

Seizing the 'ripe' moment: building confidence and security in South Asia

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It has become commonplace to see the relationship and tension between India and Pakistan as one of the most sensitive nuclear flashpoints in the world. With a fifty-year dispute over Kashmir and three wars between them, for nearly twenty years the two states have been lurching from crisis to thaw, only to fall back into crisis again. And throughout this oscillating pattern the two states' nuclear developments have continued unabated, culminating in the events of May 1998 when both nations detonated tests and became *de facto* nuclear-weapons states.

However, there is perhaps a crucial moment to be grasped in terms of developing a structured security dialogue between the two states. At the time of writing, the January 2004 summit of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) appears to be a crucial turning point. Following a meeting between Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee and Pakistan President Musharraf, India 'hailed "progress"'.¹ Vajpayee, in a speech to the SAARC summit, remembered that 'our forefathers [had] fought side by side transcending religious, regional and linguistic differences against the colonial oppressor in the first war of Independence in 1857', and hoped that 'perhaps India, Pakistan and Bangladesh can together celebrate' the 150th anniversary of that uprising 'in remembrance of our joint struggle against a common adversary'.² Such language of commonality has certainly been rare. It is, potentially, a moment of 'ripeness' for a change in the nature of the relationship between India and Pakistan.

This article looks at the nature of this emerging moment of 'ripeness', to assess how it is different from other potential moments over the past fifteen years. But recognizing a ripe moment is not sufficient; what are needed are ideas about how the moment can be seized, and so this article looks at the contribution that might be made to the security and stability of the subcontinent through the development of confidence-building measures (CBMs). The Lahore Declaration of February 1999 created some possibilities for development, but these were seemingly lost during the Kargil crisis of that year, and the increasing tensions of 2002. Indeed, many 'moments' have simply not developed over the past twenty years. Hence, before examining possible confidence-building measures, the article begins with a consideration of the concept of 'ripeness' and its application to South Asia over the past fifteen or so years.

Recognizing 'ripeness'

The concept of 'ripeness', as developed by Zartman and others, suggests that there is a specific moment that is particularly favourable for a change in the nature of tense relations in favour of some

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form of negotiation process.³ The key is both in the identification of this moment, and in seizing it in order to bring about a change in relations. Both elements are crucial—it is not enough simply to recognize the moment of ripeness; it must be acted upon.

Zartman argued that the moment becomes ripe in the context of what he described as a ‘mutually hurting stalemate’. In that situation, cost-benefit analysis on the part of the conflicting parties illustrates that there is more to be gained from de-escalation than from a continuation of the *status quo*, or through an escalation. Thus, there is a plateau in the nature of the relationship upon which there is time for reflection and choice. But importantly, this is a moment created by perception—it is not simply a matter of rational calculation. That is, what is required is a change in the ‘enemy image’, in the ability of one side to trust the other, in order for the moment to be ‘ripe’.

Why is there the possibility of significant movement in this phase of relations between India and Pakistan? Why might this be a moment of ripeness? Perhaps three factors are important. First, international pressure has grown; as Pakistan’s President Musharraf noted himself in a very important interview with Reuters when asked whether this time there was a difference about the current thaw: ‘one [factor is] of the world realising that Kashmir is a serious issue which must be resolved, and obviously they keep saying this is a nuclear flashpoint and all that, so the world is concerned.’⁴ Prime Minister Vajpayee has said that ‘Pakistan has been repeating its stance [over Kashmir] and we have also been doing the same, and the world has been saying that we should resolve it.’⁵ That concern translates into very real diplomatic pressure, as seen in particular during the crisis of 2002. Second, the sense of

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risk is increasing amongst policy-makers in both New Delhi and Islamabad. Both sides seem to have a strong sense of their own ability to control escalation in conflict; but both are concerned that the other side may not have sufficiently robust procedures, or fear ‘extremists’ in the other capital. With nuclear weapons, such fears are very sobering indeed. But there is a third factor as well. The strategic balance on the subcontinent has changed significantly over thirty years. The Tashkent Declaration of 1966, following the war of the previous year, set out principles ‘of vital importance for the welfare of the 600 million people of India and Pakistan.’⁶ Nowadays, India alone has a population of over 1 billion, and a middle class that has now grown to some 120 million, that is only slightly less than Pakistan’s total population of 153 million. (Bangladesh is, of course, now independent; its population is nearly 147 million.)⁷ Whereas, for much of the period since independence Pakistan’s economic performance was at least on a par with that of India, and in some ways superior, in the analysis of Ishrat Husain: ‘there is an important and perceptible positive shift in most of the indicators of India since 1991. Export growth rates have almost doubled, GDP growth is averaging 6 to 7% in recent years, current account deficit is down and foreign capital flows for investment have risen several fold. The edge that Pakistan has gained over India in most of these indicators until 1990 is fast eroding.’⁸

And, finally, a quick look at the military balance shows a major Indian advantage: in manpower (1.1 million compared to 500,000), combat aircraft (738 to 353), estimated nuclear weapons (60 to 25), warships (27 to 8), and military budget (\$15.9 billion to \$2.6 billion).⁹ The strategic change is exacerbated for Pakistan by the growing sense of internal challenge from terrorist and dissident groups, symbolized by the attempted assassinations of the President in December 2003. These trends seem likely to continue. But they do not form a platform from which India can change the situation by force. Thus, for international, risk assessment and strategic reasons, there might be a moment where relations could move from thaw into a structured peace process.

It would, however, be foolish to be overly optimistic—there is nothing inevitable about such a positive outcome. Sanjoy Majumder of the BBC quotes a final year medical student in Lahore. ‘We’ve seen it all before’, she says. ‘The talk, the gestures—and then it’s back to the squabbling.’¹⁰

There have been other moments of apparent ripeness when a structured peace might have emerged since the event that marked South Asia's first nuclear crisis nearly fifteen years ago. In 1987, India conducted a major military exercise known as 'Brasstacks' held in a strategically sensitive location, which produced a nervous response from Pakistan, fearing this was the precursor to an Indian attack.¹¹ In late January of that year, Abdul Qadeer Khan, the key man responsible for the Pakistani nuclear programme, gave an interview to an Indian journalist and signalled Pakistan's success in producing weapon-grade uranium; a clear signal of nuclear deterrence.¹² Three years later, tensions resurfaced. Infiltration into Kashmir from the Pakistani side of the border led to Indian consideration of pre-emptive strikes against bases across the Line of Control in Kashmir; such considerations were interpreted in Islamabad as preparations for a deep military strike into Pakistan, to which the only response seemed to be nuclear. Fearing an inability of the two sides to manage the crisis, the American president sent Robert Gates on a mission to both capitals. He reportedly pressed for restraint in New Delhi, while informing Islamabad that all the Pentagon's war-gaming on the region led to Pakistani defeat.¹³

The 1987 and 1990 crises could have led to a thaw producing a more structured dialogue, but they did not, for four crucial reasons. First, Pakistani leaders had read the crises as underpinning the need for a nuclear deterrent, and hence continued their development of such weapons. With Chinese aid, and despite the cut-off of American economic and military assistance, this process continued through to 1994. Second, the balance on the subcontinent had been altered by the collapse of the Soviet Union, and hence the collapse of the 1971 Peace and Friendship Treaty with Moscow. Third, Indian policy calculations had predicted that the efforts to extend the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) beyond its twenty-five years would fail; in 1995, the opposite occurred. With the treaty's extension, only Cuba, India, Pakistan and Israel were left outside its scope. Fourth, the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) was also making significant progress, resulting in its adoption in September 1996. This would clearly lead to increased pressure on the South Asian states; but, critically for India, China had conducted a series of nuclear tests prior to its accession. Indian policy-makers saw this as a sign that China felt comfortable that it would not need to test further, and that pressure on India to sign the CTBT, along with China's nuclear comfort, could only be to India's strategic detriment.

In the period between the crises of 1987 and 1990 and the 1998 nuclear tests, therefore, the possibilities of halting nuclear developments on the subcontinent were in fact very limited. And certainly the role of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in coming to power in India was important in that the party had made an election pledge to 'induct' nuclear weapons into India's armoury.¹⁴ The moment for negotiations did not become, in arms-control terms, ripe.

The crisis re-emerged in 1999 and in 2002. In 1999, Pakistan made an incursion at Kargil; the crisis did not escalate, and some have concluded that a form of nuclear deterrence had emerged.¹⁵ But these are dangerous assumptions. There is evidence that the regime in Islamabad under Nawaz Sharif assumed that the nuclear relationship would freeze any possibilities for escalation at the level of limited conventional conflict. Further, Indian forces were able to inflict significant casualties on the infiltrators in the theatre; Pakistan and Kashmiri militants were not able to hold the ground, not least with Pakistan under intense diplomatic pressure from the United States. Further, the conflict began only three months after a thaw in relations had been symbolized by the visit of Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee to Pakistan, thus underlining in New Delhi the problem of trust in the relationship with Pakistan. A potential moment of ripeness was lost by a policy misjudgement in Islamabad.¹⁶ Hopes that, in the aftermath of Kargil, there might be a chance for progress were dashed by the failure of the Agra Summit in July 2001, which seemed to suggest further that the moment was still not ripe for development.

The 2002 crisis resulted from continued incursions into Indian-controlled Kashmir, and seemingly an inability or an unwillingness on the part of Pakistan to control the attacks. The context had been set at the end of 2001 when the Indian Parliament was stormed. By the summer of 2002, thirty-two people had been killed in just one day by the incursions. India's Prime Minister was reported as telling

his troops that 'India has accepted the challenge thrown down by our neighbour and we are preparing ourselves for decisive victory against the enemy. We will not let Pakistan carry on its proxy war against India any longer'; and when Vajpayee was asked about gathering 'war clouds' he reportedly replied: 'The sky is clear. But sometimes lightning strikes, even in clear skies.'¹⁷ All of this led to a recommendation by the United States for its citizens to leave the region; the United Nations took the same line, as well as other states. The outside perception was that the region was on the brink of a nuclear war. But statements from the participants frequently suggested the opposite. India's Defence Minister, George Fernandes, said that: 'The underlying belief [of our western critics] is: "Bombs are safe in our hands. But after they cross the Arabian Sea and move eastward, they are not".'¹⁸ In a similar vein, India's *Economic Examiner* told us that 'Polemics are liberally used when tensions rise, but it is naïve for the West to conclude that the elite in India or Pakistan (the most educated and sophisticated people outside Europe and North America) did not know what their nuclear bombs would do.'¹⁹

Since those dark days, a thaw has certainly set in to the extent that by early 2004 both states can talk openly about discussions over Kashmir, emphasizing flexibility on the part of both countries.²⁰ It must represent, in any language, a moment of ripeness. And it is not just amongst the policy elite: snapshot polls indicate public support too.²¹ The issue is whether this moment can be seized; can a process be consolidated that finds ways of building confidence between the two states. The following section looks at methods and ideas concerned with seizing this moment of ripeness.

Seizing the ripe moment and building confidence

MECHANISMS FOR AGREEING A PROCESS

One of the major difficulties in moving relations from tension, through thaw, to something more positive is that there are always countervailing tendencies. There are always those who are concerned that it is dangerous to place too much trust; that worst-case analysis is the only basis upon which it is possible to deal with the 'other'. There are those who have learnt, often through violence, that the 'other' cannot be trusted. There are some who see personal political advantage in maintaining tension. There is the problem of inertia—any new initiative takes time and effort. And in many countries, many of these countervailing pressures are articulated through the media.

Certainly, the media in both countries have been able to give voice to concerns and fears of the 'other'. In contrast to much of the positive rhetoric surrounding the 2004 SAARC summit, Absar Alam, in the Pakistani newspaper *The Nation*, suggests, in an article entitled 'The ego has landed' (Vajpayee being the 'ego'), that India is driving the current move towards a fuller normalization of relations.

The price that India extracted from Pakistan to attend the SAARC summit is huge, according to some Pakistani analysts who believe that now the Kashmir issue will stay in cold storage for a long time and efforts will only focus to improve relations in other fields. This is what India wanted. In return, New Delhi has made Islamabad announce a ceasefire on Siachin and the Line of Control, and restore air, rail and road links. This is in addition to agreement on terrorism control and a pledge to launch efforts for poverty control. There are many in the Pakistani establishment who believe that all these measures could be rolled back if India did not move ahead to discuss the core issue of Kashmir. Sure, CBMs can always be reversed, but for that Islamabad will have to do a lot of explaining in western capitals.²²

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Musharraf chose a public forum—an interview with Reuters—to float the idea that Pakistan would set aside its fifty-year-old demand to implement the Security Council resolution that troops should be withdrawn from Kashmir and a plebiscite held on the question as to whether the province should be a part of India or Pakistan.²³ Such ‘flexibility’ has to be crucial to making the transition into a deeper set of relations.²⁴ But in a public forum, it has to be reacted to in a public way. These comments were met by hostility in Pakistani-controlled Kashmir²⁵—and though welcomed by the Indian government, they encountered suspicion in parts of the Indian media. *The Times of India* asked: ‘Does Mush like the taste of his own words? Or do domestic compulsions make him eat them? Whatever, the Pakistan President has made it a habit of backtracking on his grand gestures—give it to him, he makes them often. But then he takes them away.’²⁶ A report in the *Hindustan Times* also focused on Pakistan’s ‘backtracking’.²⁷ With a different approach to the worst-case analysis, Syed Saleem Shahzad argued that: ‘Musharraf’s offer is seemingly a bold one designed to put India on the back foot, for the longer Delhi dithers, the more they will appear to be the recalcitrant party, especially as the United States is exerting pressure on both sides to resolve the problem “by meeting each other halfway”’.²⁸

The point here is not to be critical of the media, but to illustrate the difficulties of communicating flexibility and change in a public forum. Under those circumstances, there is a large and important role for track-two diplomacy. But in other places, and at other times, different tactics have been followed. For example, in the dispute over Taiwan, a formula of words allowed diplomatic progress to be made between the United States and China with agreement that ‘all Chinese on either sides of the Taiwan straits maintain that there is but one China.’ In the peace agreement between Israel and Egypt, concern that audiences were playing a role in stalling movement led to a deliberate decision to leave the public stage, and the final negotiations between Begin and Sadat were held at Camp David, specifically to isolate negotiators from their national audiences. Something very similar occurred at Dayton at the conclusion of the Bosnian conflict.²⁹

A further reason why imaginative means of communication are important is because of the danger of ‘entrapment’ in negotiations. The problem here is not one of the audience, but rather a situation where a process develops from which the perception is that when making concessions is undesirable, but the only way out, it amounts in effect to capitulation. Thus, both sides continue with the conflict, unable to escape from the weight of investments already made. Consider the Viet Nam War: American administrations for a long time became entrapped in continuing the fighting to make the loss of American lives seem ‘worthwhile’; continuing because of the ‘immeasurable’ costs of regimes that might collapse like dominoes in South-East Asia if they withdrew. This concern with entrapment could be a very real danger in the India–Pakistan case. In both countries, historical investment in the rivalry and conflict with its neighbour is high.³⁰ In both of them, major costs have been borne to develop military forces, to the detriment of the general economy. Most particularly, this may be said to be true in the nuclear realm. With such investment, not only of monetary resources but also of human and intellectual resources, a decisive move away from a military relationship would be a major undertaking in its own right.

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But, in that case, it might be thought that a secure nuclear-deterrent relationship might actually encourage negotiations; might it provide the cover for an improving political relationship? In other words, paradoxically, nuclear deterrence might provide the security that allows a general improvement in security relations? Perhaps. But there are several factors that are important in thinking about the stability of such a relationship. There might be a change in the broader strategic environment—whether in China, in Iran or in the Middle East. Deterrence is burdensome to maintain. And it also carries with it the danger—no matter how small—that it might break down with cataclysmic results.

DEVELOPING CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES

India and Pakistan are by no means new to the area of CBMs, although it must be admitted that few concrete measures have taken place. There are some agreements on communications (see below), and a 1998 agreement not to attack each other's nuclear facilities.³¹ In February 1999, leaders of the two states, meeting in Lahore, issued a declaration ('Recognising that the nuclear dimension of the security environment of the two countries adds to their responsibility for avoidance of conflict between the two countries'), and issued a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU).³² The MoU, in particular, made a whole series of CBM proposals—covering seminars on security concepts and nuclear doctrines, notification of ballistic missile flight tests, accidental or unauthorized nuclear use, unilateral moratoria on nuclear tests, prevention of incidents at sea, consultative mechanisms, and communications links—

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while agreeing to consult bilaterally in multilateral fora. Little progress had been made on developing the Lahore agenda in the crises of the following years. But now, if there is a moment of ripeness, it can be seized by looking again at the Lahore MoU, seeing where it needs updating and developing, and working to bring about its introduction.

CBMs cover a whole spectrum of different activities. Some non-military ones are already being put back into place. On New Year's Day 2004, passenger flights between the two countries began once again, symbolic of the restoration of travel arrangements. The January 2004 SAARC summit also made crucial agreements in terms of the adoption of liberal visa regimes for media and journalists in the region. This could be a vital step in improving understanding between states and peoples; Yashwant Sinha, India's External Affairs Minister, notably asked that journalists become what he described as 'co-conspirators' in the task of leaving 'behind the baggage of hatred, suspicion and violence.'³³ And, perhaps, the most important of all CBMs in the region, the Indus Water Treaty, has been honoured for over forty years, despite war and crises.³⁴

Non-military CBMs are important and should not be underestimated. However, it is in the military realm that most focus is placed; and here there is complexity not only in the issues and the history involved, but also in India's security relationship with China. However, focusing on South Asia and developing and following the outline of the Lahore MoU, five ideas have emerged.

The first concerns debate over security concepts and nuclear doctrine. Clearly, the development of nuclear concepts in both countries is at a relatively early stage, but with a statement from India on this issue, and with statements of a more philosophical nature from Pakistan, the developments that have occurred should not be undervalued.³⁵ But there is a danger that if these developments continued, India would move further towards a policy of massive retaliation, Pakistan towards a minimal deterrent (but one that would be capable of inflicting catastrophic damage upon India), and that this would not encourage crisis stability. (India may be tempted to launch a first strike to 'knock out' the minimal deterrent; Pakistan might be tempted to launch early to avoid such a scenario.)

Should there be clarity over the 'red lines' that would lead to nuclear use? Some Indians certainly fear that this might allow a separation of limited conventional war from nuclear war—with the learned experience of Kargil in mind. Indeed, there was much concern during the Cold War on the Western side about precisely these sorts of issues, and so the response in general was to keep the issue opaque—NATO, in particular, followed a line which said that 'whatever was necessary' would be used in conflict. That made 'no first use' declarations redundant, which has not been a logic followed in New Delhi.

What is clear is that both India and Pakistan would benefit from sharing the development of their respective nuclear doctrines. Neither will gain from creating strategic instability, either because there

are nuclear incentives to strike first in a crisis, or because the two sides are unclear of the relationship between low-level conventional conflict and the use of nuclear weapons. Doctrine seminars, perhaps facilitated by a third party, could play a very important role.

Second, work could be developed on notification of ballistic missile flight tests. This seems a particularly important area, given the great argument over alleged non-notification of tests in early 2003. Flight-testing has taken on a political resonance in South Asia, far greater than was ever the case between the Cold War adversaries. Hence, the development of CBMs relating to ballistic missile flight-testing is an area for serious consideration. Obvious possibilities include agreement on how far in advance a test must be notified; the direction of the missile trajectory; the period over which tests will take place; and the criteria for abstinence of tests during periods of crisis. Cruise missiles would need to be included in such CBMs as well. In the East-West context, there had been a steady development of missile launch monitoring from 'quantitative' to 'qualitative', so that, in the end, each side was actually supplying information to the other that helped to generate transparency and trust. Although the scale of missile developments on the subcontinent compared to that of the superpowers during the Cold War is clearly very different, this attitude—growing transparency to encourage trust—should be an important part of CBMs in the region.

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Third, on the subject of accidental or unauthorized use, the incorporation of robust safety systems that minimize the risk of accidental use, training in accident response, public education and communication with the other side on these measures in order to generate confidence are obvious and important lines of development. These are central issues not only in terms of developing trust and rules of the road, but also because they will dictate how (and if) the two states' nuclear technology becomes fully weaponized—and how a safe command and control system will be developed accordingly.³⁶ Perhaps, ultimately, a Nuclear Risk Reduction Centre could be developed; it might be worth having this on the agenda from the beginning.

The fourth area is communication. We know that a back channel exists between the two states and has been used—for example, over Kargil. Foreign ministers have, of course, spoken to each other directly on the telephone. There is also a formal line between the Directors-General of Military Operations (DGMO) of both states, that has operated since 1987 on a weekly basis. But there is no 'hotline'—a secure, dedicated line—as existed successfully for many years in the Soviet-American conflict, and that has also operated in Sino-Indian relations. For some years in the superpower relationship it was agreed that the hotline would only be used for discussions over nuclear matters. A structure of communication, clarifying at what level issues could be shared, and in what format, would be a relatively straightforward matter. There is no evidence that the DGMO line has been deliberately used for disinformation, although this would need to be ruled out at all levels. And the creation of a hotline would not imply that there was any suspicion as to the motives of either state. It simply creates 'rules of the road' by and for each state. One of the central concerns for the nuclear powers during the Cold War was with survivability; should there be a use of force by either side, by accident or deliberately, a national authority with full communication capabilities would be the only means of judging a response. A hotline is crucial to this.

Fifth, and finally, CBMs could be developed in connection with the central issue: Kashmir. Debate over the Line of Control has continued for over forty years, as specialists have sought to initiate breakthroughs, including the possibility of making it an international border, or of a repartition along religious/ethnic lines (both very difficult for the parties concerned to accept). But in the interim, perhaps there are possibilities for addressing the central sore—cross-border terror raids. Can Indian scepticism about Pakistani actions be addressed by the deployment of United Nations or other neutral observers as monitors? This has been seen as more difficult for India to accept than for Pakistan. There might be

scope for an observation element to monitor activity and to monitor training camps. If they were allowed an intrusive role, monitoring forces could enter without giving time for camps to disperse. This would be more difficult for Pakistan to accept. Perhaps there could, with goodwill, be some compromise by both sides along these lines. A variant of this might be the deployment of observers to monitor adherence to the Agreement on Advanced Notice of Military Exercises that the parties entered into in 1991.³⁷ The key is not the creation of concrete proposals from outside, but the generation of ideas to

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Many of these ideas might be too radical for the political environment; but the point of identifying a moment of ripeness is to see how the environment could change and be developed. And it is not necessary to simply focus on maximal solutions. Although the political will needed to create CBM structures that are implemented and to establish the 'rules of the game' might be at a premium between India and Pakistan, the possibility of creating a virtuous circle by starting with very modest CBM measures should not be neglected.

Conclusion

The January 2004 SAARC summit ended with a key commitment by India and Pakistan—that bilateral talks would begin the following month. The moment of ripeness has, it seems, been recognized. Now it needs to be seized. Security issues have to be tackled with a sense of urgency. Any future terrorist incident might provoke India into punitive action, which in the worst case might lead to uncontrolled or accidental responses, all the way to a nuclear exchange. This suggests that, although the nuclear aspects will have to be a part of the general discussions on security, it might also be worth considering whether they can be made separable, in case the moment passes too quickly.

But the central task must be to build upon the moment by agreeing an agenda of CBM initiatives; and the five areas discussed above are a good starting point. What is also needed is a commitment to make agreements that might become legally binding, to insulate (as far as possible) processes from any future downturn in relations.

The role of the specialists from the two countries in carrying through their leaders' commitments to flexibility is certainly a key issue, as are the continued efforts of those leaders to keep talks on track. But there has been a very important role for the international community (and, of course, for the United States in particular) in encouraging and supporting these developments, and in being creative about future facilitation roles. However, the essence of any new process to develop greater security rests first and foremost with the policy-makers of the region.

Notes

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 21. *The Statesman* conducted two illustrative polls. On 9 May 2003 Indians were asked 'Does Pakistan really want to solve all outstanding issues with India?' In response, 42% agreed, 57% did not. On 3 January 2004, in reply to the statement 'Peace with Pakistan is not a realistic desire given current conditions', 33% agreed, 62% did not. That is, with all the caveats about this not being a scientific process, those who felt peace was possible rose from 42% to 62%, those who did not fell from 57% to 33%. See < www.thestatesman.org/page.pollarchives.php > .
 22. Absar Alam, 2004, The Ego Has Landed, *The Nation*, 4 January, at < www.nation.com.pk/daily/Jan-2004/4/main/top3.asp > . See for Indian media criticism of the Pakistani media on these issues, Pak Media Flays Govt. for Putting J&K on the Backburner, *The Hindu*, 4 January 2004, at < www.hindu.com/thehindu/holnus/00104141559.htm > .
 23. The President's comment was 'we are for the United Nations Security Council resolutions whatever it stands for. However, now we have left that aside.' Musharraf interview on India and Kashmir, Reuters, 19 December 2003.
 24. And, as such, it had been an issue of debate between 'modernizers' and 'traditionalists' within the Pakistan elite for some years. See the brief account by Alexander Evans, 2001, Reducing Tension Is Not Enough, *Washington Quarterly*, Spring, pp. 186–91.
 25. Sheikh Mushtaq and Zulfiqar Ali, 2003, India Welcomes Pakistan's Surprise Kashmir Offer, *Reuters*, 19 December, at < www.reuters.com/locales/newsArticle.jsp?type=topNews&locale=en_IN&storyID=4019943 > .
 26. C.R. Jayachandran, 2003, What Makes Musharraf Eat His Words?, *The Times of India*, 19 December, at < timesofindia.indiatimes.com/cms.dll/html/uncomp/articleshow/369903.cms > .
 27. Musharraf's Remarks on Kashmir Cause a Flutter in Pakistan, *Hindustan Times*, 19 December 2003.
 28. Syed Saleem Shahzad, 2003, Pakistan Plays a Canny Game, *Asia Times Online*, 20 December, at < www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/EL20Df02.html > .
 29. An excellent empirical analysis of this point is that of T. Armstrong, 1993, *Breaking the Ice: Rapprochement between East and West Germany, The United States and China, and Israel and Egypt*, Washington, DC, United States Institute for Peace.
 30. See, as an example, the article by Firoza Ahmed, 2003, Possible to Negotiate Peace with India?, at < www.paknews.com/articles.php?id=2&date1=2003-11-11 > , that refutes the contributions of Indian authors in the Pakistani media by focusing on differences in the historical record, presented as an objective reality.

31. For the text of the short agreement, the Prohibition of Attack on Nuclear Facilities, see < www.pnnd.org/pak_india_nuclear_power_plants.htm> .
32. The text of the Declaration, the Joint Statement and the MoU can be found at < www.usip.org/library/pa/ip/ip_lahore19990221.html> .
33. See O.P. Veerma, 2004, Talks with Pak within SAARC Regime: India, *Deccan Herald*, 4 January, at < www.deccanherald.com/deccanherald/jan042004/i1.asp> .
34. Text of the treaty is available at < www.stimson.org/southasia/?sn=sa20020116300> .
35. On Indian doctrine, see Draft Report of the Indian National Security Advisory Board of August 1999 at < www.indianembassy.org/policy/CTBT/nuclear_doctrine_aug_17_1999.html> . For further insight, see Rear-Admiral Raja Menon (Retd.), 2000, *A Nuclear Strategy for India*, New Delhi, Sage Publications. On Pakistan, see, for example, Foreign Minister Abdul Sattar's address in response to India's doctrine, excerpted in *Disarmament Diplomacy*, 1999, no. 41 (November), at < www.acronym.org.uk/textonly/dd/dd41/41pakis.htm> .
36. For an excellent analysis, see Shaun Gregory, 2001, A Formidable Challenge: Nuclear Command and Control in South Asia, *Disarmament Diplomacy*, no. 54 (February), which can be found at < www.acronym.org.uk/textonly/dd/dd54/54greg.htm> .
37. See the text of the agreement on < www.southasiafoundation.org/saf/safdic/doc/india_pak/agr_42.htm> .