

Chapter 2

Disarmament, Small Arms, and Intra-State Conflict: The Case of Southern Africa

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Introduction

Conflict in Southern Africa has been "widespread, intense and protracted" and has its origins in the conflicts over race, land, labor and political rights that occurred as a result of European conquest and colonial domination.¹ However, in the last few years, the Southern African regional security environment has witnessed a remarkable transformation. Since 1989 the two main sources of conflict in Southern Africa, the Cold War and Apartheid, have disappeared. Thus the ideological, strategic and logistical imperatives that fueled and sustained many of the intra- and inter-state conflicts in the region have also disappeared. In this context, many of the region's conflicts have been resolved, usually through the presence or intervention of a multilateral peace support operation. Despite these positive developments, many countries in the region are still experiencing various forms of intra-state conflict. This paper examines the relationship between disarmament during multilateral peace support operations, small arms, and intra-state conflict with reference to Southern Africa.²

The deployment of multilateral peace support operations in countries such as Namibia, Angola and Mozambique was contingent upon the presence of a negotiated settlement agreement. The settlement agreement, which provided the terms of reference for the mandate of the multilateral peace support operation, usually contained a specific disarmament component. The disarmament component included some or all of the following measures: 1) control of

¹ T. Ohlson, S. Stedman and R. Davies, *The New is Not Yet Born: Conflict Resolution in Southern Africa*, Washington D.C., The Brookings Institution, 1994, p.77.

² For the purpose of this paper, "Southern Africa" includes the following countries: South Africa, Namibia, Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Angola, Malawi and Tanzania.

weapons, 2) disarmament, and 3) demobilization.³ Section I compares and contrasts the disarmament components of the settlement agreements and mandates of the various multilateral peace support operations that have been deployed in Southern Africa.⁴ While most of the settlement agreements contained a specific disarmament component, there were significant differences in terms of the mandate of each peace support operation and the way in which the disarmament component was to be implemented. Section II examines the implementation of the disarmament components of the settlement agreements during the various peace support operations.

The lack of effective disarmament during a multilateral peace support operation can have a number of consequences. Ineffective arms control measures and the failure to disarm combatants can contribute to the proliferation of arms, particularly small arms, within the country in the post-settlement period. Inadequate provisions for the demobilization and reintegration of combatants into civilian life during multilateral peace support operations can contribute to the emergence of armed banditry, particularly amongst unemployed and disaffected ex-combatants. Section III examines the relationship between ineffective arms control and disarmament and small arms proliferation, and analyzes how inadequate programs for the demobilization and reintegration of combatants can contribute to increased armed banditry.

The problems of small arms proliferation and armed banditry, which are linked, are inherently destabilizing and have helped to create and sustain new types of intra-state conflict in Southern Africa in the post-settlement period. Section IV examines the different types of intra-state conflict that are present in Southern Africa, and considers the relationship between small arms proliferation, armed banditry and the various types of intra-state conflicts.

The evidence from Southern Africa suggests that the lack of effective arms control, disarmament and demobilization measures during multilateral peace operations has not only prevented the successful resolution of many of the region's intra-state conflicts, but has the potential to undermine and ultimately frustrate the post-conflict reconciliation, reconstruction and peace-building processes which are so desperately needed in all the countries of Southern Africa. The international community, and particularly the United Nations, can play a role

³ See United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), *Practitioners' Questionnaire on Weapons Control, Disarmament, and Demobilization During Peacekeeping Operations*, Geneva: United Nations, 1995, pp.vii-viii.

⁴ This paper focuses on the following multilateral peace support operations: UNAVEM I and II in Angola, UNTAG in Namibia, and UNOMOZ in Mozambique.

in helping to ensure effective disarmament during peace operations. In this way, it can help to promote sustainable peace-building, reconstruction and development in the post-conflict period. Section V suggests a number of recommendations for improving the disarmament components of multilateral peace support operations in order to minimize the problems associated with ineffective disarmament and demobilization.

I. Multilateral Peace Support Missions in Southern Africa: The Disarmament Components of Settlement Agreements and Mandates

This section compares and contrasts the disarmament components of the settlement agreements and mandates of the various multilateral peace support missions that have been deployed in Southern Africa since 1989. The various missions were deployed into very different geo-political, institutional and operational environments, and this was reflected in their differing mandates, rules of engagement, operating procedures, structures, sizes and budgets.

All of these multilateral missions in Southern Africa were deployed under the auspices of the United Nations. They represented the "Second Generation" of United Nations peacekeeping, in that they pushed the bounds of "First Generation" peacekeeping both operationally and conceptually by having primarily non-military mandates.⁵ The UNTAG mission in Namibia in 1989-90 represented the start of "Second Generation" UN peacekeeping. It was the first UN mission, apart from UNTEA, to have a primarily non-military mandate, and its mandate included both peacekeeping and peacemaking elements.⁶

The mandate of each mission, which was contained in a UN Security Council Resolution, was derived from a negotiated settlement agreement. The settlement agreement was usually agreed to by all the parties prior to the deployment of the multilateral mission.

⁵ See S. Ratner, *The New UN Peacekeeping*, 1995, New York: St. Martin's Press for a discussion of the conceptual and operational differences between first and second generation UN peacekeeping.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p.118.

**UNAVEM I (United Nations Angola Verification Mission I):
Angola, 1989-1991**

The bilateral agreement between Angola and Cuba, which provided the basis for UNAVEM I's mandate (UN Security Council Resolution 626 of 1988), did not contain an explicit disarmament component. However, the Cuban forces were disarmed as they withdrew, at the discretion of their camp commanders and apparently in agreement with the Angolan authorities.⁷ The Cubans' arms and military equipment were sent back in advance to Cuba on Soviet ships from Luanda and Lobito.

**UNTAG (United Nations Transition Assistance Group):
Namibia, 1989/90**

The Namibian Settlement Plan, as contained in UN Security Council Resolution 435 of 1978, had an explicit disarmament component.⁸ UNTAG's mandate, therefore, included a specific disarmament component that tasked UNTAG with responsibility for monitoring and supervising all of the disarmament provisions of the settlement plan.⁹ These included:

- the confinement of SWAPO and South African forces to base;
- the dismantling of the South African military presence in Namibia;
- the withdrawal of the South African Defense Force from Namibia;
- the disarmament and demobilization of SWAPO forces and the local forces established by South Africa; and
- the collection, storage and guarding of the arms and military equipment of demobilized personnel.

⁷ Jullyette Ukabiala, *Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Angola*, Geneva: United Nations, unpublished draft, p.35.

⁸ UN Security Council Resolution 632 of 1989 approved the deployment of UNTAG, which was charged with the implementation of Security Council Resolution 435 in its original and definitive form.

⁹ See United Nations, *The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peacekeeping*, New York: United Nations for details of the UNTAG mandate.

The Namibian Settlement Plan did not, however, make provision for the integration of armed forces prior to the election, the formation of a new Namibian Defense Force, or the reintegration of ex-combatants into civilian life.

UNAVEM II (United Nations Angola Verification Mission II): Angola, 1991-1995

The Bicesse Accords, which were signed in Portugal in May 1991 between the MPLA government and UNITA, provided the basis for UNAVEM II's mandate, which was contained in UN Security Council Resolution 696 of 1991.¹⁰ The Bicesse Accords contained an explicit disarmament component which included the following measures:

- a cease-fire between both parties;
- the end of supplies of all lethal weapons by any government;¹¹
- the separation, demobilization and disarmament of all forces;
- the disbanding of the MPLA and UNITA standing armies;
- the collection and disposal of weapons; and
- the formation of a new Angolan Armed Force (FAA) of 50,000 before elections.

However, UNAVEM II's mandate did not have an explicit disarmament component, for it was charged with merely monitoring and verifying the implementation of the various provisions, including the disarmament measures, of the Bicesse Accords.

UNOMOZ (United Nations Operation in Mozambique): Mozambique, 1993-1995

The General Peace Agreement (GPA) that was signed by FRELIMO and RENAMO in Rome in October 1992 provided the basis for UNOMOZ's

¹⁰ UN Security Council Resolution 696 of 1991 effectively entrusted UNAVEM I with a new mandate which was initially for a period of 17 months. UNAVEM II's mandate was extended and enlarged in the next few years as the country returned to civil war.

¹¹ The so-called "Triple Zero" clause of the Bicesse Accords prohibited either side from acquiring new supplies of weapons. See Human Rights Watch Arms Project, *Angola, Arms Trade and Violations of the Laws of War Since the 1992 Elections*, New York, 1994, p.10.

mandate, as contained in UN Security Council Resolution 797 of 1992. UNOMOZ's mandate had a comprehensive disarmament component derived from the provisions of the GPA. The disarmament component made provision for UNOMOZ to supervise, monitor and verify the following measures:

- the cease-fire which came into effect on 15 October 1992;
- the complete withdrawal of foreign forces;
- the separation and containment of the forces to base;
- the demobilization and disarmament of combatants;
- the collection, storage and destruction of weapons; and
- the disbanding of private and irregular armed forces.

In terms of UN Security Council Resolution 850 of July 1993, UNOMOZ's mandate was enlarged, and UNOMOZ was appointed chair of the Joint Commission for the Formation of the Mozambican Defense Force (CCFADM), which was charged with supervising the formation of the new Mozambican Defense Force (FADM).

Comparison of Disarmament Components of Settlement Agreements and Mandates

Several points can be made with respect to the disarmament components of the settlement agreements and mandates of the various multilateral peace support operations. The mandates of all the missions were derived from negotiated settlement agreements, which had been agreed to by all the parties prior to the deployment of the multilateral mission.¹² In the case of Namibia, one of the parties, SWAPO, was not a party to the settlement agreement. In all the missions, the settlement agreements were mediated by external parties, either the former colonial powers (e.g., Portugal, South Africa), the Cold War superpowers (USA, USSR), and/or the United Nations.

Some of the missions were involved in assisting a decolonization process (e.g., UNTAG in Namibia), while others (e.g., UNOMOZ in Mozambique) were

¹² For details of the settlement agreements which provided the basis for the mandates of the various multilateral missions, see Virginia Gamba, Jakkie Potgieter, and Jullyette Ukabiala, *Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Angola/Namibia*, Geneva: United Nations, unpublished draft; and Eric Berman, *Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Mozambique*, Geneva: United Nations, unpublished draft.

involved in helping to resolve conflicts 'left over' from the Cold War. All of the missions were tasked with monitoring and/or supervising the implementation of a negotiated settlement agreement. In some of the missions (e.g., Namibia) the settlement agreement provided the link between conflict resolution, elections and constitution-making.

Some of the missions had multifaceted mandates which included military, police and civilian components (e.g., UNTAG, UNOMOZ).¹³

In terms of levels of authority, some of the missions had a purely monitoring and verification function (e.g., UNAVEM I); others had a monitoring and supervisory function (e.g., UNOMOZ); and in some cases the mission also had a control function (e.g., UNTAG). In Angola, UNAVEM I and II played a rather passive role by merely monitoring and verifying the implementation of various settlement agreements. In Namibia and Mozambique, the multilateral missions played a more active role by supervising the implementation of the terms of the settlement agreement.

Most of the multilateral missions, except for UNAVEM I, had an explicit disarmament component in their mandate (United Nations Security Council Resolution). The disarmament component of the mandate usually included all or some of the following measures:

- 1) arms control (weapons exclusion zones, weapons storage, dual-key arrangements);
- 2) disarmament (weapons destruction, arms embargoes, weapons buy back programs, de-mining, and the disarming of combatants and irregular forces); and
- 3) demobilization (disarming of combat units, reintegration of combatants into civilian life, and the formation of a new national armed force).¹⁴

The settlement agreements for Angola (UNAVEM II) and Mozambique (UNOMOZ) contained provisions relating to the demobilization and reintegration of combatants into civilian life, and the formation of new, integrated armed forces prior to the holding of elections. In Namibia, the settlement agreement did not

¹³ For details of the mandates of the various multilateral peace support missions, see Gamba, Potgieter, and Ukabiala; and Berman.

¹⁴ See UNIDIR, *Practitioners Questionnaire*, pp.vii-viii.

make provision for the reintegration of combatants into civilian life or the formation of a new armed force.¹⁵

The disarmament component of each settlement agreement usually also included a timetable and a sequence for implementing the various disarmament measures. In all of the missions, the disarmament component of the settlement agreement was expected to be fully implemented before the political aspects of the settlement agreement (i.e., the holding of elections) could be carried out.

II. Multilateral Peace Support Operations in Southern Africa: Implementation of Disarmament Components of Settlement Agreements

This section examines the implementation of the disarmament components of the settlement agreements during the various multilateral peace support missions. All the missions, without exception, suffered delays and problems with the implementation of the disarmament components of their respective settlement agreements. In some cases (e.g., Mozambique), the timetable and sequence of implementing certain disarmament measures was revised or abandoned because of specific problems; in other cases (e.g., Angola), it was simply ignored.

Most of these delays and problems were mission-specific, but there were a number of common problems. There were delays in the deployment of all the UN missions, because of funding, logistical, and co-ordination problems within the UN organization. This caused delays in the implementation of many of the disarmament measures. All the missions suffered from a lack of adequate planning before deployment, and a lack of reliable and accurate information about the disarmament aspects of the mission - i.e., the quantity and quality of arms of each warring party. There was also often a lack of clarity, or even agreement, between the parties and the United Nations forces as to the specific modalities, schedule and procedures of the disarmament component of the mission.

¹⁵ Although the Namibian Settlement Plan did not make provision for the integration of armed forces prior to elections, after the elections UNTAG chaired a Tripartite Military Integration Committee which was established to develop a concept for an integrated Namibian Defense Force. The Kenyan battalion from the UNTAG force remained after the elections to help train the nucleus of the new Namibian Defense Force. The formation of a new Namibian Defense Force took place after independence, and was assisted by a British Military Advisory Training Team (BMATT). See United Nations, *The Blue Helmets*, pp.383-384.

Delays were also caused by the mistrust and suspicion between the parties, and their different interpretations of the disarmament component of the settlement agreement. Poor infrastructure (particularly lack of communication infrastructure), which caused logistical problems, also contributed to the delays in implementing the various disarmament measures. The poor security situation in the country, and in the assembly areas, and a lack of discipline on the part of the warring parties also caused problems and contributed to delays in implementing the disarmament measures. In many cases, specific training regarding disarmament operations was not undertaken prior to deployment, and in some cases training for disarmament only took place in the field. Poor co-ordination and planning between the various components of the UN mission also contributed to delays and problems with the implementation of the disarmament measures. In none of the missions did the parties enter into subsidiary disarmament agreements, which may have strengthened the disarmament component of the settlement agreement.

In assessing the implementation of specific disarmament measures, such as arms control, during the various missions, it is obvious that, with the exception of UNTAG, all the other multilateral missions were unable to implement effective disarmament before the holding of elections.

Weapons Control

The settlement agreements for Namibia, Angola and Mozambique all contained specific provisions relating to weapons control. These provisions normally included the following measures: dual key arrangements, weapons exclusion zones, and the collection and storage of weapons.

During all of the missions, regulations and operating procedures with respect to the collection and storage of weapons were agreed upon between the parties and the UN. In Mozambique the Cease-fire Commission, which was chaired by UNOMOZ, developed regulations and procedures to be followed with respect to the registration, classification, and storage of weapons; the transfer of weapons to the FADM; and the functioning of regional arms depots.¹⁶ In Angola, the parties themselves reached agreement on the regulations and procedures to be followed with respect to the collection and storage of weapons. The UN was not involved in these agreements, but merely made practical suggestions with respect

¹⁶ See United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), *Practitioners' Questionnaire on Weapons Control, Disarmament, and Demobilization during Peacekeeping Operations*, No. M111, Geneva: United Nations, unpublished survey response.

to the classification and storage of arms.¹⁷ The UNTAG forces negotiated a number of "field agreements" with the South African forces, which contained detailed schedules and procedures for the collection and storage of weapons during the disarmament process.

In all the missions the collection of weapons took place primarily in the assembly areas, although most of the multilateral forces made some limited attempts to search for, and collect weapons that were outside the assembly areas. In all the cases, the warring parties and the United Nations forces were involved in the collection of weapons.¹⁸

The UNTAG mission was relatively successful with respect to the collection and storage of weapons. However, most of the weapons which were collected in the assembly areas in Namibia were of poor quality, thus suggesting that the better quality weapons remained outside the disarmament process. The UNTAG forces knew that there were hidden arms caches in many parts of the county, and during the mission were able to neutralize some of these caches.¹⁹ The presence of illicit weapons was not a problem for the UN forces in Namibia. However, UNTAG personnel were aware that the various parties continued to have access to weapons through external channels of supply, but were unable to effectively monitor or control these external channels of weapons supply during the mission.²⁰ All the weapons that were collected as a result of the disarming of forces were stored in warehouses, which were guarded by UNTAG military personnel.²¹ The weapons which were collected and stored during the UNTAG mission were transferred to the new Namibian national forces (military and police) after independence.

The collection and storage of weapons in Angola was less effectively implemented than in Namibia. In Angola, UNAVEM II monitors merely monitored the Angolans, who were responsible for the collection and storage of weapons. In practice this meant that many weapons were not collected, and thus

¹⁷ See United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), "Analysis Report of Practitioners' Questionnaire on Weapons Control, Disarmament, and Demobilization during Peacekeeping Operations: Angola," Geneva: United Nations, unpublished draft., p.11.

¹⁸ See United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), "Analysis Report of Practitioners' Questionnaire on Weapons Control, Disarmament, and Demobilization during Peacekeeping Operations: Mozambique," Geneva: United Nations, unpublished draft; UNIDIR, "Analysis Report of Practitioners' Questionnaire: Angola"; and UNIDIR, *Practitioners' Questionnaire*, No. N008.

¹⁹ See UNIDIR, *Practitioners' Questionnaire*, No. N008, p.27.

²⁰ See UNIDIR, *Practitioners' Questionnaire*, Nos. N008 and N011.

²¹ See United Nations, *The Blue Helmets*, p.371.

remained outside the disarmament process. UNAVEM II monitors, because of a lack of resources and their limited mandate, and because of the movement of combatants in and out of camps, were unable to effectively monitor the collection and storage of weapons in the assembly areas. According to UN sources, the collected weapons were poorly guarded and stored in unsecured locations in the camps. In some cases, combatants at the assembly points awaiting demobilization were given their guns back on the understanding they were used only to hunt for food, fearing that many combatants would turn to violent crime if provision were not made for them.²² Reports on the poor quality and limited quantity of the weapons stored at assembly points indicated that both UNITA and the MPLA forces were storing hidden weapons for potential future contingencies.²³

The UNAVEM monitors did not have the mandate or the resources to search for, and neutralize, arms caches. The parties' continued access to weapons through external supply channels, in contravention of the arms embargo, and UNAVEM's inability to monitor and control these external channels of supply undermined the collection and storage of arms.²⁴ The existence of hidden arms caches, and large amounts of illicit arms outside the disarmament process, not only caused problems for the UN forces, but meant that both sides were able to rearm with relative ease when the civil war restarted after the elections.²⁵

In Mozambique, UNOMOZ military personnel were involved in monitoring and supervising the collection, registration and storage of weapons at assembly areas. However, contrary to the rules approved by the Cease-fire Commission, UNOMOZ was denied permission to collect and disable weapons at unassembled locations outside the assembly areas.²⁶ This meant that UNOMOZ was unable to search for, and neutralize, the many arms caches which remained outside the disarmament process. UNOMOZ collected a total of 189,827 weapons, 43,491 of which belonged to paramilitary forces (out of a projected total of 49,806). This was significantly less than the amount of weapons which were known to be in Mozambique. Because of delays in the demobilization process, UNOMOZ was unable to complete the verification of weapons before the expiration of its mandate. Many of the weapons which were collected at the assembly areas were

²² See The World Bank, *Demobilization and Reintegration of Military Personnel in Africa: The Evidence from Seven Country Case Studies*, Washington D.C.: World Bank, 1993, p.30.

²³ "Further Report of the Secretary General on UNAVEM II", 24 June 1992.

²⁴ See UNIDIR, "Analysis Report of Practitioners' Questionnaires: Angola", p.27.

²⁵ See *Ibid.*

²⁶ "Further Report of the Secretary General on UNOMOZ", 26 August 1994.

of poor quality, thus suggesting that the better quality weapons remained outside the disarmament process.²⁷ UN forces were also given priorities as to the type of weapons which were to be collected: first, light weapons from regular forces; next, light weapons from irregular forces; and then heavy weapons.²⁸ There was thus an acknowledgment that the presence of light weapons constituted the greatest risk in terms of the restarting of the conflict. The presence of hidden arms caches and illicit weapons was a problem during the UNOMOZ mission, and the UN forces were unable to control the external channels of weapons supply during the mission, especially in the absence of an arms embargo.²⁹

Many of the problems surrounding the collection and storage of weapons in Angola and Mozambique were related to the suspicion and mistrust that existed between the various parties, a lack of commitment to effective disarmament on both sides, and the lack of agreement between the parties as to the procedures for collecting and storing arms. In particular, the CCPM in Angola was totally ineffective in ensuring the collection and storage of weapons. Furthermore, in both countries the UN force felt that it was unable to effectively monitor or control external supply channels, let alone search for and neutralize arms caches. In both Angola and Mozambique, the UN lacked the political will to actively confront the issue of weapons which remained outside the disarmament process, despite pressures from the international community.

The problems associated with the collection of weapons in Angola and Mozambique were related to the lack of reliable information on the quality and quantity of weapons held by each party prior to the deployment of the mission. A lack of personnel who were trained specifically for the collection of arms, and the lack of appropriate equipment for implementing the collection of weapons, also impeded the effective collection of arms during the various multilateral peace support operations. The lack of information given to the general public about the disarmament process, and particularly the collection of weapons, together with a lack of resources (intelligence, personnel, specialized equipment), meant that most of the multilateral forces could not implement effective arms control measures during their missions. However, in some cases (e.g., Mozambique), the local population was used to obtain information about the location of undeclared weapons caches.³⁰

²⁷ See UNIDIR, *Practitioners' Questionnaire*, No. M098.

²⁸ See UNIDIR, "Analysis Report of Practitioners' Questionnaires: Mozambique", p.22.

²⁹ See *Ibid.*, p.23.

³⁰ See UNIDIR, *Practitioners' Questionnaire*, No. M113.

The Bicesse Accords and the Rome General Peace Agreement made provision for the formation of new Armed Forces, and thus contained provisions relating to the transfer of arms, which had been collected from the assembly areas, to the new Armed Forces. However, there were problems with the collection and safe-keeping of weapons during the demobilization processes in Angola and Mozambique. This was partly related to problems linked to the UN's inability to monitor the collection and storage of weapons during the demobilization process, particularly in Angola. The inability of the multilateral forces to effectively monitor and control the collection and storage of weapons caused problems with the transfer of weapons to the new Armed Forces. In Mozambique, the new armed force was unable to effectively monitor and control the weapons which had been transferred from the assembly areas.³¹ Theft of weapons from the FADM storage facilities was a common problem, and partly explains the huge inflows of weapons into South Africa during the UNOMOZ mission. In Angola and Mozambique, few attempts were made to keep weapons, equipment and soldiers at different locations, and to keep weapons and equipment properly secured. This proved critical to the success of the mission.³²

In some of the missions, such as UNOMOZ and UNAVEM II, security zones were established to assist the implementation of weapons control and disarmament measures, and to enhance the security of the assembly areas. Security zones were not established during the UNTAG mission.

Disarmament

The settlement agreements for Namibia, Angola and Mozambique all contained provisions relating to disarmament. These provisions normally included the following measures: weapons destruction, arms embargoes, cash/land for weapons activities, the disarming of irregular units and/or individuals, the disarming of combatants, and de-mining.

Weapons Destruction/Disposal

Most of the settlement agreements made provision for the destruction and/or disposal of weapons and ammunition which were in bad condition or unserviceable. In all the cases the weapons that were collected during the disarmament process were stored and later transferred to the new armed forces.

³¹ See UNIDIR, "Analysis Report of Practitioners' Questionnaires: Mozambique," p.33.

³² See UNIDIR, "Analysis Report of Practitioners' Questionnaires: Angola," p.40.

In Angola, unserviceable weapons were destroyed, and the rest were stored for later use by the new Angolan armed forces.³³ In Mozambique, UNOMOZ monitored and supervised the destruction of weapons, ammunition and explosives, particularly those that were in bad condition, dangerous, and/or inappropriate for the new armed forces.³⁴ During the post-demobilization verification mission, which comprised the Mozambican government, RENAMO and UNOMOZ, substantial numbers of weapons were discovered at declared and undeclared locations.³⁵

Arms Embargoes

An important aspect of the disarmament components of most of the settlement agreements was the presence of an arms embargo on all parties during the multilateral mission. Namibia, as a "colony" of South Africa, had been subject to the 1977 mandatory United Nations arms embargo against South Africa. The arms embargo remained in place during UNTAG's mission and was only lifted after Namibia's independence.

In Angola, an arms embargo on both sides was one of the provisions of the Bicesse Accord, and some of the UNAVEM II forces were involved in monitoring the embargo at airports, border posts and ports.³⁶ The supervising of the arms embargo was the responsibility of the Joint Political-Military Commission (CCPM), which was responsible for supervising the implementation of all aspects of the Bicesse Accords. However, there is evidence to suggest that the CCPM was unable to enforce the embargo, and that both parties continued to acquire arms during the UNAVEM II mission, in contravention of the embargo, by turning away from traditional suppliers (e.g., South Africa and the USSR) in favor of black market suppliers.³⁷

³³ See *Ibid.*, p.3.

³⁴ See UNIDIR, "Analysis Report of Practitioners' Questionnaires: Mozambique," p.20; and UNIDIR, *Practitioners' Questionnaire*, Nos. M111, M115, M114, and M093.

³⁵ See United Nations, *The UN and Mozambique*, New York: United Nations, 1995, p.43.

³⁶ See UNIDIR, "Analysis Report of Practitioners' Questionnaires: Angola," p.28.

³⁷ For a discussion of the violations of the arms embargo in the Bicesse Accord by both parties, see Human Rights Watch Arms Project.

With the country returning to full-fledged civil war, the Angolan government announced in April 1993 that the Triple-Zero clause in the Bicesse Accords was obsolete, and that it would no longer abide by the arms embargo.³⁸ In September 1993 the United Nations Security Council (Resolution 864) imposed an international arms embargo on UNITA. However, the implementation of the embargo has not stopped UNITA from acquiring weapons from a number of different sources.³⁹

In Mozambique no arms embargo was included in the settlement agreement. This constituted a serious problem because it meant that arms continued to enter Mozambique officially throughout the UNOMOZ mission, thereby undermining the disarmament component of the settlement agreement.

The presence or absence of an arms embargo on all parties during the deployment of a multilateral mission had a significant effect on the ability of the multilateral forces to implement effective disarmament, particularly with respect to controlling the external supply channels of weapons during peace support missions. The ongoing availability of arms, often from external black market sources, not only undermined the effective implementation of the disarmament measures, but compromised the security of the multilateral forces, particularly those that were unarmed (e.g., UNAVEM II).

Weapons Buy Back Programs

A number of ad hoc weapons buy back programs, where weapons were bought for cash, food and/or agricultural implements, were initiated during some of the peace support missions (e.g., Mozambique). However, these programs met with little success, in terms of the number of weapons handed in and the quality of weapons that were collected. In most cases the very old and poor quality weapons were handed in during buy back programs, suggesting that the better quality weapons were kept outside. While the effectiveness of weapons buy back programs is disputed, because they can stimulate new, and illegal markets in weapons, it is generally accepted that buy-back programs which provide food and/or agricultural implements are more appropriate than programs which offer cash for weapons.

³⁸ Later that year, all the members of the observing troika (the US, Russia, and Portugal) announced a lifting of their bans on arms sales to the Angolan Government. See *Ibid.*, p.36.

³⁹ It has been reported that UNITA obtained weapons directly and indirectly from a number of different countries, such as Zaire, Congo, Russia, China and South Africa. See *Ibid.*, p.49.

Disarming of Private and Irregular Units

Most of the settlement agreements made provision for the disarming and disbanding of private and irregular units. In Namibia the issue of disarming private and irregular units did not constitute a major problem. In Angola, the warring parties supervised the disarming and disbanding of irregular units, with the UN merely acting as observers.⁴⁰ In Mozambique the UNOMOZ forces, in conjunction with the local authorities, were involved in the disarming of irregular units and bandits. The weapons that were collected from these irregular forces were handed over to the UN forces for custody.⁴¹

Disarming of Combatants

All of the settlement agreements provided for the disarming of all combatants during the deployment of the peace support mission. Once combatants had been disarmed, they were either demobilized or recruited into the new armed force. In all of the multilateral missions, combatants were required to turn in a weapon either upon registration at the assembly areas, or upon their demobilization, in order to become eligible for various benefits. In all of the cases disarmament was voluntary, as opposed to coercive.⁴² In Namibia and Mozambique, however, the presence of armed military personnel meant that it was easier to encourage the disarming of soldiers and to enforce non-compliance. In Angola, it was impossible for the unarmed UNAVEM monitors to effectively monitor and verify the disarming of soldiers, because of substantial movement in and out of camps, and because of limited numbers of observers and a limited mandate. The inability of the UNAVEM II monitors to enforce the collection and storage of weapons meant that disarmament was reversible in Angola. Although disarmament was reversible in Namibia and Mozambique, given the presence of large amounts of arms outside the disarmament process, thus far both countries have not experienced a large scale rearming of individuals who are outside of the armed forces.

Psychologically, parties will only disarm if they are confident that the preceding stages of demobilization have been securely carried out and can be sustained. In Angola and Mozambique, both parties remained deeply suspicious

⁴⁰ See UNIDIR, "Analysis Report of Practitioners' Questionnaires: Angola," p.29.

⁴¹ See UNIDIR, "Analysis Report of Practitioners' Questionnaires: Mozambique," p.25.

⁴² See *Ibid.*, p.15; UNIDIR, "Analysis Report of Practitioners' Questionnaires: Angola," p.19; and UNIDIR, *Practitioners' Questionnaire*, Nos. N011 and N008.

of each other (and the UN) throughout the UN mission, often accusing each other of not complying with the provisions of the disarmament component of the settlement agreement. The result was that neither of the warring parties was ever totally committed to fulfilling the provisions of the disarmament component. Being able to guarantee the security of disarmed combatants is an important factor in being able to effectively implement a disarmament process. In addition, the value of a weapon, and the willingness to part with it depends on two factors - its real (and perceived) economic value, and its security value. In Namibia and Mozambique the multilateral forces had sufficient resources and armed personnel to guarantee the security of disarmed forces. However, in Angola, the unarmed UNAVEM personnel were unable to guarantee the security of disarmed forces, particularly given the large amounts of soldiers and arms from both sides which remained outside the disarmament process. In both Angola and Mozambique the handing in of weapons not only meant a loss of security, but amounted to the loss of economic security and livelihood for many combatants. The presence of an adequately funded demobilization and reintegration program for combatants, to compensate for this loss of economic security, is a necessary requirement for successful disarmament.

The failure of the UNAVEM II mission, and its inability to ensure the effective implementation of the disarmament measures of the Peace Accords, was primarily a function of its limited mandate and the lack of commitment from both parties to ensuring effective disarmament. The passive mandate of UNAVEM II and its inability to enforce non-compliance meant that it was unable to ensure that all the disarmament measures of the settlement agreement were effectively implemented prior to the elections.

UNTAG and UNOMOZ, on the other hand, had more comprehensive and proactive mandates, and thus were able to play a much more interventionist role in ensuring the implementation of the disarmament components of their respective settlement agreements. In none of the missions was a system of rewards and penalties established to motivate compliance with the provisions of the settlement agreement.

De-mining

In both Angola and Mozambique, the presence of large amounts of landmines, particularly anti-personnel mines, constituted a severe threat to the security of UN personnel and to the disarmament process as a whole. In Angola, where there were an estimated 9 to 15 million landmines throughout the country, a de-mining sub-committee was established under the CCPM, and teams of

MPLA and UNITA troops cleared some 300,000 mines in the first month after the accords were signed.⁴³ UNAVEM personnel monitored the CCPM de-mining operation.⁴⁴ The de-mining program was aborted when the country returned to war.

In Mozambique, an ambitious de-mining program was initiated by the UN to deal with the problem of the estimated 2 million mines which were present throughout the country.⁴⁵ The de-mining program, which was coordinated by UNOHAC in conjunction with the ICRC, WFP and the UNDP, was subject to many delays, but an accelerated program eventually got under way in mid-1994.⁴⁶ Part of the program involved the establishment of a Mine Clearance Training Center, which was tasked with training local individuals as mine clearers. The de-mining program was not completed before the end of the UNOMOZ mission, but the United Nations has committed itself to continue funding and managing the de-mining program (through the UNDP).⁴⁷

Demobilization and Reintegration

Most of the settlement agreements contained provisions relating to the demobilization and reintegration of combatants. These provisions normally included the following measures: the cantonment and disbanding of regular combat units; the disbanding of irregular units; the reintegration of ex-combatants into civilian life; and the reintegration of regular and irregular forces from the different warring parties into new national forces (military and police). In most of the cases, the demobilization of combatants and the formation of a new national armed force was to be completed before elections could be held.

The rationale for implementing a demobilization and reintegration program for ex-combatants during a peace support operation is that such a program can defuse tensions between parties, thereby helping to achieve the effective disarming of warring parties and reducing the possibility of parties trying to use military means for political purposes. The demobilization and reintegration of combatants into civilian life during a peace support operation thus provides a

⁴³ See *Jane's Defense Weekly*, 10 August 1991, p.219.

⁴⁴ See UNIDIR, "Analysis Report of Practitioners' Questionnaires: Angola," pp.35-36.

⁴⁵ See UNIDIR, "Analysis Report of Practitioners' Questionnaires: Mozambique," pp.27-29.

⁴⁶ See United Nations, *The UN and Mozambique*, pp.52-53.

⁴⁷ See "Final Report of the Secretary General on UNOMOZ," S/1994/1449, for a description of the details of the de-mining program in Mozambique.

relatively stable environment for the holding of elections, thereby keeping the warring parties with the framework of the peace process and assisting with the implementation of the settlement agreement. It is also an important ingredient for post-conflict peacebuilding and reconstruction. Furthermore, the absence of such a program, and the release of large amounts of ex-combatants into civilian life without any prospects of employment, can provide the seeds for future forms of intra-state conflict.

In most of the missions there were a number of problems with the demobilization of combatants such as: 1) political problems - the deep suspicion and mistrust between the parties meant that soldiers were kept out of the demobilization process; 2) logistical problems - poor infrastructure, inadequate facilities, and lack of equipment delayed the establishment of assembly areas and the processing of combatants at assembly areas; 3) humanitarian problems - large numbers of displaced people, drought, and refugees; and 4) security problems - the criminality of society and the presence of weapons. As a result of these problems, there were delays in the demobilization process, with the result that the timetable for the implementation of the later stages of the disarmament component had to be constantly revised. In some cases, the various stages of the demobilization process took place concurrently, while in other cases various stages were aborted or not sufficiently completed before elections.

In Namibia, the demobilization of combatants from both sides was effectively carried out, despite some initial delays at the beginning of the UNTAG mission. These delays were related to SWAPO incursions at the time of the beginning of the cease-fire, and South Africa's reluctance to demobilize all its forces (e.g., Koevoet) and to dismantle its military command structures in Namibia. All the citizen forces and commandos (numbering 11,578) had been disarmed and demobilized by D-day. Some of these forces were reactivated as a result of the SWAPO incursions in early April, but by the end of May they had all been disarmed and demobilized. The SWATF forces (21,661) were completely demobilized by the end of June, 1989. However, the majority of demobilized SWATF personnel retained their uniforms and continued to receive their pay until after the elections.⁴⁸ The South Africans also tried to avoid demobilization of their forces in Namibia by transferring members of the Koevoet counter-insurgency unit to the SWAPOL. Under pressure from the UN, South Africa finally agreed

⁴⁸ See United Nations, *The Blue Helmets*, pp.370-373.

to demobilize 1,600 ex-Koevoet members before the elections.⁴⁹ These demobilizations were supervised by UNTAG military monitors.

A program for the reintegration of ex-combatants and the formation of a new Armed Force was not part of the Namibian settlement agreement. However, UNTAG became involved in the initial attempts to establish a new armed force in Namibia. After the elections a Tripartite Military Integration Committee, with UNTAG as its chair, was established to develop a concept for the Namibian army. The Committee was charged with planning the integration of Namibian armed personnel and developing a military structure for the future Namibian army. A team from the Kenyan battalion of UNTAG remained after the elections to help train the integrated nucleus of the new Namibian army, which participated in the independence ceremonies. Shortly after independence, a British Army Military Advisory Training Team (BMATT) arrived in Namibia to help establish and train a new Namibian army. The formation of the Namibian Defense Force (NDF) occurred through the voluntary recruitment of former soldiers, rather than through a formal integration of existing armies, as almost *all* combatants were demobilized during the UNTAG mission.

In Namibia the total number of combatants before demobilization was approximately 52,000 (South African: 32,000 and SWAPO: 20,000).⁵⁰ All combatants were demobilized before the elections. However, after demobilization had occurred, 57% of former SWAPO combatants remained unemployed, 36% were involved in subsistence agriculture, and 7% were in formal employment. Many of the former SWATF members and members of South African-sponsored forces departed from Namibia and returned to South Africa after demobilization. The formation of the new Namibian Defense Force (NDF), which took place after independence, was made up of SWATF and SWAPO ex-combatants. Approximately 7,000 ex-SWAPO combatants joined the NDF, which had an initial force level of 10,000.⁵¹

The new Namibian government initially hoped that reintegration would occur "spontaneously" after combatants were demobilized, and so made no special plans to facilitate the reintegration of ex-combatants. However, 16 months

⁴⁹ See *Ibid.*, p.376.

⁵⁰ The number of SWAPO combatants may be an underestimate, as they were repatriated along with other Namibian returnees. 32,000 people showed up when the new Namibian government announced payments for veterans.

⁵¹ See L. Nathan, "Marching to a Different Drum: A Description and Assessment of the Formation and Assessment of the Namibian Police and Defense Force", *Southern African Perspectives*, No. 4, 1990, Center for Southern African Studies, University of the Western Cape, for a comprehensive discussion of the formation of the new armed forces in Namibia.

after independence, faced with high-level formal unemployment (over 80%) among ex-combatants, and a growing incidence of banditry, the government began a haphazard reintegration program, which included lump-sum cash payments to all those ex-combatants who were still unemployed, and the Development Brigades, a publicly financed on-the-job vocational training program.⁵² UN agencies, such as the UNHCR, UNICEF, and UNESCO, also assisted with the reintegration of ex-combatants in their respective areas of specialization. NGOs (e.g., Council of Churches in Namibia) were responsible for managing most of the reintegration programs in Namibia.⁵³

The demobilization of combatants in Angola was subject to many delays and problems, and was not effectively implemented before the elections were held in September 1992. It was initially intended that no combatants would be demobilized until the cantonment process was complete. The cantonment process was delayed, however, because of logistical problems (shortages of food and clothing), poor planning, security problems, discipline problems, and an uneven commitment to cantonment on the part of both sides. In many instances cantoned troops left the assembly areas before they could be demobilized.⁵⁴ This in turn delayed the demobilization process, and eventually the cantonment and demobilization stages took place concurrently. In July 1992 the cantonment of forces to assembly areas was abandoned, after only 49% of troops had been assembled, in favor of a speedier process which involved troops being selected for demobilization or for integration into the new Angolan Armed Force without passing through Assembly areas. In September, just before the elections, only 41% of troops had been demobilized.⁵⁵ Just before the elections, only 45% of government troops and 24% of UNITA troops had been demobilized.⁵⁶

The delays in the demobilization process meant that the disarming of combatants was not effectively implemented before the elections. In addition, both sides kept soldiers and arms out of the disarmament process in case of future contingencies. UNITA kept far more of its troops out of the demobilization process than the MPLA. It was estimated that UNITA kept a 10,000 to 20,000-strong army close to the Namibian border and at other locations, and 3,000 -

⁵² See World Bank, p.54.

⁵³ See *Ibid.*, p.76 for details of the NGO-sponsored reintegration programs in Namibia.

⁵⁴ See V. Fortna, "United Nations Angola Verification Mission II", in W. Durch, (ed.), *The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping*, New York: St.Martins's Press, 1993, p.400.

⁵⁵ See Y. Lodico, *The United Nations Verification Mission: Prospects for UNAVEM III*, Unpublished mimeo, 1995, p.29.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

5,000 elite troops in Zaire.⁵⁷ The MPLA reportedly shifted 10,000 to 20,000 troops into a paramilitary police force, thereby excluding them from the demobilization process. In addition, each side was granted, under the terms of the Peace Accords, personal security forces, which they also withheld from the demobilization process. The lack of real commitment to the demobilization process from both sides, and the large amounts of arms and soldiers which were kept outside the process, severely undermined the demobilization component of the Peace Accords, and facilitated the rearming of both sides and the ease with which both sides returned to war. The failure to implement effective demobilization merely exacerbated the problems with implementing the various arms control and disarmament measures.

In Angola, the settlement agreement provided for the formation of a new armed force, the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA), with a troop strength of 50,000. Each party was to contribute an equal amount of troops to the new armed force, but recruitment was intended to be voluntary. The formation of the FAA was supervised by a joint commission for the formation of the Armed Forces, which fell under the authority of the CCPM. The Portuguese, French and British were responsible for the training of the new armed force.⁵⁸ The formation of the FAA, which occurred simultaneously with the demobilization process, was to have been completed before elections. However, it also ran behind schedule, as a result of food shortages and logistical problems, and by early September 1992, just before the elections, only 8,800 soldiers (18%) had been integrated into the FAA.⁵⁹ The fact that both parties were not only uncooperative in the demobilization process, but also kept large numbers of soldiers out of the demobilization process, in violation of the Bicesse Accords and as a hedge against future contingencies, meant that by the time of the elections, Angola had three standing armies on its soil.⁶⁰ After the elections, with the return to civil war, most of the demobilized ex-combatants were remobilized, and those members of the new Angolan armed force returned to their former armies.

⁵⁷ See Victoria Brittain, "Angola: The Final Act?", *Southern Africa Report*, Vol. 7, May 1992, p.20.

⁵⁸ Fortna, p.400.

⁵⁹ See Shawn McCormack, "Change and the Military in Angola: The Impact of the World Order on the Process of Conflict Resolution and Democratization in Angola", paper presented on May 13 1993 for the Center for Southern African Studies, University of York.

⁶⁰ The government also openly created its new paramilitary police force, the Ninjas, in contravention of the Bicesse Accords during the demobilization period. See Human Rights Watch Arms Project, p.11.

The total number of combatants in Angola before demobilization was approximately 151,000 (MPLA: 113,700 and UNITA: 37,300).⁶¹ By the time of elections in September 1992, only 41% (61,994) had been demobilized (MPLA:54,737 and UNITA:7,270). The CCPM (with observers from USA, the USSR, and Portugal) was tasked with administering the demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants. A number of NGO-sponsored programs for the reintegration of ex-combatants were prepared, but the implementation of most of these programs was postponed until after the elections.⁶² A large European Union-designed reintegration program was also prepared, but never implemented, because of the resumption of the civil war.

In Mozambique, demobilization was sufficiently completed before elections took place. However, there were also a number of problems and delays related to difficulties in reaching agreement on the final list of assembly areas, and by both side's initial reluctance to allow their forces to be demobilized. Delays in the cantonment process, because of logistical problems, caused delays in the demobilization process, and large numbers of soldiers remained in the assembly areas for long periods without being demobilized, thus leading to riots and mutinies. Demobilization was "sufficiently completed" by 15 August, but both sides withheld troops and arms from the demobilization process - approximately 5,000 Government troops and 2,000 RENAMO troops - as a hedge against post-election crises.⁶³ When the assembly areas were closed on 15 August, there were still a number of soldiers (3,734) in the assembly areas who had not been demobilized - they were quickly demobilized or recruited into the FADM.⁶⁴

The settlement agreement made provision for the formation of a new Mozambican armed force (FADM). It was intended that the FADM would have a strength of 30,000 troops, drawn in equal numbers from both parties, and that the formation of the FADM would be completed before elections. The formation of the FADM, which was intended to take place in conjunction with the demobilization process, also proceeded behind schedule, because of logistical problems (lack of training facilities) and a lack of volunteers. At the time of the elections less than 12,000 soldiers had joined, mostly from the government forces. This was significantly less than the 30,000 that had been agreed upon in terms of the settlement agreement. The figure of 30,000 was moderated downwards to 15,000 in August 1994, at the suggestion of the UN, when it became clear that the

⁶¹ This number is based on a UNAVEM count as of June 1992.

⁶² See World Bank, p.77.

⁶³ *Africa Confidential*, Vol. 35, No. 19, 23 September 1994, pp.3-4.

⁶⁴ See United Nations, *The UN and Mozambique*, p.41.

integration of 30,000 combatants into the FADM would not be achievable before the elections. By mid-1995 it was estimated that the numbers in the FADM had decreased to below 10,000.⁶⁵

The total number of combatants in Mozambique before demobilization was estimated at 137,000 (Government: 116,000 and RENAMO: 21,000).⁶⁶ By the end of the UNOMOZ mandate in December 1994, 82,000 troops had been registered at assembly areas, of which 12,000 had been recruited into the FADM (Government:8,500 and RENAMO:3,500). The remaining 70,000 were demobilized and reintegrated into civilian life.

The settlement agreement in Mozambique also provided for a program for the reintegration of combatants into civilian life. UNOMOZ, through the UNOHOC, chaired the Commission for Reintegration (CORE), which was tasked with planning, organizing and monitoring the reintegration of demobilized soldiers. Through CORE, demobilized soldiers received 6 months severance pay. A Reintegration Support Scheme, which was managed by UNDP, provided demobilized soldiers with subsidy payments representing a further 18 months' pay. In addition, the ILO initiated a vocational training program for demobilized soldiers, while the IOM established a job referral and counseling service. A Working Group of NGOs was convened in late 1994 to support the work of CORE.

III. Disarmament, Small Arms Proliferation, and Armed Banditry

In comparing and contrasting the implementation of the disarmament components of settlement agreements during the respective multilateral peace support operations, it is evident that most of the multilateral forces were unable to implement effective disarmament measures before they departed.

⁶⁵ Michael Stephen, "Demobilization in Mozambique", in Cilliers, J. (ed.), 1995, *Dismissed: Demobilization and Reintegration of Former Combatants in Africa*, Midrand, Institute for Defense Policy, p.62.

⁶⁶ Some 13,000 government troops were demobilized before the signing of the GPA.

The ineffective implementation of arms control and disarmament measures during multilateral peace support operations has had a significant impact on the availability of weapons, particularly small arms, in the countries of Southern Africa. In most cases, arms that remained 'outside' the disarmament process (i.e., were not collected, stored and/or destroyed by the multilateral forces) have either been used to restart intra-state conflicts, or have found their way into the illegal arms market in neighboring countries, thereby contributing to the problem of arms proliferation in these countries.⁶⁷ The absence of a well-planned and well-funded demobilization and reintegration program for ex-combatants can result in renewed conflict or lead to increased banditry amongst unemployed and dissatisfied ex-combatants. The increase in armed banditry is inextricably linked to alternative employment opportunities (or the lack of employment opportunities) for ex-combatants, and to the availability of weapons, which in turn is a consequence of ineffective arms control and disarmament during multilateral peace support missions.

The countries of Southern Africa are currently "awash" with weapons, particularly small arms. This proliferation of weapons, which constitutes a major threat to the security of both states and citizens in the region, can be explained, in part, by the history of armed conflict in Southern Africa, in which Western countries, countries from the Warsaw Pact, Cuba, China and South Africa supplied large amounts of weapons to governments and "rebel movements" in the region.⁶⁸ The presence of small arms production facilities in many countries in the region, "leaks" from state armories, and inadequate control over police and armed forces have also contributed to the problem of small arms proliferation in Southern Africa.⁶⁹ However, the lack of effective arms control and disarmament during multilateral peace support operations is also regarded as one of the major reasons for the proliferation of small arms in Southern Africa.

In Namibia, the UN forces were able to implement relatively effective arms control and disarmament measures. UNTAG forces were able to neutralize many of the hidden arms caches in Namibia prior to the elections. They also monitored and verified the withdrawal of South African arms and equipment from Namibia.

⁶⁷ See C. Smith, "Light Weapons and the International Arms Trade", Geneva: United Nations, unpublished draft, for a discussion of the flow of small arms in Southern Africa.

⁶⁸ See R. Williams, 1995, "Small Arms Proliferation in Southern Africa: Problems and Prospects", paper delivered at conference on "The proliferation of Light Weapons in the Post Cold War: A Global Problem", UNIDIR, Berlin, May 1995, pp.2-6.

⁶⁹ The following countries in Southern Africa have domestic defense industries which produce small arms and ammunition: South Africa, Namibia, Zimbabwe, Zambia and Tanzania.

The presence of "field agreements" between the parties, which covered all aspects of the collection and storage of weapons, together with effective control of weapons which had been collected, also contributed to the success of the arms control component of the UNTAG mission. In terms of the disarming of combatants, all SWAPO forces were disarmed before they returned to Namibia, and the military and paramilitary forces which had been established by South Africa were demobilized and disarmed prior to the elections under the supervision of UNTAG. All weapons and equipment which belonged to the South African forces were confiscated and guarded by UNTAG, and handed over to the new Namibian armed forces after independence.

However, after independence it became clear that many weapons had remained outside the disarmament process.⁷⁰ This was because combatants from both sides had been able to establish arms caches during the transition period.⁷¹ The availability of weapons outside the armed forces started to become a problem in the early 1990s, particularly in light of the rising crime rates. In order to address the problem of the proliferation of weapons, the Namibian government announced an amnesty period for the surrender of illegal and unlicensed weapons. Due to a poor response, the period was subsequently extended, but when the amnesty expired only a small fraction of the anticipated number of weapons had been turned in.⁷²

Many of the weapons which remained outside the disarmament process in Namibia have found their way into neighboring countries, thereby contributing to the proliferation of small arms in countries such as Botswana, Zambia and South Africa.⁷³ The dramatic increase in armed criminal violence in countries such as Zambia and South Africa has been directly linked to the flow of illegal weapons from neighboring countries which have recently experienced a multilateral peace support operation.⁷⁴

In Angola, UNAVEM II did not have the resources (or the mandate) to try and implement effective arms control measures and thereby reduce the number of weapons prevalent in the country. According to UN sources, the weapons that were collected were poorly guarded and stored in unsecured locations in the

⁷⁰ See "Kaokoland: Arms Cache", *Times of Namibia*, 14 August 1991, p.1.

⁷¹ See World Bank, p.30.

⁷² See S. David, 1991, "One Year On", *Namibia Yearbook*, 1990-1991, p.67.

⁷³ See J. Cock, 1995, "Light Weapons Proliferation in Southern Africa as a Social Issue", paper presented to BASIC Light Weapons Workshop, India, 21-23 October, for a discussion of the flow of arms from Namibia to South Africa.

⁷⁴ See *The Sunday Mail*, Zambia, 20 August 1995.

camps. The weapons that were collected at the assembly points were of poor quality and limited quantity, thus suggesting that the MPLA and UNITA forces were storing weapons for future contingencies.⁷⁵ In some cases, combatants at the assembly points were given back their weapons on the understanding that they were only used to hunt for food. The inability of the UN forces to implement effective arms control measures meant that vast quantities of arms remained outside the disarmament process.⁷⁶ These arms provided the fuel for the resumption of the civil war, which occurred in late 1992 after UNITA rejected the results of the UN-supervised elections. Many of the arms which remained outside the disarmament process in Angola ended up flowing into other countries in the region, such as Namibia and South Africa.⁷⁷ Anecdotal evidence suggests that large numbers of weapons from the Angolan conflict have ended up in neighboring countries.⁷⁸

In Mozambique, the UNOMOZ forces attempted to collect the large numbers of weapons which were estimated to be in the country at the time of the peace agreement.⁷⁹ The weapons that were collected during the UNOMOZ operation were of poor quality, thus suggesting that many weapons were kept out of the process for future contingencies. Many of the weapons that were not collected found their way into neighboring countries.⁸⁰ Those weapons that were collected during the disarmament process were often stored in the assembly areas and were not securely stored. Furthermore, the state armories were often not adequately guarded and there were many instances of "leakage" from state armories during the UNOMOZ mission. Thus, when the UN forces left towards the end of 1994, large numbers of weapons remained outside the process.⁸¹

⁷⁵ See World Bank, p.31.

⁷⁶ It was estimated that there were 2 million weapons in circulation in Angola when the civil war restarted in late 1992. See *Ibid.*, p.7.

⁷⁷ Ohlson, Stedman and Davies, p.195.

⁷⁸ There have been reports of young Angolan woman exchanging AK-47s for second-hand clothes on the Namibian border with Angola (*Angolan News Agency*, 9 November 1993). There have also been reports of Angolans exchanging guns for food with people from Namibia and Zambia (*The Sunday Mail*, Zambia, 20 August 1995).

⁷⁹ A South African Police source estimated that there were approximately 1.5 million AK-47s in Mozambique in 1993 left over from the war. See *The Citizen*, 16 July 1993.

⁸⁰ During the UNOMOZ mission, the Malawian army uncovered a cache of AK-47s and RENAMO uniforms at the headquarters of the ruling Malawi Congress Party. See *Africa Confidential*, Vol. 34, 17 December 1993.

⁸¹ The UN Cease-fire Commission had not verified 40% of RENAMO's arms caches when it left Mozambique in December 1994. This did not include either side's secret supplies of weapons. See *Africa Confidential*, Vol. 36, No. 8, 14 April 1995.

The proliferation of weapons, particularly small arms, has become a significant problem in post-settlement Mozambique, and during 1995 large numbers of arms caches were discovered by the Zimbabwean mine-clearing teams.⁸² The proliferation of weapons in Mozambique is not only linked to ineffective arms control and disarmament during the UNOMOZ operation. Many members of the new armed forces have deserted the FADM since December 1994, taking their weapons with them. Some senior members of the armed forces have also been implicated in illegal arms deals involving weapons from state armories, because of low salaries in the new armed forces, inadequate discipline, low levels of morale, and a ready market for weapons in South Africa and other neighboring countries.⁸³ These developments have certainly contributed to the proliferation of weapons in Mozambique and in neighboring countries like South Africa and Malawi. Mozambique constitutes the largest single source of supply of small arms for the South African domestic market.

The failure of UN forces to implement effective arms control and disarmament measures during their deployment in various Southern African countries can be explained by a number of factors: limited and/or inadequate mandates, insufficient resources, the absence (or violation) of an arms embargo, inadequate storage facilities, and/or a lack of co-operation and commitment on the part of the warring parties. Furthermore, the UN forces in these countries had insufficient information about the quality and quantity of weapons that were present in the country prior to their deployment, insufficient training to implement arms control measures, and inadequate personnel and equipment to undertake arms control operations.

In both Angola and Mozambique, the multilateral forces were unable to implement the effective disarmament of all combatants. This was related to a lack of co-operation and commitment on the part of the warring parties, and to a number of logistical problems on the part of the UN. A lack of resources for monitoring the implementation of the various disarmament measures, and the inability of the UN forces to guarantee the safety of disarmed soldiers, contributed to the lack of effective disarmament. The absence of a reward or incentive scheme for complying with disarmament and the lack of a system for enforcing non-compliance also contributed to the failure of the disarmament process. The passive nature of UNAVEM II's mandate compromised the ability of UNAVEM forces to enforce disarmament. In Namibia, the disarming of combatants was more successful, given the political power of UNTAG and its ability to exert

⁸² "Arms for Africa", *Sunday Times* (Johannesburg), 27 August 1995.

⁸³ See Williams, *op. cit.*, p.5.

control over all the parties. UNTAG's large numbers of armed personnel also allowed it to effectively monitor the implementation of the various disarmament measures, such as weapons destruction and the disarming of combatants.

From the above it is evident that in all of the multilateral peace support operations, the arms control and disarmament measures of the settlement agreement were not effectively implemented. Even in Namibia, which is regarded as a relatively successful mission, large numbers of arms remained outside the disarmament process, and thus contributed to the arms proliferation problem in the post-election period. In Angola and Mozambique, large numbers of arms remained outside the disarmament process, thereby exacerbating the existing problem of arms proliferation in these countries. The arms which were not collected, stored and/or destroyed during the multilateral peace support operations not only ended up in circulation in the countries concerned, but also ended up contributing to the proliferation of weapons in neighboring countries, particularly in those countries such as South Africa where there is a large demand for small arms.

Armed banditry, coupled with rising levels of crime and violence, is becoming a common feature of many countries in Southern Africa.⁸⁴ The issue of armed banditry is not only exacerbated by the availability of small arms, but is inextricably linked to the failure to implement well-planned and well-funded demobilization and reintegration programs for ex-combatants during multilateral peace support operations. During the various multilateral peace support operations in Southern Africa, programs for the demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants were implemented with varying degrees of success, and in some cases (e.g., Angola) they were aborted.

In Namibia, although demobilization was "effectively" completed before the UN forces left, the Namibian settlement agreement made no provision for a reintegration program for ex-combatants, for it was more concerned with demobilizing and disarming combatants and returning Namibians to their home territory than with a targeted reintegration program for ex-combatants. The new Namibian government initially hoped that reintegration would occur "spontaneously". However, a reintegration program was finally implemented by the government in late 1991 when it became apparent that large numbers of ex-

⁸⁴ See Ohlson, Stedman and Davies (1994) for a discussion of the incidence of armed banditry in Southern Africa.

combatants (nearly 80%) were still unemployed.⁸⁵ The reintegration program, which was relatively haphazard and limited in scope, consisted of a lump-sum payment (US\$476) and the establishment of the Development Brigades, a publicly-financed on-the-job vocational training program.⁸⁶

Most commentators have argued that the Namibian reintegration program has not been particularly successful, for the lump sum payments were not sufficient to contribute significantly to ex-combatants' long-term reintegration, and the Development Brigades program has suffered from inadequate funding. Furthermore, the absence of complementary programs, such as targeted training programs to improve the skills of ex-combatants, public work schemes, and psychological counseling to help combatants reintegrate more successfully also undermined the success of the reintegration program. The problem of armed banditry among ex-combatants which has emerged in northern Namibia in the last few years has been linked to the failure of the Namibian reintegration program.⁸⁷

In Angola, a detailed demobilization and reintegration program was prepared as part of the implementation strategy of the disarmament component of the settlement agreement. The reintegration program, which was to be implemented after the elections, had secured funding commitments from the European Community and some NGOs and was intended to be targeted towards the needs of ex-combatants, in addition to providing financial compensation such as pensions and severance pay.⁸⁸ By the time the elections were held in September 1992, some demobilization had taken place, although it was severely behind schedule. Furthermore, both sides kept forces out of the demobilization process in order to prepare for future contingencies: the government reportedly shifted 10,000 to 20,000 of its best troops into a new paramilitary police force, while UNITA kept its heaviest weapons and 25,000 of its best fighters in the bush. By the time of the election, 40,000 troops had yet to be demobilized, the two armed forces were still intact, and the new integrated armed force had barely been formed. The program for the reintegration of ex-combatants, which had been

⁸⁵ See World Bank, p.52.

⁸⁶ See Shikangalah, S., 1994, "The Development Brigade: The Namibian Experience", in *African Defense Review*, Vol. 3, No. 20.

⁸⁷ See R. Preston (ed.), 1993, "The Integration of Returned Exiles, Former Combatants and Other War-Affected Namibians", *Report of the Namibian Institute for Social and Economic Research*, University of Namibia, for a discussion of how the failure of the Namibian reintegration program led many ex-combatants to turn to armed banditry. See also Nathan, L., 1995, *The Changing of the Guard*, HSRC, Pretoria.

⁸⁸ In Angola, an ECC funded survey of FAPLA combatants was conducted in order to assist with the planning of the reintegration program. See World Bank, p.55.

prepared, was never implemented because of the resumption of the civil war in late 1992. The return to civil war in Angola was linked to the failure to implement an effective demobilization program during the deployment of UNAVEM II.

In Mozambique, a demobilization and reintegration program for ex-combatants was an integral part of the settlement agreement. Despite a number of problems and delays, most of the FRELIMO and RENAMO forces had been demobilized before the elections were held in late 1994.⁸⁹ The reintegration program, which was relatively well-planned, started before the elections but was threatened by a lack of resources, and by December 1994 only 28% of the promised funding for the reintegration program had been received. Delays in payments, together with the absence of complementary reintegration programs for the communities which are absorbing ex-combatants, and the lack of employment opportunities, particularly in the rural areas, has led many ex-combatants to "return to the bush" or drift to the cities.⁹⁰

The failure to implement an effective and well-funded demobilization and reintegration policy, particularly in the light of Mozambique's high levels of poverty and underdevelopment, has led to rising levels of crime and violence, a growing lawlessness and an increase in armed banditry amongst ex-combatants. Examples of this banditry include the shooting of the new FADM commander in Maputo in February 1995, and the increase in armed robbery on the main north-south road from Beira to Maputo and in Sofala and Zambezia provinces.⁹¹ Groups of armed dissidents, known as Chimwenje (torch) have been carrying out operations in Manica Province, including attacks on a Mozambican government post in October and November 1995.⁹² In September 1995 it was reported that there were high levels of discontent amongst former RENAMO soldiers, and that as many as 400 armed RENAMO soldiers had taken over the town of Dombe.⁹³ The discovery of a number of arms caches since the elections has also led to rising tensions, with clashes between civilians and police and mutual

⁸⁹ The United Nations estimated that both sides kept armed forces and weapons out of the demobilization process. This included less than 2,000 troops on RENAMO's side and 5,000 on the government's side. See *Africa Confidential*, 23 September 1994, Vol. 35, No. 19.

⁹⁰ Stephen, p.65.

⁹¹ Most of the robbers admit to being former soldiers of either FRELIMO or RENAMO. See *Africa Confidential*, 14 April 1995, Vol. 36, No. 8.

⁹² It is alleged by some commentators that the Chimwenje dissidents have links with RENAMO, because they operate in the Dombe area, which is a RENAMO stronghold and the site of a former RENAMO encampment. RENAMO arms caches and radio equipment have also been discovered in the Dombe area. See *Africa Confidential*, 5 January 1996, Vol. 37, No. 1.

⁹³ "Disillusioned Guerrillas", *Sunday Times* (Johannesburg), 27 September 1995.

recriminations between RENAMO and FRELIMO as to who is responsible for the individual caches.⁹⁴

The formation of a new armed force during a peace support operation is often regarded as an integral part of the demobilization and reintegration process. It is also seen as an important mechanism for "mopping up" unemployed people, or for dealing with the large numbers of combatants who will be left without employment as a result of the end of the conflict. It is also used as a means of deflating conflict during peace support operations and contributing to post-conflict reconciliation and peace-building. The formation of new armed forces is complete in Namibia, partially complete in Mozambique and incomplete/arrested in Angola.⁹⁵ The absence of white, settler armies in Mozambique and Angola should minimize the racial/ethnic problems that have afflicted the formation of new armed forces in Namibia.⁹⁶ The formation of the new armed force in Mozambique has not been particularly successful, and by mid-1995 there were less than 10,000 members of the FADM, as large numbers of soldiers deserted as a result of poor salaries and working conditions.⁹⁷

IV. Small Arms Proliferation, Armed Banditry and Intra-state Conflict in Southern Africa

Despite the resolution of many of Southern Africa's historical conflicts, including the ending of Apartheid in South Africa, many of the countries in the region are still experiencing some type of intra-state conflict. This intra-state conflict can take a number of different forms:⁹⁸

- conflict associated with war termination and reconciliation - this includes Angola, Mozambique, South Africa, and to a lesser extent, Namibia;

⁹⁴ Stephen, p.65.

⁹⁵ See Nathan (1990) and Preston (1993) for a discussion of the problems associated with the formation of the new armed forces in Namibia.

⁹⁶ The armed forces in Namibia have had a number of problems with respect to the integration of former adversaries into the same armed force. There have also been a number of problems with the ethnic composition of the new Namibian Defense Force (NDF), in that 60% of Namibians are Ovambo, whereas 90% of command posts in the NDF are held by Northern Ovambos (Kwanyama). See *Africa Confidential*, 4 August 1995, Vol. 36, No. 16.

⁹⁷ See *Africa Confidential*, 14 April 1995, Vol. 36, No. 8.

⁹⁸ See Ohlson, Stedman and Davies, pp.221-223 for a discussion of the various types of intra-state conflict that are present in Southern Africa.

- conflicts over the distribution of resources - this includes countries which are pursuing structural adjustment programs with distributional consequences that create conflict - e.g., Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe; and conflicts over distribution that are tied to conflicts over reconciliation - e.g., Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa;
- conflicts over political participation - in which groups and individuals are demanding political rights, the institutionalization of multi-party democracy and an end to one-party states (e.g., Zimbabwe, Tanzania), military dictatorships (e.g., Lesotho) and anachronistic forms of government (e.g., Swaziland), and more accountability from leaders (this form of intra-state conflict is present in all countries in the region); and
- conflicts over political identity - in which conflicts over political identity clash with ethnic, tribal, religious, linguistic and other sub-national loyalties (in countries such as Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Malawi, Tanzania and Zimbabwe, various ethnic, racial and religious groups have mobilized to fight or demand political change).

In reality, these various forms of conflict are not distinct, but are interconnected. Thus conflicts over participation have implications for distribution, while conflicts over political identity are often linked to conflicts over participation and distribution. In most countries in Southern Africa, the state is often weak and lacks legitimacy, which in turn limits its capacity and ability to deal effectively with problems such as the proliferation of weapons and the rising tide of violent crime. The presence of severe economic problems (e.g., foreign debt burdens, declining terms of trade, little or no foreign investment, and declining foreign aid receipts) often exacerbates the potential for intra-state conflicts and undermines the ability of governments to resolve these conflicts.

The presence of IMF structural adjustment programs, which inevitably involve cuts in public spending and often lead to low levels of violence, also limits the ability of governments to resolve these intra-state conflicts. The departure of United Nations missions, often after an extended period, has had a destabilizing effect on some of the countries in Southern Africa (e.g., Mozambique). The political, institutional and economic void which often accompanies the departure of large numbers of UN personnel may also create the conditions for new forms of intra-state conflict.

The causes of these various forms of intra-state conflict are complex and in many cases interrelated. However, there are two specific factors which have helped to feed and sustain many of these various forms of intra-state conflict: the proliferation of small arms and the problem of armed banditry. The problem of

small arms proliferation in Southern Africa, as pointed out earlier, has a number of causes, such as the long history of protracted armed conflict in the region, the role of the superpowers in supplying their "proxy armies" with vast amounts of arms and military equipment, and the presence of inadequate police forces. However, much of the blame for the problem can also be attributed to inadequate arms control and disarmament measures during peacekeeping operations.

In all of the peace support operations which have been deployed in Southern Africa, an opportunity existed for the peacekeeping or monitoring force to implement effective arms control and disarmament measures. In all of the operations, that opportunity was wasted. In Mozambique and Angola, the United Nations allowed elections to take place when it knew that armed forces and weapons had been kept out of the process by both sides, and that there were still a large number of arms caches which had not been neutralized. Many of the weapons which remained outside of the disarmament process in Angola, Namibia and Mozambique found their way into neighboring countries, through smuggling and other parts of the black market, thereby contributing to the problem of arms proliferation, which is inherently destabilizing for these countries. The proliferation of small arms also tends to fuel the rising tide of criminal violence and armed banditry, which is becoming a severe problem in many of the countries in the region. The problem of weapons proliferation in Angola and Mozambique has certainly fueled the violence in Kwazulu-Natal in South Africa,⁹⁹ as well as contributing to the rising crime rates in Zimbabwe, Zambia and other countries in the region.¹⁰⁰

The problem of armed banditry also has its origins in the execution of multilateral peace support operations, particularly the absence of adequately planned and funded demobilization and reintegration programs for ex-combatants. Thus, in many instances, disaffected ex-combatants, who have spent most of their life as soldiers, and who still have access to weapons which were not collected during the peace support operation, have been tempted to use these weapons in order to resolve their economic, social, and/or political conflicts. In many cases, criminal violence and armed banditry have become 'politicized' and thus have taken on the dimensions of an intra-state conflict.¹⁰¹ In some cases the

⁹⁹ See G. Mills, "AK-47 is Still a Grave Threat to Stability in SA", *Cape Times*, 16 February 1993, p.10.

¹⁰⁰ See T. Msengazi, "Illegal Arms Trade: An Ingredient for Crime" in Southern African Research and Documentation Center, *Southern Africa News Features*, Harare, 11 June 1993, p.2.

¹⁰¹ This is evidenced by the Chimwenje armed dissidents in Mozambique who are allegedly linked to RENAMO. See *Africa Confidential*, 5 January 1996, Vol. 37, No. 1.

problem of armed banditry, which is usually an internal matter, has 'spilled over' to neighboring countries and has the potential to create inter-state conflicts. For example, it is alleged that disaffected dissidents in Mozambique are supporting the activities of ex-Young Pioneers in post-Banda Malawi, and Zimbabwean opposition groups in Zimbabwe.¹⁰²

V. Conclusion/Recommendations

This paper has attempted to analyze the relationship between the disarmament components of multilateral peace support operations, small arms and intra-state conflict in Southern Africa, using the experiences of Namibia (UNTAG), Angola (UNAVEM I and II) and Mozambique (UNOMOZ).

Most of the settlement agreements which provided the mandates for the various multilateral peace support missions contained an explicit disarmament component with measures relating to arms control, disarmament and demobilization. The settlement agreements also usually contained a timetable and sequence for the implementation of these various disarmament measures. However, all of the multilateral peace support operations suffered delays and problems with the implementation of the disarmament components of their respective settlement agreements, and in some cases the timetable and sequencing of implementing certain disarmament measures had to be revised, abandoned, or even ignored. The problems with sequencing were particularly significant in that in certain cases (e.g., Angola, Mozambique) the various stages of the process, such as cantonment, disarmament, demobilization and the reintegration of combatants, often ended up taking place simultaneously. This situation placed huge strains on the UN operation's human and logistical resources and provided numerous opportunities for problems to arise, such as combatants deserting the assembly areas. In some cases, it undermined the success of the peace support operation (e.g., Angola).

In all the cases, multi-party elections were supposed to be held after the disarmament component of the settlement agreement had been effectively completed. In most of the cases, with the exception of Namibia, elections were held before most of the disarmament measures had been completed. The failure to implement effective disarmament before the holding of elections and the

¹⁰² See *Africa Confidential*, 5 January 1996, Vol. 37, No. 1.

departure of the multilateral forces has had a number of negative consequences for the countries concerned.

The inability to implement effective arms control and disarmament measures during peace support operations has certainly contributed to the problem of weapons proliferation, both within the countries concerned and in the region as a whole. The evidence from Southern Africa suggests that those weapons which remained outside the disarmament process have either been used to restart conflicts (e.g., Angola), or have found their way into neighboring countries. The problems of rising crime and violence in countries such as Zimbabwe, Zambia and South Africa have been linked to the illegal flows of weapons from neighboring countries, particularly those countries which have experienced a peace support operation (e.g., Namibia, Angola and Mozambique).

The absence of well-planned and well-funded demobilization and reintegration programs during peace support operations has also had a number of detrimental consequences for the countries concerned. Countries such as Namibia and Mozambique have experienced rising levels of crime and violence, as well as increasing incidents of armed banditry, as a result of the failure to implement effective demobilization and reintegration programs. The presence of large numbers of demoralized, disaffected, unemployed ex-combatants, especially in the context of high levels of unemployment and poor economic conditions, has certainly contributed to the increasing incidence of armed banditry in many countries in Southern Africa.

In addition, the problems of small arms proliferation and armed banditry, which are common in countries such as Mozambique which have experienced multilateral peace support operations, can also provide the conditions for the resumption of different forms of intra-state conflict. These intra-state conflicts, it is argued, also have the potential to spill over to neighboring countries, and thereby contribute to the development of inter-state conflicts.

The problem of small arms proliferation, it has been suggested, requires a well-coordinated regional approach, which focuses on both the demand and supply sides of the market and utilizes bilateral and/or multilateral agreements. The tripartite agreement between South Africa, Swaziland and Mozambique, which was signed in June 1993 in an attempt to deal with the problem of illegal arms flows into South Africa, is an example of such a multilateral approach. A regional arms control mechanism, which tries to impose restraint and controls on suppliers and recipients, should therefore be established as part of a broader regional security arrangement which involves transparency, consultation, and co-operation with regard to defense and security matters. In addition, a regional arms register, along the lines of the UN register of conventional weapons but with

detailed information about production and stockpiles of weapons, could be established as a first step towards controlling the supply of weapons. The success of these regional initiatives would depend on the political will of the various governments, and whether they would be willing or able to adequately fund the initiatives.

The problem of armed banditry, which is essentially a domestic issue, can only be solved if it is linked to efforts to control the proliferation of small arms, to create a more secure environment for all citizens, and to improve the economic opportunities for ex-combatants. Thus, ex-combatants need to be convinced that their economic and physical security will not be compromised by handing in their weapon(s) and turning their backs on crime and banditry. Governments can play an important role in contributing to the creation of a more secure environment by increasing funding for the police and providing alternative job opportunities for ex-combatants. The international community, particularly the United Nations, can also play an important role by helping to fund targeted reintegration programs for ex-combatants and remaining engaged in countries during the post-settlement peacebuilding period.

The evidence from the various countries seems to suggest that a viable program for the demobilization and reintegration of combatants into civilian life during a peace support operation can play a critical role in ensuring the success of the peace support mission, and in contributing to the process of post-conflict peacebuilding and reconciliation. Furthermore, the presence of a program to assist the communities where the ex-combatants are going to settle - including the provision of seeds and agricultural implements, the establishment of training programs, and the rehabilitation of infrastructure - can also play a significant role in minimizing post-settlement intra-state conflict, particularly the incidence of armed banditry amongst disaffected ex-combatants.

While the formation of a new armed force during a multilateral peace support operation can be important as a confidence-building measure for former warring parties, it is too complex and demanding a process to be successfully implemented during a peace support operation. The lessons from Namibia suggest that the formation of a new, integrated armed force, with all its potential problems, should be delayed until after elections and the end of the peace support mission. The lessons from Mozambique suggest that the creation of a new armed force has to be adequately funded in order to prevent mutinies and/or corruption. The successful formation of new armed forces is also contingent upon the socio-economic and political context within which the new armed force is established. However, the international community, including the United Nations, can

certainly play an important role in assisting with the formation of a new, integrated armed force in the post-settlement period.

The failure to implement effective disarmament measures during multilateral peace support operations has thus not only contributed to the proliferation of small arms within and between the countries of Southern Africa, but has directly and indirectly helped to sustain the various forms of intra-state conflict which are present in the countries in Southern Africa. The high levels of crime and violence, which are fed by the presence of small arms, also have significant opportunity costs, in that governments have to spend increasing amounts of public resources on the police and defense (border patrols), thereby reducing the amount of resources available for other forms of government spending, such as education and health. The effective arms control, disarmament and demobilization of combatants during multilateral peacekeeping operations is therefore not just about controlling the proliferation of arms and minimizing the potential for intra-state conflict. It is also about reversing the process of militarization in Southern Africa, and thereby helping to guarantee long term peace, security and development for all the peoples of the region.