

# Civilians and the military in Latin American democracies

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The many changes of the past decade, among them the new legitimacy regarding the defence of human rights, non-state actors being included on national and international agendas, the settlement of conflicts by peaceful means and moves towards regional integration, have motivated a desire to see the role of the military in society redefined in the new democracies of Latin America.

## *Myths and changing realities*

In 1996 Abraham Lowenthal and Jorge Domínguez<sup>1</sup> said that, notwithstanding certain operational problems, deviations and setbacks, there was a major shift in the region towards democracy. Coups d'état, the traditional response to recurrent political crisis, seemed to have vanished from Latin America. The shift towards a democratic reordering of society at the beginning of the twenty-first century, however, has been erratic and over the past few years the institution-building landscape has been fogged by populist or incompetent presidents, unstable governments and governments of doubtful legitimacy. We have also witnessed new forms of military involvement in guises that preserve the semblance of democracy: military control of vast quantities of economic resources, intelligence services with close links to governments, military putschists following populist policies, paramilitary intervention in political disputes and control of society through the militarization of domestic law enforcement.

Although some countries have managed to subordinate (to differing degrees) the military under civilian authority, this does not necessarily mean that the management of defence policy is in the hands of civilian authorities. The return to democracy is thus leaving a gap in the civilian control of the armed forces and their adjustment to the rules of democracy. Military organizations have collectively lost a certain measure of their authority but their historical alliances with the dominant sectors of society have allowed them to continue to wield significant power. This logrolling is winning them prerogatives as a collective entity within the democratic framework. The military reacted possessively to the change in the state, striving to retain the resources that had historically been their own. They adjusted collectively to democracy, defending their legal and institutional privileges. Nowadays they have less scope to challenge the civilian authorities, although relations between civilians and the military have not yet settled down to clear communication through institutional channels.

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Political and social rights may now be accorded greater weight but there is still a measure of arbitrariness, which is also an expression of the authorities' confusion about assigning the military a mission consistent with the rule of law in a regional integration process. If the democracies in Latin America are to become entrenched, we believe that civilian management of defence must become established as state policy.

Civilian authority is built upon the knowledge and acquired skills of civil servants, congressional advisers and political parties. Yet in the period of democratic transition, we have seen emphasis on offering military leaders additional training. For example, the Pentagon (through its Southern Command) has offered several courses and training programmes specifically for the military and has failed to develop training programmes for civilian management of defence policy. Nor do the Latin American governments themselves offer formal civilian training programmes. The creation of a new civilian leadership based on genuine aptitude is crucial to the stability of Latin American democracies.

### *Accomplishments and errors throughout the region*

Since the return of democracy to Latin America an attempt has been made to establish a new pact of civilian control, albeit incomplete, enabling the political elites to contend for power without the 'blessing' of the armed forces. In some countries this new hegemonic settlement has been a success, and political differences are settled through electoral competition; in others, instability predominates.

The restoration of democracy across the continent has been an erratic process. Peru's inability to include its traditional elites within its modernization project has led to a recurrent crisis of political control, and power has been fragmented by the predominance of a marginal military sector.<sup>2</sup> The support of President Fujimori by the armed forces made it impossible to institute civilian management of defence and, as a result, the armed forces have not remained on the political sidelines.

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Despite a tacit agreement that governed relations between civilians and the military for thirty-five years<sup>3</sup>—through a long crisis with outbreaks of extreme civil strife and unaccountable general impoverishment—the assumption of the Venezuelan presidency by

Hugo Chávez on 2 February 1999 has produced a dominant coalition that departs from democratic procedures. The country's new *Carta Magna* concentrates power in the executive and grants the military new prerogatives in a variety of political domains that, besides military tasks, also touch on questions of education and development. The supremacy of civilian authority is not discussed in relation to the Chávez administration.

If the armed forces of Venezuela were called to decide the political future of the nation, they might create instability and erode legitimacy. Legitimacy is not measured by the number of Chávez's congressmen. Instead, it derives from the predictability of the institutional game that neutralizes the collective weight of the military. The recent military coup showed that populist and state-centred measures confront a fragmented society, each time with more violence. With nearly half of the population demanding his resignation, it was clear that Chávez failed to improve democratic procedures.

The crisis in political legitimacy in Paraguay—a paragon of the institutional imperfections found in the new democracies—surely needs no illustrating. The assassination of Vice President Argaña and the forced exile of President Cubas to Brazil in March 1999 attest to the violence used to settle political disputes in a country where the armed forces are privileged actors. It is also the military that is supposed to uphold 'order', and the lack of clear rules promotes the emergence of patriarchal leaders in the

place of party authorities. To round off this dismaying prospect, the Partido Colorado is simultaneously the source of legitimacy, crisis and confrontation. With such a singular party structure, rebuilding any kind of institutional consensus is virtually impossible.

In Uruguay, where the military problem seems to be less acute, there are still vestiges of the privileges that the officers won while in power. Due to the breakdown of the two-party system and the advances made by the Frente Amplio, a party with socialist origins, fears of the military have increased. There are no spaces to challenge the civilian government but neither can the government establish complete supremacy.<sup>4</sup>

The armed forces in Brazil are a segment of society, a political force to contend with and an agency of the state; they have retained numerous functions, and this enables them to negotiate their privileges and ensure they get their share of power in decision-making processes. The simplest sign that civilian authority is paramount—defence policy run from a civilian ministry—was a complex process marked by tensions between the government and the military. The political reshuffle of the late 1990s appears to be based on the idea of preserving these features in association with a new reformist vision: Brazil as a global player. This vision can be inferred from a statement by the Brazilian Foreign Minister: 'The multilateral forums are certainly the best arena where Brazil can exercise, on a global level, its competence in the defence of national interests. The play of alliances of a variable geometry, made possible by a world of indefinite polarities, strengthens our participation in these forums, where we can best develop our action potential in the formulation of rules and norms of conduct for the management of the globalization space in every field of interest to Brazil.'<sup>5</sup>

In Ecuador, the constitutional government of Jamil Mahuad ended in January 2000 due to a crisis of legitimacy supported by the military and indigenous populations. The country has had eight presidents in less than three years (three of them for just one day).<sup>6</sup> As an institution, the Ecuadorian Armed Forces keep a tight hold on power. They mediated in the political crises affecting presidents Abdala Bucaram and Jamil Mahuad, illustrating a peculiar authoritarian alliance between indigenous and military authorities.

The country at the centre of most controversies is, without doubt, Colombia, where the situation has been described as a case of the state lacking a monopoly of power. In actual fact, a success story of weak armed forces not taking part in politics has resulted not in a stronger democracy but in a failure of the design of the nation. The armed forces have increased their relative political autonomy in matters of repressive activities and rather than demilitarize the conflicts; the peace policy followed by the civilian authorities has made the armed confrontation worse. 'Plan Colombia' emphasizes military power without providing convincing answers to how the administration of justice will be improved, the safety of the general populace restored or transgressors punished,<sup>7</sup> while stimulating a conflict in which both the guerrillas and the military believe that greater military might will improve their negotiating positions.<sup>8</sup>

The army in Chile is loath to give up power: the reordering process in Chile has thus been conspicuously slow and deliberate. It is thanks to external factors that the civilian authorities have recently appeared to be gaining legitimacy without the need to report to the military, which still considers itself as the 'guarantor' of the state. In this case one element contributing to the difficulty of bringing the armed forces under the control of the civilian authorities and making the country governable is the fact that the military's allies have a voice in a political coalition with a comfortable electoral margin.

As Ricardo Córdova points out, the power struggle in El Salvador was not settled around the negotiating table, where none of the contending parties emerged with a clear victory. Democracy was brought to El Salvador, and changes were made in its military policy, thanks to strong multilateral support.<sup>9</sup> But the violent exchanges that daily punctuate society,<sup>10</sup> the high crime rate, the ineffectual

judiciary and the high levels of social inequality, although not posing a challenge to the political regime, are signs of an explosive disillusionment that the state in its current, still fragile condition is unable to keep in check.

The upsurge in political democracy in Guatemala is more the result of a collapse of authority than a reordering of the republic's armed forces. The country is emerging from peace negotiations that tend to hide a strong internal conflict. Additionally, a significant part of the largely indigenous populace is marginalized, illustrating the lack of consensus between the government and society. Control over the armed forces has been a tortuous affair of advances and retreats.<sup>11</sup> The military conversion programme cannot undo the injustices of the authoritarian regime and, consequently, trust between society and the military is still a long way off. Although it has signed an agreement including democratic institution-building measures, the government has not developed the requisite skills to administer a democracy.<sup>12</sup>

This overview of Latin America reveals glaring gaps in the entrenchment of democracy. There is no scope for military coups in the traditional manner, either in the state of countries' domestic affairs or in the international setting. There are, however, still deep rifts, which call for prudence in relations between the military and political forces. We know from experience that when political reshuffles are left incomplete the armed forces are a factor contributing to instability and tension. Although many in the military are not likely to take tanks into the streets as in Venezuela, a lot of them do not seem to understand that they are not the 'protectors' of political decisions, that they do not define the welfare of the nation, and that they cannot act according to their own interpretation of the rules of government.

Even though civilian authority is being restored in Latin America, republican institutions and standards are not. In the case of defence, the absence of political leadership, the lack of regulatory moves and the power remaining in the hands of the military all make progress towards democracy uncertain. Many countries' defence ministries are still headed by active duty or retired military men. Others are headed by civilians but their functions are limited to mediating between the military and the authorities and do not cover ministerial tasks such as setting defence policy, defining the missions of the armed forces, overseeing compliance with directives or putting right any failings that occur.

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In almost all the countries, the defence ministry's role as a creator of policy amid the various authorities of the state is limited. In part this is a response to a fear of reaction from the armed forces that would make the countries ungovernable. It also attests to an absence of civilian expertise in managing defence, an area that has always been in officers' hands. This lack of aptitude means that government officials are unable to present themselves to the military as legitimate negotiating partners. This hinders the development of a professional dialogue between civilians, elected officials and government agencies. In bilateral and pan-American meetings, in general, there are no professional exchanges between civilians. During bilateral talks between defence ministries, the technical points of the agenda are prepared and developed by the military. To achieve democratic management of defence policy it is necessary to have a dialogue between civilian officials. But the defence ministries have not trained people to manage this debate.

The lack of democratic control over defence is compounded by other shortcomings. For example, for the most part intelligence services have not been turned into civilian agencies independent of and unconnected to the military. Moreover in most Latin American countries there is no congressional oversight of intelligence service activities. The congresses have scant ability to evaluate either military activities or public spending on defence once funding has been assigned en bloc to each of the armed forces. These institutional shortcomings hamper the redistribution of authority by disrupting the recovery of powers that would safeguard legitimate democratic control.

## *Advances and setbacks*

Various countries, among them Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador and Argentina, have made notable efforts to rise above the ideological issues that characterized their non-democratic periods. They have attempted to separate defence from domestic security functions so as to prevent the military from becoming a threat to society itself. The divide between public order and defence functions is a sensitive issue for the entrenchment of democracy.

There used to be no distinction between defence and domestic security in Latin America, where the armed forces ran the state and militarized police activities. The liberal tradition of supporting the role of civil society as a safeguard of a working democracy and as a check on the separation of power scarcely existed in Latin American countries. The state was subject to no limits. The principles of legitimacy were overturned and constantly challenged by the influence of military sectors. The armed forces became accustomed to wielding control over various parts of society. Under such arrangements, defence covered all aspects of the state, from issues of public order to questions concerning the economy and education.

Changes on the international scene are promoting a security agenda that covers new risks such as drug trafficking, migration and terrorism—areas in which public order and defence issues tend to overlap. The overlap has perhaps a lesser effect on the institutional order in developed countries, but in Latin America it is allowing the armed forces to become involved without the institutional counterbalances that exist in consolidated democracies.<sup>13</sup> What in developed countries might look like progress towards security for the general population poses, in many Latin American states, a growing threat to the entrenchment of democracy and a window of opportunity for the military to intervene in domestic affairs. The issue is well illustrated by the ‘war on drugs’. Involving the military in efforts to combat drug trafficking tends to stunt the incipient formation of regulatory channels in the design of defence policy. The armed forces in the region are conducting drug-control missions without any clear policy having been formulated by defence ministries or the topic having been debated in national congresses. As a result, efforts to combat drug trafficking are giving the military additional scope to act autonomously and leading to *de facto* involvement without the required mandates from the civilian authorities.

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Meanwhile, the political elites in Latin America have left incomplete the definition of a security framework that clearly establishes the mission of the armed forces. The prospect of cooperative security was developed in the early 1990s,<sup>14</sup> the goal being to encourage the establishment of communication channels and to build trust on the basis of the principles of equality, justice and reciprocity. This approach managed to create a framework for confidence- and security-building measures both in the Americas through the Organization of American States, and in bilateral relations through joint operations by armed forces.<sup>15</sup>

More recently the notion of human security has emerged: it runs counter to earlier thinking by placing the individual, not the state, at the centre of political decisions.<sup>16</sup> The 1994 *Human Development Report* produced by Mahbub ul Haq for the United Nations Development Programme was the first to articulate the concept of human security, now championed by the Governments of Canada and Switzerland in particular. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development adds a further element to these ideas, one stemming from the recognition that violent conflicts adversely affect development and cooperation programmes.<sup>17</sup> Hence it explores the connection between the economy and security, pursuing structural stability in the sense of total respect for the rule of law and human

rights, economic and social development backed by dynamic, representative institutions that can handle change and settle differences without recourse to violent conflict.<sup>18</sup>

Unfortunately, these approaches—which represent very encouraging improvements over the notions of defence traditionally applied by Latin American armed forces—have not been translated into specific statements of doctrine. The armed forces continue to be trained on the basis of criteria similar to those used during the Cold War. However, within this uncomfortable panorama we must acknowledge a new element with very positive effects: participation in United Nations peacekeeping missions.

Peacekeeping missions give a boost to democracy since members of the military get to know and work alongside officials and citizens from a variety of countries, thereby acquiring a better understanding of the choices and beliefs encountered in other cultures. This diversity and openness encourages greater tolerance, which is one element of the democratic mindset. Being run by civilian governments and the United Nations, peacekeeping missions make for greater civilian control over defence. Those responsible for administering contributions to peacekeeping missions are national officials from diplomatic missions to the United Nations who receive requests from the Security Council and pass them on to

their respective governments. This strengthens various internal negotiating mechanisms among agencies, thereby reducing the weight of the military in decisions on questions of security.

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Participation in peacekeeping missions has given renewed legitimacy to officials who have lost the esteem of their compatriots; it is one of the most promising ways of bringing the military under supervision and control. Yet despite its stated intention to collaborate in the democratization of Latin America's armed forces, the United States Southern Command has notably omitted the encouragement of peacekeeping missions from its prescriptions for the region.

Some countries have been relatively active in peace operations, while others have been reticent or indifferent. Among the Latin American countries, Argentina has been the most active, within involvement rising from twenty observers in 1988 to more than 1,400 troops in 1994. If it continues to apply its troop rotation scheme, more than 50% of its career military personnel will have served in United Nations operations by the year 2002. Uruguay has provided the longest-standing and second largest contribution to the United Nations from Latin America—the largest in relation to the size of its armed forces. Some 900 Uruguayan troops served in the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) in 1998. By 1999, Brazil had contributed 12,000 troops to peacekeeping operations. At the end of the Gulf War the Chilean air force provided a helicopter squadron to monitor the border zone between Iraq and Kuwait, and since 1991 it has taken part in six missions. Bolivia, Ecuador and El Salvador have also sent personnel, and some of these officers have been trained at the Argentine Joint Peacekeeping Training Centre (CAECOPAZ).

### ***Concerns and alarms***

Changes in military institutions in a number of Latin American countries have come more in response to a need to reform the state than to a new definition of defence within the framework of democratic government. The effects of this have been positive inasmuch as the executive has imposed its authority on military institutions, but there has also been a downside in the emergence of new forms of military power. For example, one way to bestow the military fresh advantages is to transform the armed forces into entrepreneurial organizations.

Back in the days of authoritarian governments the military already performed political and administrative tasks such as managing state- and jointly owned enterprises. This allowed them to establish connections with the groups in power, maintain contacts, hold information about private economic activity, and handle discretionary resources unseen and unsupervised by society. As administrators of their own social welfare institutions, the armed forces have pursued an aggressive investment policy—which has left some military personnel in possession of economic holdings of startling size.

The irruption of the military into private manufacturing and marketing meant that extensive resources were being manipulated without congressional supervision or instructions from defence ministries. The consequent autonomy allowed the military to compete with the state (as in Ecuador) or influence its decision-making process (as in Honduras).

For instance, the Ecuadorian Army Industry Department (Dirección de Industrias del Ejército de Ecuador, DINE) owns steelworks, a hotel management and tourism chain with sophisticated (Marriott) hotels, the local dealership for General Motors, a mining company, a fishing company, the Rumiñahui Bank, and several factories making items for military use, among other companies and activities in the capital market.<sup>19</sup> Contrary to the situation in developed countries where the private sector competes in defence manufacturing, thus making greater transparency and supervision a must, the military in Ecuador has been set up as a holding company that has a monopoly not only on power but also on the economy. As entrepreneurs, military personnel are not taxpayers and they make use of their public institutions to secure tax exemptions.

It is not certain that the military are contributing to the betterment of society, whatever the former Ecuadorian Minister of Defence may say on the subject: 'The holdings of the DINE business group are the result of its corporate activities in which it has invested its own resources which in no sense were ever part of the budget of the state or the land forces; their consolidation is the fruit of that joint participation by the public and private sectors, when the objectives that prompt it are consistent with the transparent attitude of their members—which is aimed at the common good, seeking to help to solve the problem of unemployment and contribute [towards] the finances of the state through the large inputs made every year by the industrial corporations in the group.'<sup>20</sup>

The situation is similar to that in Central America as described by Brenes and Casas: 'The Central American generals accepted a loss in political influence in exchange for two things: impunity for human rights violations and silence on the subject of their personal and institutional finances.'<sup>21</sup> Such activities create circuits ungoverned by regulation and, hence, unlikely to attract penalties. According to this study, the Honduran and Guatemalan armed forces' banks are among the leading banking institutions in Central America.

In the case of Honduras, the armed forces are the eighth most influential business group in the country. Leticia Salomón draws attention to the difficulties this situation creates within the business community, which complains of unfair competition since the armed forces can reduce their costs of production thanks to the exemptions granted by the state.<sup>22</sup> Besides this, in both Honduras and El Salvador the defence budgets are secret and only the congresses know how much money has been allocated to them in total.

Since the changes dreamt up by the Sandinista revolution, followed by the modifications imposed by President Violeta Chamorro, many public sector entities in the orbit of the Nicaraguan army have been privatized. The deal was a tacit concession allowing the army to regain privileges in exchange for accepting the new political rules of the game. The upshot is a powerful institution where military personnel are allowed to own construction firms, furniture manufacturers, fishing companies and airlines.<sup>23</sup> Additionally, the senior ranks receive preferential distribution of estates and ranches as post-war compensation.

Corrupt administration of national resources has also been reported in Peru. In a communiqué issued in response to the repatriation of Fujimori's intelligence secretary Vladimiro Montesinos, Lt. Col. Ollanta Tazo, the head of the military uprising on 29 October 2000, justified his action in pursuit of a clean-up in Peruvian politics: 'Montesinos's circle of top generals who have grown rich on drug trafficking, gun-running and other shady deals very seriously threaten the health of the Peruvian army and people and, in consequence, the very existence of Peru as a sovereign nation state.'<sup>24</sup> When the daily paper *Liberación* published stories of the two million dollars that Montesinos had in Wiese Bank in Switzerland, President Alberto Fujimori told EFE, the Spanish news agency, 'the income found is the profits earned by a legal advisory business in which Montesinos is a partner, which operates independently of the activities of the adviser of the SIN (National Intelligence Service).'<sup>25</sup>

Despite such justifications, concerns about corruption continue. For example, Camilo Soares, the young Paraguayan leader of the conscientious objector movement, has denounced the military for managing corruption.<sup>26</sup> Another sign of military corruption can be seen in the proliferation of airstrips in areas under military control. It is reported that an unusual amount of loading and unloading, possibly due to smuggling and drug trafficking, goes on in these areas.<sup>27</sup>

Once the armed forces lost the discretionary use of the state-owned economic resources that they had managed when in power, their payroll fell. This has triggered an alarm about a dangerous 'proletarianization of the officer class' as they have looked for alternative ways of keeping at their disposal enough assets to allow them to decide independently what they spend. The results of this kind of autonomy in the market in countries with clear institutional shortcomings are further attenuated transparency and public supervision. Everything is for sale—personal protection, economic security and deals awarded to individuals who, through exploitation of their institutional advantages, can compete unfairly with the private sector while at the same time extend their influence on society in other ways.

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### *Closing observations*

Almost all governments have made conspicuous attempts to overcome their authoritarian pasts but have been much less effective in organizing the management of defence in accordance with the parameters laid down by multilateral organizations. The mandate to stabilize democracy has been firm and clear throughout the region. The governments of Latin America have taken up this challenge together with the need to reform the organization of the state, rationalize the various state agencies, conduct financial reforms to strengthen their economies, and open up their markets under conditions too competitive for local patronage networks. In many cases these measures have been combined with efforts to restore peace and reintegrate combatants into society. Though they have met with varying degrees of success, these measures have propelled democracy forward while checking the resistance of the armed forces to governmental decisions, and generated tensions when governments have proved unable to satisfy the demands of different sectors of society.

In the democratic transition process, foreign pressure has pushed for state reform and domestic pressure for improved living conditions. Setting up a ministry of defence responsible for running the armed forces has not been a priority. In view of this fact, during the reform process an opportunity has been missed to make the military accountable to civilian rule. The result is the construction of imperfect democracies, capable of functioning with an autonomous centre of power.

As an institution, the armed forces hold a monopoly on violence to defend the state against external threats. This power is delegated to them by the executive on the basis of constitutional mandates. At the same time some functions, such as the promotion of senior officers and budget allocations, are determined by congress. Because of the nature of the functions they perform, the military responds to a mandate stemming from the contract between elected officials and the electorate. This is what gives civilian control of the military its legitimacy. Besides, having mechanisms available to curb an institution whose principal mission is the legal use of violence within the confines of the state is an important principle in a democratic country.

The military can only really be accountable and kept in check if there are available personnel with the skills necessary to design the appropriate policies, if institutions have their own experts who can evaluate matters from perspectives other than the military one, and if society can legitimately voice its interests on the subject. In Latin America, however, defence questions have always been the preserve of the armed forces themselves and a few civilians associated with them.

The question of civilian versus military power is part of a broader vista covering reform of the security sector and linked to economic development, the efficiency of the public sector and improvements in the quality of life for the general populace. The countries undergoing deep economic crises have not laid thorough plans to reallocate defence spending in accordance with a definition of military doctrine and the military's missions. At most there have been payroll cuts and structural trimming—cutting where cuts could be made, not where they should.

Governments need to show a determination to exercise their authority, creating the means for and organizing the management of defence. The rules and regulations authorizing civilian management of defence do not exist in Latin America. Although the armed forces are formally assigned to operate under the hierarchical and functional authority of the executive branch, in practice they are allowed to retain autonomy of action. The governments of the region have not yet come to terms with the dangerous situation this has created. In order to ensure stability they have failed to govern each of the institutions that make up the state, and it is this relinquishment of power that ultimately weakens the consolidation of democracy.

This is a perverse feature of the legacy of military ascendancy, which can be addressed only by including a variety of civil society organizations—both national and regional—in the debate on, definition of, and in decisions affecting the thrust of military doctrine. In that way, we could forge a civilian community independent of the armed forces that would view the role of the military as a matter of state policy, as indeed it should be viewed.

## Notes

- 1 Abraham F. Lowenthal and Jorge Domínguez, 1996, 'Introduction: Constructing Democratic Governance', in Abraham F. Lowenthal and Jorge Domínguez, *Constructing Democratic Governance. Latin America and the Caribbean in the 1990s. Themes and Issues*, Baltimore, Maryland, Johns Hopkins University Press, p. 6.
- 2 Fernando Rospligiosi, 1999, 'Política y Autoritarismo en las fuerzas armadas peruanas en la década de 1990', in Rut Diamint (ed.), *Control civil y fuerzas armadas en las nuevas democracias de América latina*, Buenos Aires, Ed. Gel, p. 450.
- 3 Francine Jacome, 1999, 'Las relaciones cívico-militares en Venezuela (1992–1997)', in *Control civil y fuerzas armadas*, op. cit.

- 4 For example, the former Commander-in-Chief of the army during the rule of President Lacalle, Lt. Gen. Daniel García, remarked that the armed forces were the president's last resort, and it would not be wise to trim their budget. *La República*, Montevideo, sección política, 3 December 2000.
- 5 Lecture by Ambassador Celso Lafer, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, at the Rio Branco Institute, Brasilia, 12 April 2001. Translation by the Brazilian Embassy in Washington, DC.
- 6 'Crisis in the Andes. Unravelling Democracy', *IISS Strategic Comments* (London), vol. 6, issue 6, July 2000.
- 7 Fernando Cepeda Ulloa, forthcoming, 'La crisis de gobernabilidad en Colombia', in Jorge Domínguez and Michael Shifter, *Constructing Democratic Governance*, Maryland, Johns Hopkins University Press.
- 8 'Crisis in the Andes. Unravelling Democracy', op. cit.
- 9 See Ricardo Córdova Macías, 'El Salvador: Los acuerdos de paz y las relaciones civilo-militares', in *Control civil y fuerzas armadas*, op. cit., p. 549.
- 10 Death rates have risen higher than under the dictatorship. See Canadian Foundation for the Americas, 2000, 'Building Peace and Democracy in El Salvador: An Ongoing Challenge', *Policy Paper*, Ottawa, FOCAL, April.
- 11 It should be recalled that even while democracy was being introduced the President, José Luis Serrano, suspended the constitution, dissolved congress and the supreme court, dismissed the Procurator-General and the Human Rights Procurator, and suspended the *Elections and Political Parties Acts* by decree on 25 May 1993.
- 12 See *Agreement on the Strengthening of Civilian Power and on the Role of the Armed Forces in a Democratic Society*, concluded on 19 September 1996 between the Peace Commission of the Government of Guatemala and the General Command of the Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (URNG).
- 13 Rut Diamint (ed.), *Control civil y fuerzas armadas*, op. cit., ch. 1.
- 14 This approach derives from the report of the Brandt Commission, supplemented by the approach taken by the Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues chaired by Olaf Palme in 1982, which sought to reduce the confrontation between East and West by proposing a model of shared security.
- 15 According to the United Nations, confidence-building measures refer in the main to military matters and are designed to help build trust and establish firmer relations among states with a view to facilitating arms reductions and disarmament. United Nations, Department for Disarmament Affairs, 1989, *Los armamentos y el desarme*, Geneva, December.
- 16 See for example the Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research, [http://www.hsph.harvard.edu/hpcr/human\\_security.htm](http://www.hsph.harvard.edu/hpcr/human_security.htm)
- 17 OECD, 1998, *Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation on the Threshold of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*, Paris, OECD Development Co-operation Guidelines Series.
- 18 *Ibid*, p. 17.
- 19 Dirección de Industrias de Ejército, 1999 (brochure).
- 20 *Tarqui* [review of the Armed Forces of Ecuador], Quito, Ecuador, October 1999.
- 21 Arnoldo Brenes and Kevin Casas (eds), 1998, *Soldados como empresarios. Los negocios de los militares en Centroamérica*, San José, Costa Rica, Ed. Fundación Arias para la Paz y el Progreso Humano and the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation, p. 14.
- 22 Leticia Salomón, 1997, *Poder Civil y Fuerzas armadas en Honduras*, Tegucigalpa, Honduras, CEDOH-CRIES, p. 162.
- 23 Luis Alberto Guzmán, 1996, 'Nicaragua's Armed Forces: An Assessment of their Political Power', in Richard Millet and Michael Gold-Biss (eds), *Beyond Praetorianism. The Latin America Military in Transition*, Miami, North-South Center Press, University of Miami.
- 24 Lt. Col. Ollanta Moisés Humala Tasso, *Manifiesto to the Peruvian Nation*, 29 October 2000. Information supplied by the Office of the Ombudsman in Peru.
- 25 *Liberación*, Lima, 17 December 1999, p. 3.
- 26 Bruno Más, *Masinformes*, 12 December 1995.
- 27 *Clarín*, Buenos Aires, 24 April 1996, p. 3