

12 June 2018

## MAPPING NEGATIVE SECURITY ASSURANCES

### BACKGROUND PAPER FOR SUBSIDIARY GROUP 4 OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

As requested by the Coordinator of the Conference on Disarmament's Subsidiary Group 4 on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-nuclear Weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons ('negative security assurances' - NSAs), the authors<sup>1</sup> of this paper have compiled existing assurances provided by nuclear-armed states either on a unilateral basis, within legally binding instruments (Protocols to nuclear-weapon free zones) or in politically binding instruments. Among updates of unilateral declarations, the paper selected the most recent ones. The information made available here comes only from official or open sources. Any reference to so-called 'positive' security assurances are omitted in this paper. As a reminder, in its resolution 984 (1995) of 11 April 1995 the United Nations Security Council "[took] note with appreciation of the statements made by each of the nuclear-weapon states in which they give security assurances against the use of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear-weapon States that are Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons" (NPT).

#### I. NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATES PARTIES TO THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY (NPT)

State	Unilateral Declarations	Protocols to Nuclear-Weapon Free Zones	Politically Binding Bilateral or Multilateral Instruments
CHINA	<p>(Document S/1995/265 – 6 April 1995)</p> <p>"1. China undertakes not to be the first to use nuclear weapons at any time or under any circumstances. 2. China undertakes not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States or nuclear-weapon-free zones at any time or under any circumstances. This commitment naturally applies to non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the [NPT] or non-nuclear-weapon States that have entered into any comparable internationally binding commitment not to manufacture or acquire nuclear explosive devices".</p> <p><b>Assurance to Ukraine (Letter 4 Dec. 1994)<sup>2</sup></b></p> <p>"...The Chinese Government has always maintained that</p>	<p><b>Tlatelolco Treaty:</b> "[The Parties] undertake not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the Contracting Parties." Ratified: 2 June 1974 (Statement: "China will never use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear Latin American countries and the Latin American nuclear-weapon-free zone...").</p> <p><b>Rarotonga Treaty:</b> "[Each Party] undertakes not to use or threaten to use any nuclear explosive device against: (a) Parties to the Treaty; or (b) any territory within the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone for which a State that has become a Party to Protocol 1 is internationally responsible." Ratified: 21 Oct. 1988 (Statement: "...China will neither use or threaten to use nuclear weapons</p>	<p><b>Joint Declaration on Mongolia's Status as a Nuclear-weapon Free Zone (20 Sep. 2012)<sup>4</sup></b></p> <p>[The P5] "reaffirm, in the case of Mongolia, their respective unilateral negative security assurances as stated in their declarations issued on 5 and 6 April 1995, and referred to in Security Council resolution 984 (1995) of 11 April 1995, or as subsequently updated."</p>

	<p><i>under no circumstances will China use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States or nuclear-weapon-free zones. This principled position also applies to Ukraine...”</i></p> <p><b>Assurance to Kazakhstan (Letter 8 Feb. 1995)<sup>3</sup></b>  <i>“...The Chinese Government has unconditionally undertaken not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States or nuclear-weapon-free zones. This long-standing principled position also applies to Kazakhstan...”</i></p>	<p><i>against the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone nor test nuclear weapons in this region...However, the Chinese Government reserves its right to reconsider these obligations if other nuclear weapon States or the contracting parties to the Treaty take any action in gross violation of the Treaty and its attached Protocols, thus changing the status of the nuclear free zone and endangering the security interests of China.”).</i></p> <p><b>Bangkok Treaty:</b> <i>““Each State Party undertakes not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against any State Party to the Treaty. It further undertakes not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons within the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone.”</i> Not signed.</p> <p><b>Pelindaba Treaty:</b> <i>“Each Protocol Party undertakes not to contribute to any act that constitutes a violation of the Treaty or of this Protocol.”</i> Ratified: 10 Oct. 1997.</p> <p><b>Semipalatinsk Treaty:</b> <i>“Each Party undertakes not to use or threaten to use a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device against any Party to the Treaty on a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia...”</i> Ratified: 17 Aug. 2015.</p>	
FRANCE	<p><b>(Document S/1995/264 – 6 April 1995)</b>  <i>“France reaffirms that it will not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the [NPT], except in the case of an invasion or any other attack on France, its territory, its armed forces or other troops, or against its allies or a State towards which it has a security commitment, carried out or sustained by such a State in alliance or association with a nuclear-weapon State”.</i></p> <p><b>Assurance to Ukraine (5 Dec. 1994)<sup>5</sup></b>  <i>“France reaffirms towards Ukraine, as a non-nuclear state party to the NPT, its declaration made towards non-nuclear weapon states that are committed to</i></p>	<p><b>Tlateloclo Treaty:</b> <i>“[The Parties] undertake not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the Contracting Parties.”</i> Ratified: 22 Mar. 1974 (Statement: “[France] interprets [this] undertaking... as being without prejudice to the full exercise of the right of self-defence confirmed by Article 51 of the Charter of the [UN]....”).</p> <p><b>Rarotonga Treaty:</b> <i>“[Each Party] undertakes not to use or threaten to use any nuclear explosive device against: (a) Parties to the Treaty; or (b) any territory within the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone for which a State that has become a Party to Protocol 1 is internationally responsible.”</i> Ratified: 20 Sep. 1996 (Statement: “... [this] commitment... amounts to the negative security</p>	<p><b>Joint Declaration on Mongolia’s Status as a Nuclear-weapon Free Zone (20 Sep. 2012)<sup>8</sup></b>  <i>[The P5] “reaffirm, in the case of Mongolia, their respective unilateral negative security assurances as stated in their declarations issued on 5 and 6 April 1995, and referred to in Security Council resolution 984 (1995) of 11 April 1995, or as subsequently updated.”</i></p>

	<p><i>remain so not to use nuclear weapons against them except in the case of an aggression conducted in association or in alliance with one or several nuclear-weapon state(s) against France or a state with which it has a security arrangement.”</i></p> <p><b>(Speech by President François Hollande, 19 February 2015)<sup>6</sup></b>  <i>“France will not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states parties to the [NPT] which comply with their international non-proliferation commitments in terms of weapons of mass destruction.”</i></p> <p><b>(2017 Defence and National Security Strategic Review)<sup>7</sup></b>  <i>“Nuclear deterrence remains the cornerstone of [France’s] defence strategy. It protects [it] from any aggression against [its] vital interests emanating from a state, wherever it may come from and whatever form it may take.”</i></p>	<p><i>assurances given by France to non-nuclear-weapon States which are parties to the [NPT] such as they were... referred to by resolution 984 of the [UNSC]. These assurances shall not apply to States which are not parties to the [NPT].”</i>)</p> <p><b>Bangkok Treaty:</b> <i>““Each State Party undertakes not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against any State Party to the Treaty. It further undertakes not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons within the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone.”</i> Not signed.</p> <p><b>Pelindaba Treaty:</b> <i>“Each Protocol Party undertakes not to contribute to any act that constitutes a violation of the Treaty or of this Protocol.”</i> Ratified: 20 Sep. 1996 (Statement: <i>“... [this] commitment... amounts to the negative security assurances given by France to non-nuclear-weapon States which are parties to the [NPT] such as they were... referred to by resolution 984 of the [UNSC]. These assurances shall not apply to States which are not parties to the [NPT].”</i>)</p> <p><b>Semipalatinsk Treaty:</b> <i>“Each Party undertakes not to use or threaten to use a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device against any Party to the Treaty on a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia...”</i>. Ratified 17 Nov. 2014 (Statement: <i>“... [this] commitment... amounts to the negative security assurances given by France to non-nuclear-weapon States which are parties to the [NPT] such as they were... referred to by resolution 984 of the [UNSC]. These assurances shall not apply to States which are not parties to the [NPT].”</i>)</p>	
<p><b>USSR / RUSSIAN FEDERATION</b></p>	<p><b>(Document S/1995/261 – 6 April 1995)</b>  <i>“[The] Russian Federation will not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the [NPT], except in the case of an invasion or any other attack on the Russian Federation, its territory, its armed forces or other troops, its allies or on a State towards which it has</i></p>	<p><b>Tlateloclo Treaty:</b> <i>“[The Parties] undertake not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the Contracting Parties.”</i> Ratified: 8 Jan. 1979 (Statement: <i>“Any action taken by one or more States parties to the Treaty... that is incompatible with its non-nuclear status, and the commission by one or more States parties to the Treaty</i></p>	<p><b>Budapest Memorandum (5 Dec. 1994)</b>  <i>“...the Russian Federation... reaffirm[s], in the case of [Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan] [its] commitment not to use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,</i></p>

	<p><i>a security commitment, carried out or sustained by such a non-nuclear-weapon State in association or alliance with a nuclear-weapon State”.</i></p> <p><b>(2010 and 2014 Military Doctrine)</b><sup>9 10</sup>  <i>“The Russian Federation reserves the right to utilize nuclear weapons in response to the utilization of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction against it and (or) its allies, and also in the event of aggression against the Russian Federation involving the use of conventional weapons when the very existence of the state is under threat.”</i></p>	<p><i>of an act of aggression in support of a nuclear-weapon State or jointly with that State, will be considered by the Soviet Union as incompatible with the relevant obligations of those countries under the Treaty. In such cases the Soviet Union reserves the right to review its obligations...”</i>).</p> <p><b>Rarotonga Treaty:</b> <i>“[Each Party] undertakes not to use or threaten to use any nuclear explosive device against: (a) Parties to the Treaty; or (b) any territory within the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone for which a State that has become a Party to Protocol 1 is internationally responsible.”</i> Ratified: 21 Apr. 1988 (Statement: <i>“...“In the event of any actions undertaken by the state or states, which are parties to the... Treaty, in violation of their main commitments under the Treaty connected with the non-nuclear status of the zone and perpetration by one or several states parties to the Treaty of an act of aggression with the support of a state having nuclear weapons or jointly with it with the use by such a state of the territory, air space, territorial sea or archipelago waters of those countries for calls by naval ships and flying vehicles with nuclear weapons on board or transit of nuclear weapons, the Soviet Union will have the right to consider itself free from the commitments undertaken...”</i>).</p> <p><b>Bangkok Treaty:</b> <i>““Each State Party undertakes not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against any State Party to the Treaty. It further undertakes not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons within the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone.”</i> Not signed.</p> <p><b>Pelindaba Treaty:</b> <i>“Each Protocol Party undertakes not to contribute to any act that constitutes a violation of the Treaty or of this Protocol.”</i> Ratified: 5 Apr. 2011 (Statement: <i>“[Russia] will not consider itself legally bound under [this] Article... in case of an aggression against the Russian Federation, the Armed Forces of</i></p>	<p><i>except in the case of an attack on [itself], [its] territories or dependent territories, [its] armed forces, or [its] allies, by such a state in association or alliance with a nuclear-weapon state.”</i></p> <p><b>Joint Declaration on Mongolia’s Status as a Nuclear-weapon Free Zone (20 Sep. 2012)</b><sup>11</sup>  <i>[The P5] “reaffirm, in the case of Mongolia, their respective unilateral negative security assurances as stated in their declarations issued on 5 and 6 April 1995, and referred to in Security Council resolution 984 (1995) of 11 April 1995, or as subsequently updated.”</i></p>
--	---	---	--

		<p><i>[Russia] or its other forces, against its allies or a state it is bound with by security obligations, when such an aggression is made or assisted by a non-nuclear state jointly with a nuclear state, or if the non-nuclear state is under interallied obligations to the nuclear state...”).</i></p> <p><b>Semipalatinsk Treaty:</b> <i>“Each Party undertakes not to use or threaten to use a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device against any Party to the Treaty on a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia...”</i> Ratified 22 Jun. 2015.</p>	
<p><b>UNITED KINGDOM</b></p>	<p><b>(Document S/1995/262 – 6 April 1995)</b>  <i>“The United Kingdom will not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the [NPT] except in the case of an invasion or any other attack on the United Kingdom, its dependent territories, its armed forces or other troops, its allies or on a State towards which it has a security commitment, carried out or sustained by such a non-nuclear-weapon State in association or alliance with a nuclear-weapon State. In giving this assurance the United Kingdom emphasises the need not only for universal adherence to, but also for compliance with, the [NPT]. In this context I wish to make clear that Her Majesty’s Government does not regard its assurance as applicable if any beneficiary is in material breach of its own non-proliferation obligations under the [NPT]”.</i></p> <p><b>(National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015)<sup>12</sup></b>  <i>“The UK will not use, or threaten to use, nuclear weapons against any Non-Nuclear Weapons State party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). This assurance does not apply to any state in material breach of those non-proliferation obligations. While there is currently no direct threat to the UK or its vital interests from states developing weapons of mass destruction, such as chemical and</i></p>	<p><b>Tlatelolco Treaty:</b> <i>“[The Parties] undertake not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the Contracting Parties.”</i> Ratified: 11 Dec. 1969 (Statement: <i>“The [UK is] prepared to regard [the] undertaking... not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the Contracting Parties to the Treaty as extending not only to those Parties but also to territories in respect of which the undertaking to apply the statute of denuclearisation, in accordance with Article I of Additional Protocol I, becomes effective.”</i>)</p> <p><b>Rarotonga Treaty:</b> <i>“[Each Party] undertakes not to use or threaten to use any nuclear explosive device against: (a) Parties to the Treaty; or (b) any territory within the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone for which a State that has become a Party to Protocol 1 is internationally responsible.”</i> Ratified: 19 Sep. 1997 (Statement: <i>“The [UK] will not be bound by [this] undertaking... a) in the case of an invasion or any other attack on the [UK], its dependent territories, its armed forces or other troops, its allies or a State towards which it has a security commitment, carried out or sustained by a party to the Treaty in association or alliance with a nuclear-weapon State; or b) if any party to the Treaty is in material breach of its own non-proliferation obligations under the Treaty.”</i>).</p>	<p><b>Budapest Memorandum (5 Dec. 1994)</b>  <i>“...the [UK]... reaffirm[s], in the case of the reaffirm[s], in the case of [Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan] [its] commitment not to use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, except in the case of an attack on [itself], [its] territories or dependent territories, [its] armed forces, or [its] allies, by such a state in association or alliance with a nuclear-weapon state.”</i></p> <p><b>Joint Declaration on Mongolia’s Status as a Nuclear-weapon Free Zone (20 Sep. 2012)<sup>13</sup></b>  <i>[The P5] “reaffirm, in the case of Mongolia, their respective unilateral negative security assurances as stated in their declarations issued on 5 and 6 April 1995, and referred to in Security Council resolution 984 (1995) of 11 April 1995, or as subsequently updated.”</i></p>

	<p><i>biological capabilities, we reserve the right to review this assurance if the future threat, development or proliferation of these weapons make it necessary”.</i></p>	<p><b>Bangkok Treaty:</b> <i>“Each State Party undertakes not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against any State Party to the Treaty. It further undertakes not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons within the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone.”</i> Not signed.</p> <p><b>Pelindaba Treaty:</b> <i>“Each Protocol Party undertakes not to contribute to any act that constitutes a violation of the Treaty or of this Protocol.”</i> Ratified: 12 Mar. 2001 (Statement: <i>"The [UK] will not be bound by [the] undertaking under [this] Article... i) in the case of an invasion or any other attack on the [UK], its dependent territories, its armed forces or other troops, its allies or a State towards which it has a security commitment, carried out or sustained by a Party to the Treaty in association or alliance with a nuclear-weapon State. or, ii) if any party to the Treaty is in material breach of its own non-proliferation obligations under the Treaty”</i>).</p> <p><b>Semipalatinsk Treaty:</b> <i>“Each Party undertakes not to use or threaten to use a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device against any Party to the Treaty on a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia...”</i> Ratified 30 Jan. 2015 (Statement: <i>“The [UK] will not be bound by its undertaking under [this] Article if any Party to the Treaty is in material breach of its own non-proliferation obligations under the Treaty. In this context the [UK] consider that the Treaty, including its Article 12, prohibits those actions described in its Articles 3 and 5... The [UK] note that while there is no direct threat to the [UK] or its vital interests from States developing capabilities in other weapons of mass destruction, for example chemical and biological, [it] reserve[s] the right to review [its] undertaking under [this] Article... if the future threat, development and proliferation of these weapons make it necessary”</i>).</p>	
--	--	--	--

<p><b>UNITED STATES</b></p>	<p><b>(Document S/1995/263 – 6 April 1995)</b>  <i>The United States reaffirms that it will not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the [NPT] except in the case of an invasion or any other attack on the United States, its territories, its armed forces or other troops, its allies, or on a State towards which it has a security commitment, carried out or sustained by such a non-nuclear-weapon State in association or alliance with a nuclear-weapon State.</i></p> <p><b>(Nuclear Posture Review, February 2018)<sup>14</sup></b>  <i>“The United States will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states that are party to the NPT and in compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations. Given the potential of significant non-nuclear strategic attacks, the United States reserves the right to make any adjustment in the assurance that may be warranted by the evolution and proliferation of non-nuclear strategic attack technologies and U.S. capabilities to counter that threat. . . [S]ignificant non-nuclear strategic attacks include, but are not limited to, attacks on the US, allied, or partner civilian population or infrastructure.”</i></p>	<p><b>Tlatelolco Treaty:</b> <i>“[The Parties] undertake not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the Contracting Parties.”</i> Ratified: 12 May 1971 (Statement: <i>“As regards the undertaking... not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the Contracting Parties, the [US] would have to consider that an armed attack by a Contracting Party, in which it was assisted by a nuclear-weapon State, would be incompatible with the Contracting Party's corresponding obligations under Article 1 of the Treaty”</i>).</p> <p><b>Rarotonga Treaty:</b> <i>“[Each Party] undertakes not to use or threaten to use any nuclear explosive device against: (a) Parties to the Treaty; or (b) any territory within the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone for which a State that has become a Party to Protocol 1 is internationally responsible.”</i> Signed: 25 Mar. 1996, not ratified.</p> <p><b>Bangkok Treaty:</b> <i>““Each State Party undertakes not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against any State Party to the Treaty. It further undertakes not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons within the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone.”</i> Not signed.</p> <p><b>Pelindaba Treaty:</b> <i>“Each Protocol Party undertakes not to contribute to any act that constitutes a violation of the Treaty or of this Protocol.”</i> Signed: 11 Apr. 1996, not ratified.</p> <p><b>Semipalatinsk Treaty:</b> <i>“Each Party undertakes not to use or threaten to use a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device against any Party to the Treaty on a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia...”</i> Signed: 6 May 2014, not ratified.</p>	<p><b>Budapest Memorandum (5 Dec. 1994)</b>  <i>“...the [US]... reaffirm[s], in the case of the reaffirm[s], in the case of [Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan] [its] commitment not to use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, except in the case of an attack on [itself], [its] territories or dependent territories, [its] armed forces, or [its] allies, by such a state in association or alliance with a nuclear-weapon state.”</i></p> <p><b>Joint Declaration on Mongolia’s Status as a Nuclear-weapon Free Zone (20 Sep. 2012)<sup>15</sup></b>  <i>[The P5] “reaffirm, in the case of Mongolia, their respective unilateral negative security assurances as stated in their declarations issued on 5 and 6 April 1995, and referred to in Security Council resolution 984 (1995) of 11 April 1995, or as subsequently updated.”</i></p>
-----------------------------	--	---	---

## II. STATES NOT PARTY TO THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY (NPT)

State	Unilateral Declarations
<b>DPRK</b>	<p>(Press Release by the DPRK Government, 6 Jan. 2016)<sup>16</sup>  <i>"The DPRK, a responsible nuclear weapon state, will neither be the first to use nuclear weapons nor transfer relevant means and technology under any circumstances as already declared as long as the hostile forces for aggression do not encroach upon its sovereignty."</i></p> <p>(Speech by Kim Jung-un to the Workers' Party Congress, 7 May 2016)<sup>17</sup>  <i>"Our republic is a responsible nuclear state that, as we made clear before, will not use nuclear weapons first unless aggressive hostile forces use nuclear weapons to invade on our sovereignty."</i></p>
<b>INDIA</b>	<p>(Cabinet Committee on Security Review of Nuclear Doctrine, 4 Jan. 2003)<sup>18</sup>  <i>"India's nuclear doctrine can be summarized as follows: 1) Building and maintaining a credible minimum deterrent; 2) A posture of "No First Use": nuclear weapons will only be used in retaliation against a nuclear attack on Indian territory or on Indian forces anywhere; 3) Nuclear retaliation to a first strike will be massive and designed to inflict unacceptable damage. 4) Nuclear retaliatory attacks can only be authorised by the civilian political leadership through the Nuclear Command Authority. 5) Non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states. 6) However, in the event of a major attack against India, or Indian forces anywhere, by biological or chemical weapons, India will retain the option of retaliating with nuclear weapons. . ."</i></p> <p>(Statement to the Conference on Disarmament, 7 May 2015)<sup>19</sup>  <i>"As part of our doctrine of credible minimum nuclear deterrence, India has espoused the policy of 'No First Use' against nuclear weapon states and non-use against non-nuclear weapon states. We are prepared to convert these undertakings into multilateral legal arrangements."</i></p>
<b>ISRAEL</b>	[Israel does not express public positions on this issue and abstains on the UNGA resolution calling for an international arrangement on NSAs]
<b>PAKISTAN</b>	<p>(Statement to the Conference on Disarmament, 28 June 2017)<sup>20</sup>  <i>"As a responsible nuclear-weapon state, Pakistan has given the unilateral unconditional pledge not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against any state not possessing nuclear weapons, and we are ready to transform this pledge into a multilateral, legally binding international instrument."</i></p>

<sup>1</sup> Mr Marc Finaud, Senior Programme Advisor, Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP), and Dr John Borrie, Chief of Research, United Nations Institute on Disarmament Research (UNIDIR).

<sup>2</sup> United Nations, General Assembly, Document A/49/783, 11 Dec. 1994 (<http://undocs.org/A/49/783>).

<sup>3</sup> United Nations, General Assembly, Document A/50/86, 28 Feb. 1995 ([http://www.un.org/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=A%2F50%2F86&Submit=Search&Lang=E](http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A%2F50%2F86&Submit=Search&Lang=E)).

<sup>4</sup> United Nations, Letter dated 20 September 2012 of the Permanent Representative of France, the People's Republic of China, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America addressed to the Secretary-General, Document A/67/393-/2012/721, 20 Sep. 2012, [http://repository.un.org/bitstream/handle/11176/17552/A\\_67\\_393%3bS\\_2012\\_721-EN.pdf?sequence=24&isAllowed=y](http://repository.un.org/bitstream/handle/11176/17552/A_67_393%3bS_2012_721-EN.pdf?sequence=24&isAllowed=y).

<sup>5</sup> ExportLaw Blog, "Security Assurances" ([https://www.exportlawblog.com/docs/security\\_assurances.pdf](https://www.exportlawblog.com/docs/security_assurances.pdf)).

<sup>6</sup> French Embassy to the United Kingdom, "France Will Not Lower Its Nuclear Guard, Vows President," 2 March 2015, <http://www.ambafrance-uk.org/France-will-not-lower-its-nuclear>.

- 
- <sup>7</sup> French Government, “Defence and National Security Strategic Review 2017”, <https://www.defense.gouv.fr/layout/set/popup/content/download/520198/8733095/version/2/file/DEFENCE+AND+NATIONAL+SECURITY+STRATEGIC+REVIEW+2017.pdf>.
- <sup>8</sup> United Nations, Letter dated 20 September 2012 of the Permanent Representative of France, the People's Republic of China, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America addressed to the Secretary-General, Document A /67/393-/2012/721, 20 Sep. 2012, [http://repository.un.org/bitstream/handle/11176/17552/A\\_67\\_393%3bS\\_2012\\_721-EN.pdf?sequence=24&isAllowed=y](http://repository.un.org/bitstream/handle/11176/17552/A_67_393%3bS_2012_721-EN.pdf?sequence=24&isAllowed=y).
- <sup>9</sup> Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “Russia’s Military Doctrine”, 2010 ([http://carnegieendowment.org/files/2010russia\\_military\\_doctrine.pdf](http://carnegieendowment.org/files/2010russia_military_doctrine.pdf)).
- <sup>10</sup> Russian Embassy in London, “The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation”, <https://rusemb.org.uk/press/2029>
- <sup>11</sup> United Nations, Letter dated 20 September 2012 of the Permanent Representative of France, the People's Republic of China, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America addressed to the Secretary-General, Document A /67/393-/2012/721, 20 Sep. 2012, [http://repository.un.org/bitstream/handle/11176/17552/A\\_67\\_393%3bS\\_2012\\_721-EN.pdf?sequence=24&isAllowed=y](http://repository.un.org/bitstream/handle/11176/17552/A_67_393%3bS_2012_721-EN.pdf?sequence=24&isAllowed=y).
- <sup>12</sup> UK Government, “National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015,” Cm 9161, November 2015 ([www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\\_data/file/555607/2015\\_Strategic\\_Defence\\_and\\_Security\\_Review.pdf](http://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/555607/2015_Strategic_Defence_and_Security_Review.pdf)).
- <sup>13</sup> United Nations, Letter dated 20 September 2012 of the Permanent Representative of France, the People's Republic of China, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America addressed to the Secretary-General, Document A /67/393-/2012/721, 20 Sep. 2012, [http://repository.un.org/bitstream/handle/11176/17552/A\\_67\\_393%3bS\\_2012\\_721-EN.pdf?sequence=24&isAllowed=y](http://repository.un.org/bitstream/handle/11176/17552/A_67_393%3bS_2012_721-EN.pdf?sequence=24&isAllowed=y).
- <sup>14</sup> US Department of Defense, “Nuclear Posture Review 2018” (<https://media.defense.gov/2018/Feb/02/2001872886/-1/-1/1/2018-NUCLEAR-POSTURE-REVIEW-FINAL-REPORT.PDF>).
- <sup>15</sup> United Nations, Letter dated 20 September 2012 of the Permanent Representative of France, the People's Republic of China, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America addressed to the Secretary-General, Document A /67/393-/2012/721, 20 Sep. 2012, [http://repository.un.org/bitstream/handle/11176/17552/A\\_67\\_393%3bS\\_2012\\_721-EN.pdf?sequence=24&isAllowed=y](http://repository.un.org/bitstream/handle/11176/17552/A_67_393%3bS_2012_721-EN.pdf?sequence=24&isAllowed=y).
- <sup>16</sup> Lizzie Dearden, “North Korea announces 'successful hydrogen bomb test' as UN Security Council calls emergency meeting”, *The Independent*, 6 Jan. 2016.
- <sup>17</sup> Eric Tarmadge, “North Korea will not use its nuclear weapons first, Kim Jong-un tells Congress”, *The Independent*, 8 May 2016.
- <sup>18</sup> Indian Ministry of External Affairs, ‘The Cabinet Committee on Security reviews operationalization of India’s nuclear doctrine’, 4 Jan. 2003 ([http://mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/20131/The\\_Cabinet\\_Committee\\_on\\_Security\\_Reviews\\_perationalization\\_of\\_Indias\\_Nuclear\\_Doctrine+Report+of+National+Security+Advisory+Board+on+Indian+Nuclear+Doctrine](http://mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/20131/The_Cabinet_Committee_on_Security_Reviews_perationalization_of_Indias_Nuclear_Doctrine+Report+of+National+Security+Advisory+Board+on+Indian+Nuclear+Doctrine)).
- <sup>19</sup> Delegation of India to the Conference on Disarmament, “Statement on Negative Security Assurances by Ambassador DB Venkatesh Varma, Permanent Representative of India to the CD, in the CD Plenary”, 7 May 2015 (<http://meaindia.nic.in/cdgeneva/?3910?000>).
- <sup>20</sup> Delegation of Pakistan to the Conference on Disarmament, “Working Group on the Way Ahead, Negative Security Assurances, 28 June 2017” (<http://pakistanmission-un.org/?p=1851>).