War of 1990–91. The emphasis in the chemical weapons area was to inventory the remaining Iraqi chemical weapons, both filled and unfilled, and then to oversee the construction by Iraq of destruction facilities to achieve safe irreversible destruction of chemical weapons, agents and their production facilities.

Although Iraq was required to declare all its chemical weapons production equipment to UNSCOM inspectors, it became clear through on-site inspections that such equipment was being removed in attempts to hide it elsewhere in the country.

Destruction of Iraq's chemical weapons took place under UNSCOM supervision during the two-year period from June 1992 to June 1994. Very large quantities of weapons, agents and precursors were destroyed. However, Iraq claimed that it had also destroyed chemical weapons after the end of the Gulf War but had done so without UNSCOM supervision and thus in breach of resolution 687. This claimed unilateral destruction by Iraq has resulted in much additional work for both

UNSCOM and Iraq as UNSCOM has rightly insisted that Iraq provide verifiable evidence that such destruction did in fact take place.

A particular topic of increasing concern has been the extent to which Iraq has produced and weaponized the chemical agent VX. When UNSCOM first detected traces of VX degradation products, Iraq's initially responded that this was evidence of failed research. As time went on, it became clear to UNSCOM that sufficient precursors to produce more than 400 tons of VX had been imported by Iraq. In response Iraq gradually admitted that it had produced an increasing quantity of VX, which eventually reached almost four tons. The October 1995 UNSCOM report⁶ stated that "Of greatest concern were the new revelations concerning the timing, extent and success of Iraq's programme for the production of the nerve agent VX" and went on to note "the gravity of the clear deception of Iraq in its Spring 1995 declaration to the Commission concerning the VX nerve agent".

During 1998 UNSCOM excavated and took samples from sites where Iraq claimed that SCUD missile warheads had been unilaterally destroyed. Remnants of such warheads showed the presence of traces of VX degradation products, thereby demonstrating that these warheads had been filled with VX.⁷ Iraq has refused to provide any explanation, simply stating that "it had never weaponized VX".

BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

In the biological area, the first inspection took place in August 1991 and the subsequent UNSCOM report⁸ noted that Iraq had clearly violated its obligations to hand over to UNSCOM all its biological weapon-related items when it destroyed buildings at Salman Pak immediately prior to the first UNSCOM inspection there. A month later another report⁹ noted that "Iraqi officials told the

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Special Mission that they had nothing further to add to what had already been provided to the two biological weapons inspection teams. They maintained that all documents and information related to the programme have either been handed over to the first biological inspection team or had been destroyed." UNSCOM was rightly sceptical. Primarily because of resource limitations in UNSCOM and the need to give

priority to destruction of the declared chemical weapons, during the next three years UNSCOM gave priority to chemical weapons activities in Iraq.

Biological weapon capabilities were then readdressed starting in 1994. By early 1995 UNSCOM had clear evidence that Iraq had had a biological weapons programme although Iraq still maintained that it only had a small biological research programme for military purposes. The UNSCOM evidence included:

- The attempted importation by Iraq of three 5,000 litre pathogen grade fermenters;
- The procurement of thirty-nine tons of growth media in 25–100kg drums;
- The Al Salman facility for which four filling machines and a spray dryer were imported; and
- The Al Hakam facility, which was inconsistent with its alleged single cell protein role.

UNSCOM pressure led Iraq to admit on 1 July 1995 that it had had an offensive biological weapon programme, including the production of a number of biological agents, but denied the weaponization of such agents. The subsequent UNSCOM report¹⁰ noted that Iraq had prepared a draft FFCD (full, final and complete disclosure) and stated that:

“The July draft declaration contained many areas in which Iraq’s disclosures were inconsistent with the Commission’s information or where information was missing or unclear. These deficiencies followed a pattern: they appear to be designed to deny information that will either provide evidence of weaponization or reveal military connections with the biological weapons programme. There was also a strong suspicion that Iraq’s new accounts of agent production, complex growth media consumption, were manipulated to provide what Iraq hoped would pass as a credible accounting for the missing media”.

Iraq delivered its biological FFCD, still denying that any agents had been weaponized, to the Executive Chairman of UNSCOM on 4 August 1995. Later that month, General Hussein Kamel Hassan left Baghdad for Jordan. A week later, the Executive Chairman of UNSCOM was invited to return to Baghdad. This invitation said that General Hussein Kamel Hassan had been responsible for hiding important information on Iraq’s prohibited programmes from UNSCOM and IAEA by ordering Iraqi technical personnel not to disclose such information and also not to inform Mr Tariq Aziz or General Amer of these instructions. When the Executive Chairman returned to Baghdad, Iraq informed him that the FFCD of 4 August 1995 should not be considered valid. Iraq then presented a vastly different account of its past biological warfare programme, admitting weaponization immediately prior to the outbreak of the Gulf War, including the filling of biological warfare agents into 166 bombs and 25 Al Hussein missile warheads.

Prior to leaving Baghdad, the Executive Chairman publicly stated that whilst very significant new information had been provided, not a single document that could help in verifying that information had been handed over. Shortly after saying this and whilst preparing to go to the airfield to leave Iraq, General Amer contacted the Chairman and requested that on his way to the airfield he visit a farm which had belonged to General Hussein Kamel Hassan, where items of great interest to UNSCOM could be found. On arrival at the farm (the Haider farm), the Chairman and his team found, in a locked chicken coop, numerous boxes that were packed with documentation, together with microfiche, computer diskettes, videotapes and photographs of prohibited hardware components. One prominently placed box contained all the materials on biological weapons. Examination of the contents of the boxes revealed well over half a million pages of documentation. While most of this related to the nuclear area, a large amount concerned the chemical, biological and missile areas. UNSCOM’s initial assessment was that the bulk of the material in the missile, chemical and biological fields came from a number of the sites where Iraq’s proscribed programmes had been carried out. However, documentation from the headquarters of the Military Industrialization Corporation was not included, nor were the relevant archives of the Ministry of Defence or the Intelligence Services.

Repeated UNSCOM inspections were then carried out to determine the actual scope of the Iraqi biological weapons programme and to verify the information provided in the revised declarations subsequently provided by Iraq. The April 1996 UNSCOM report¹¹ noted that Iraq, as recently as August 1995, admitted in an official letter that “it had been engaged in a dedicated concealment effort to hide proscribed items and documents from the Commission” and the report noted that this withholding of important information from UNSCOM had been taking place since the outset of the existence of UNSCOM. It further noted that as Iraq had admitted in 1995, “its full, final and complete disclosures over a number of years have been deliberately misleading”. Additionally, “Iraq has recently admitted that the unilateral destruction had been carried out in order to downsize its proscribed programmes. Thus, according to Iraq, items were partially or totally concealed and all materials relevant to their existence were unilaterally obliterated as it was believed that their revelation would complicate matters and prolong the process with the Commission.” Such actions made UNSCOM’s task much more difficult and delayed the completion of its work.

These difficulties continued with the April 1997 report¹² noting that Iraq had “initiated a policy of deliberate concealment, denial and masking of the most important aspects of its proscribed weapons and related capabilities.” In the face of this challenge, the inspection activities of UNSCOM and the integrated analytical work since 1991, supported by advanced techniques and applied science, have “led to the uncovering of the full dimensions of Iraq’s complex programmes of mass destruction.” Only in the last two years have the inspections unmasked a complete biological weapons

programme. The report stated that “these accomplishments demonstrate that international weapons inspections under the auspices of the United Nations, if applied with first-rate expertise and modern technology, can achieve effective results.”

During 1998, UNSCOM excavated the remains of SCUD missile warheads unilaterally destroyed by Iraq and analyzed samples taken from these remnants for traces of anthrax. These analyses showed that at least seven of the SCUD warheads had contained anthrax — a finding that was at variance with the Iraqi declaration that only five such warheads had been filled with anthrax.

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Ongoing Monitoring and Verification

At the beginning of October 1991, the plan for the future monitoring and verification of Iraq’s compliance to its undertaking not to use, retain, possess, develop, construct or otherwise acquire any chemical or biological weapons or any ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 km was transmitted¹⁴ to the Security Council. The plan required UNSCOM (through inspections and aerial overflights, as well as through the provision of information by Iraq) to monitor and verify that activities, sites, facilities, material and other items, both military and civilian, are not used by Iraq in contravention of its obligations.

The plan requires the regular provision by Iraq of full, complete, correct and timely information. UNSCOM could designate for inspection any site, facility, activity, material or other item in Iraq, carry out inspections at any time and without hindrance, of any site, facility, activity, material or other item in Iraq, conduct unannounced inspections and inspections at short notice and inspect any number of declared or designated sites or facilities simultaneously or sequentially. UNSCOM would also consider and decide upon requests by Iraq to move or destroy any material, equipment or item relating to its nuclear, chemical or biological weapons or ballistic missile programmes, or material, equipment or any item relating to its other nuclear activities.

Detailed requirements for chemical and biological items and missiles were specified in Annexes 2, 3 and 4 of the plan respectively. Provision was also made for the annexes to be updated and revised by UNSCOM in the light of experience. Should there be any instances of non-compliance, UNSCOM has the right to “take it into custody and shall provide for its disposal, as appropriate” and “should the Special Commission discover any activity taking place in contravention of Resolution 687 (1991), 707 (1991) or of the plan, it shall have the right to call upon Iraq to halt the activity and to prevent its recurrence. The Special Commission shall also have the right to take any prohibited

item involved, including any documentation, into custody and shall provide for its disposal as appropriate.”

The OMV plan was approved by resolution 715 (1991).¹⁵ However, a month later, Iraq rejected¹⁶ the OMV regime and did not accept it until November 1993.¹⁷ During the following year, UNSCOM concentrated its efforts on the setting up of the OMV regime by carrying out baseline inspections aimed at drawing up protocols for each site to be monitored.

The UNSCOM report¹⁸ of October 1994 was particularly detailed as it concluded that the OMV system was provisionally operational. It noted that the OMV regime was based on regular inspection of facilities of concern, on an inventory of all dual-purpose items (i.e. those which have permitted uses but which could be used for the acquisition of banned weapons) and on following the fate of all inventory items. Underpinning the inspections and the establishment and maintenance of accurate inventories would be a full array of interlocking activities: aerial surveillance with a variety of sensors, tags and seals; a variety of detection technologies; information obtained from other sources; and, when sanctions on the dual-purpose items were lifted, notification under the export/import control mechanism. None of those elements on its own would suffice to provide confidence in the system but together they “should constitute the most comprehensive international monitoring system ever established in the sphere of arms control.”

It noted that confidence in the effectiveness of the OMV regime would depend, inter alia, on the following:

- Possession by UNSCOM of a full picture of Iraq’s past programmes and full accounting of the facilities, equipment, items and materials associated with those past programmes, in conjunction with the full knowledge of the disposition of dual-purpose items currently available to Iraq. This information would provide the baseline data for OMV. Iraq was required to update its declaration on its dual-purpose activities and capabilities every six months.
- Completion of comprehensive OMV protocols for each site at which monitoring will be conducted. These protocols would be produced from the baseline inspections: these were inspections for the purposes of familiarization, tagging and inventory, sensor installation or protocol building as necessary. These would provide the basis for future OMV activities at that site.
- The OMV regime was designed to be robust. Experience has shown that, even when initially presented with inadequate declarations, UNSCOM had, through use of its various resources and of its inspection rights, elicited the information required to establish the OMV regime. However, should Iraq seek systematically to block the work of UNSCOM by, for example, preventing access to sites, UNSCOM would be unable to provide the Security Council with the assurance it required concerning Iraq’s compliance with the terms of resolution 687.

In addition to conducting OMV activities at sites for which OMV protocols have been prepared, the monitoring teams based at the UNSCOM Baghdad Monitoring and Verification Centre would also conduct visits to various institutions at which research is undertaken but which might not need to be subject to regular monitoring. Such visits were to gain an understanding of the direction and level of Iraq’s basic research that might be useful for the production of chemical or biological warfare agents. These teams would also seek to clarify outstanding anomalies in Iraq’s declaration concerning its dual-purpose capabilities.

By April 1997, in the chemical weapons area, some 150 facilities in Iraq were being monitored and since October 1994, over 550 inspections had been carried out by the resident chemical monitoring group. The chemical monitoring teams based in Baghdad had discovered some 200 key pieces of undeclared dual-use equipment, such as heat exchangers, glass reactor vessels and distillation columns capable of use in proscribed chemical weapons activities. In addition, some 800 pieces of

related equipment have been located. Consequently, Iraq was not fully meeting its requirement to report on its holdings of dual-use equipment.

In the biological weapons area, by April 1997 some eighty-six sites were being monitored regularly. Several pieces of significant undeclared equipment, spare parts and supplies had been discovered in inspections. Iraq had still not declared all sites where dual-use equipment was present and the biological monitoring teams based in Baghdad continued to identify sites that Iraq should have declared.

Analysis

On-site inspections have been crucial to the success of UNSCOM in the face of continual Iraqi deception and obstruction. In this analysis, the importance of short notice inspections, visual observation, interviewing, identification of key equipment, auditing and sampling and identification are examined.

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INSPECTIONS

An essential element of UNSCOM has been the mounting of missions to Iraq to carry out on-site inspections and other activities associated with implementing resolution 687 and subsequent resolutions. Missions have ranged in size from just a few people to over fifty or more; duration has also varied from one day to several weeks or months. A particular characteristic of the UNSCOM missions has been that because UNSCOM has not had a large permanent staff, these missions have primarily been composed of individuals seconded by Member States of the United Nations to UNSCOM for the duration of the particular mission on which they have been engaged.

VISUAL OBSERVATION

The importance of visual observation has been particularly evident throughout UNSCOM's activities, especially in the face of Iraqi deception and obstruction. The value of U-2 and helicopter surveillance backed by on-site inspection has been shown as there were several instances of inspection teams being delayed at the entrance to facilities whilst Iraq moved equipment and materials out of the facility. Visual observation has also been essential in evaluating the role of sites and of the attempts made to conceal information.

INTERVIEWING

Interviewing has been another key tool used by UNSCOM in the light of Iraq's declared absence of any relevant documentation. A number of missions have specifically focussed on interviewing key participants in the prohibited programmes in order to attempt to recover an account of what happened and when. This approach has also been necessary to try to verify Iraq's unilateral destructions for

which it asserts that there is no remaining documentation. Interviews have, however, been difficult as they are invariably carried out in the presence of Iraqi “minders” and there have been several cases where interviewees have been persuaded to change their recollections. Nevertheless, the inconsistencies between different accounts and the Iraqi declarations have helped to demonstrate that Iraq has not been forthcoming about its past programmes.

IDENTIFICATION OF KEY EQUIPMENT

The identification of key equipment has been particularly valuable in both the chemical and the biological areas. Inspections by UNSCOM throughout the past seven years have identified equipment that is relevant to the prohibited programme and which has not been declared or disclosed by Iraq. One of the earliest examples was the discovery in December 1991 at a sugar factory in Mosul of 100 items of metal-working machinery from the Muthanna chemical bomb workshop. Much later, UNSCOM identified equipment removed from Kuwait and located in many chemical facilities in Iraq. Dual-purpose equipment procured for the chemical weapons programme has been identified by UNSCOM and destroyed under UNSCOM supervision. In the biological weapons area, the location of fermenters, filling machines and spray dryers has been the subject of much attention by UNSCOM, with key equipment being destroyed under UNSCOM supervision.

AUDITING

Auditing has been crucial to UNSCOM's activities. It has been particularly important that UNSCOM verify Iraq's FFCDs. Much emphasis has rightly been placed on achieving material balances for both weapons and for agents. Iraq has provided some information in its FFCDs whilst other documents have been found by inspection teams. The inconsistencies between the Iraqi FFCDs and other information found in Iraq has demonstrated that Iraq has continued to conceal and deceive its true capabilities from UNSCOM. Such auditing has been necessary across all areas being addressed by UNSCOM as the information relating to SCUD missiles, their indigenous production, and their warheads has to be correlated with information on the numbers of special warheads, filled with chemical and biological agents, which in turn have to be correlated to the quantities of agents produced by Iraq and the quantities of precursors or growth media imported into or produced by Iraq.

In October 1997 UNSCOM reported¹⁹ material balances for the period 1981 to 1990 for chemical agents and their precursors and for chemical munitions (see Table 1). These balances made it clear that there are significant quantities unaccounted for and currently unverified in the absence of further documentary evidence from Iraq.

It is against this background that the importance of the document found in a July 1998 inspection detailing the Iraqi Air Force consumption of both conventional and special aerial bombs becomes evident. UNSCOM had reported²⁰ that this document was “a listing of munitions expended by the Iraqi Air Force” and which included “together with conventional munitions detailed, four particular types of other munitions were included. They were denoted as 'special'. These types have been declared by Iraq to have been used for chemical and biological warfare agent delivery.” It was also noted that “the inspectors were able to take notes from the document. The notes revealed serious discrepancies between Iraq's declarations on the consumption of chemical bombs and the data copied from the document on the expenditure of these weapons.” Iraq regarded this document as

Table 1. Chemical Agent and Munitions Material Balance
1981–1990

Material	Quantity in tons	Remarks
Precursor chemicals	more than 20,000	Some 4,000 tons of declared precursors have not been verified
CW agents produced	3,850	Several hundred tons additional CW agents could have been produced
CW agents consumed during 1981–1988	2,870	No documents or information have been provided to support the declared quantity
CW agents destroyed under UNSCOM supervision	690	Verified by UNSCOM
CW agents discarded during production or destroyed during bombing	290	No supporting documentation for 130 tons declared discarded or destroyed
Munitions	Quantity	Remarks
Empty munitions produced and procured	247,263	107,500 empty casings have not been verified
CW filled munitions	152,119	Several thousand additional munitions could have been filled
CW filled munitions consumed during 1981–1988	101,080	No documents or information have been provided to support the declared quantity
CW filled or empty munitions destroyed by Iraq unilaterally	29,172	15,620 not verified due to destruction method
CW filled and empty munitions destroyed under UNSCOM supervision	38,537	Verified by UNSCOM
CW filled and empty munitions discarded during production or destroyed during bombing	78,264	No supporting documentation for 16,038 munitions declared discarded or destroyed

being irrelevant to the work of UNSCOM.

Auditing was just as important in the biological weapons area. In June 1998, UNSCOM said that the statements in the biological FFCD could not yet be verified in respect of: growth media material balance, agents produced/destroyed, munitions available, munitions filled and weapons destroyed.

SAMPLING AND IDENTIFICATION

Sampling and identification has played an important role in the work of UNSCOM. The early sampling and identification work carried out in the survey of the Muthanna chemical weapons site demonstrated that Iraq had been working on a wider range of chemical agents than it had declared. In the later years, sampling and identification played a key role in demonstrating that Iraqi unilaterally destroyed missile warheads had been filled with the chemical agent VX and that more missile warheads had been filled with anthrax than had been declared. Sampling and identification had thus provided key evidence that Iraq's declarations continued to be false and inconsistent.

Conclusions

On-site inspection has been crucial for the work of UNSCOM in implementing resolution 687. Without these inspections, there could have been no uncovering of Iraq's past programme; no destruction of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, equipment and facilities; and no assurance that Iraq was not reacquiring such a capability. The UNSCOM experience demonstrates clearly that an effective regime must include on-site measures.

Notes

- ¹ United Nations Security Council, Resolution on the situation between Iraq and Kuwait, S/RES/687 (1991), 3 April 1991.
- ² United Nations Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General submitting the plan for ongoing future monitoring and verification of Iraq's compliance with relevant parts of Section C of Security Council resolution 687 (1991), S/22871/Rev.1, 2 October 1991.
- ³ United Nations Security Council, Security Council Resolution on the situation between Iraq and Kuwait, S/RES/715 (1991), 11 October 1991.
- ⁴ United Nations Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the status of the implementation of the Special Commission's plan for the ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq's compliance with relevant parts of Section C of Security Council resolution 687 (1991), S/1994/1138, 7 October 1994.
- ⁵ United Nations Security Council, Report of the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission established by the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 9 (b) (i) of Security Council resolution 687 (1991), S/23165, 25 October 1991.
- ⁶ United Nations Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the status of the implementation of the Special Commission's plan for the ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq's compliance with relevant parts of Section C of Security Council resolution 687 (1991), S/1995/864, 11 October 1995.
- ⁷ United Nations Security Council, Letter dated 5 August 1998 from the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission established by the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 9 (b) (i) of Security Council resolution 687 (1991) addressed to the President of the Security Council, S/1998/719, 5 August 1998.
- ⁸ Special Report of the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission established by the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 9 (b) (i) of Security Council resolution 687 (1991), S/23606, 18 February 1992.
- ⁹ United Nations Security Council, Further Report of the Secretary-General on the status of compliance by Iraq with the obligations placed upon it under certain of the Security Council Resolutions, S/23687, 7 March 1992.
- ¹⁰ United Nations Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the status of the implementation of the Special Commission's plan for the ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq's compliance with relevant parts of Section C of Security Council resolution 687 (1991), S/1995/864, 11 October 1995.
- ¹¹ United Nations Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the activities of the Special Commission established by the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 9 (b) (i) of resolution 687 (1991), S/1996/258, 11 April 1996.

- ¹² United Nations Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the activities of the Special Commission established by the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 9 (b) (i) of resolution 687 (1991), S/1997/301, 11 April 1997.
- ¹³ United Nations Security Council, Letter dated 26 October 1998 from the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission established by the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 9 (b) (i) of Security Council resolution 687 (1991) addressed to the President of the Security Council, S/1998/995, 26 October 1998.
- ¹⁴ United Nations Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General submitting the plan for future ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq's compliance with relevant parts of section C of Security Council resolution 687 (1991), S/22871/Rev.1, 2 October 1991.
- ¹⁵ United Nations Security Council, Resolution on the situation between Iraq and Kuwait, S/RES/715(1991), 11 October 1991.
- ¹⁶ Iraq rejection of OMV plan as reported in paragraphs 12 and 13 of United Nations Security Council, Special Report of the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission established by the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 9 (b) (i) of Security Council resolution 687 (1991), S/23606, 18 February 1992.
- ¹⁷ United Nations Security Council, Letter dated 26 November 1993 from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Iraq addressed to the President of the Security Council, S/26811, 26 November 1993.
- ¹⁸ United Nations Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the status of the implementation of the Special Commission's plan for the ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq's compliance with relevant parts of Section C of Security Council resolution 687 (1991), S/1994/1138, 7 October 1994.
- ¹⁹ United Nations Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the activities of the Special Commission established by the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 9 (b) (i) of resolution 687 (1991), S/1997/774, 6 October 1997.
- ²⁰ United Nations Special Commission, Letter from the Executive Chairman addressed to the President of the Security Council, 22 July 1998.